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Contesting Austerity: A Comparative Approach to the Cycles of Protest in Portugal and 
Spain under the Great Recession (2008-2015) 
This dissertation compares the contentious responses to austerity in Portugal and Spain in the 
context of the Eurozone crisis and the Great Recession between 2008 and 2015. Despite many 
similarities in the origins and socio-economic effects of the crisis, the dynamics of contention 
in each country differed in terms of number, rhythm and actors. While Portugal and Spain 
experienced parallel protest dynamics until 2011, after that point the former falls into a pattern 
of “stop-and-go” with sporadic large events by social movements. In contrast, in Spain 
mobilisation and confrontation levels rose into a sustained wave that lasted until late 2013 and 
leading to the emergence of new political parties.  
 The dissertation aims at explaining these different trajectories and outcomes arguing 
that they are connected to the nature and configurations of the actors in the process, which 
come to shape the kinds and forms of claim-making involved. Rather than focusing solely on 
social movements, the dissertation looks at a plurality of actors and claims. Following a cycle-
based approach, the focus of the analysis falls on the relations between institutional and non-
institutional actors in reshaping the political sphere in each country.  
 The research design is based on process tracing and paired comparison, combining a 
protest event analysis with interviews. Analytically, I consider the following dimensions: time 
and space, actors, networks and alliances; organization, repertoires and strategies; claims and 
frameworks. 
 The empirical chapters reveal contrasting dynamics at work in each country. In 
Portugal, even if social movements emerged, austerity was mainly challenged within the 
borders of the existing institutional framework, both through the control of protest movements 
by parties and trade unions and through an internal recomposition of the left leading to a new 
system of alliances. Rather than a disruptive discourse, the dominant actors wanted to conserve 
the status-quo of the welfare state in Portugal against austerity. In Spain, social movements 
developed as a disruptive force that questioned both austerity and political institutions. 
Relatively stronger and autonomous than in Portugal, the Spanish movements were able to 
collaborate on a more equal footing with institutional actors, constituting overlapping protest 
dynamics that sustained mobilisation. In contrast to Portugal, this resulted in a variety of 
discourses and conceptions of citizenship expressing the different interests in the field.  
 This dissertation shows that cycles of contention are shaped by the way the contentious 
field is organized and that the types of relations between institutional and non-institutional 
actors play a fundamental role in the way such cycles unfold. 
 
        Tiago Miguel Lopes Carvalho 
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Electioneering 
 
I will stop 
I will stop at nothing 
Say the right things 
When electioneering 
I trust I can rely on your vote 
 
When I go forwards you go backwards and somewhere we will meet 
 
Riot shields 
Voodoo economics 
It's just business 
Cattle prods and the IMF 
I trust I can rely on your vote 
 
 
 
Radiohead, Ok, Computer, 1997 
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1. Introduction 
 The shape of the future will depend not on how violent or widespread contention has become, but on 
how it relates to states, capitalism and the international system. 
Tarrow, 2011, p. 37 
 
This dissertation compares the contentious responses to the implementation of austerity and 
market liberalisation in Portugal and Spain in the context of the Great Recession between 2008 
and 2015. Taking each country as a context for an episode of contention, it analyses the 
relations between different sets of actors, their evolution over time, and their political 
outcomes.  
This study has three guiding questions. What were the contentious responses to 
austerity in Portugal and Spain between 2008 and 2015? Why did these contentious responses 
to austerity and their political outcomes differ? More specifically, what is the process that leads 
to the emergence of a new political subject such as Podemos in Spain and a reconfiguration of 
the party alliances in the Portuguese case? 
These cases are situated at the intersection of the transnational and cross-country waves 
of contention that swept the world after the 2007/8 financial collapse. From the Arab Spring to 
Occupy, to the emergence of populist political parties, both on the left and on the right, this 
wave of contention has introduced new political dynamics. Despite the apparent novelty of this 
wave of contention over the last 40 years, there have been similar processes in other parts of 
the world. Published in 1997, the lyrics in the epigraph remark a specific political situation 
involving the interrelation between institutional politics and protests against internationally-
led austerity measures (Riot shields/ Voodoo economics/ It’s just business/ Cattle prods and 
the IMF). The structural adjustment programmes implemented by the IMF around the world 
since the 1980s seem to have produced similar political backlashes to austerity, provoking a 
crisis of legitimacy, intense protest waves, and populism (Roberts, 2012). The Eurozone crisis 
should be seen, to a certain extent, as part of this broader historical dynamic, which can be 
traced to the shift from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism, producing political changes at 
both the national and the global level. 
In this scenario the cases of Portugal and Spain present divergent outcomes regarding 
both the nature and intensity of protest and the reconfiguration of the party-system, a focus on 
which should help us to understand that the so-called anti-austerity protests cannot be treated 
as a single phenomenon despite their commonalities and linkages. When observing the political 
consequences of the Great Recession and austerity, we find different protest responses and 
13 
 
outcomes in Portugal and Spain. One might expect the similar historical backgrounds of these 
countries – both semi-peripheral European countries who underwent a rapid socio-economic 
transformation in the second half of the twentieth century, and a transition to democracy 
followed by integration into European institutions from the 1970s – to produce similar 
outcomes. Arguably, even if in a broader macro-historical perspective, a certain parallel can 
still be observed, since both have gone through a crisis embedded in European dynamics, an 
in-depth analysis of the anti-austerity cycle reveals different trajectories. As I will show in the 
empirical chapters of this thesis, the shape of the cycle of protest was different in each case, 
and the lack of successful new political parties in Portugal contrasts with the plurality of 
electoral actors that emerged in Spain. 
Following a contentious politics approach, I will argue that the grievances stemming 
from increasing deprivation and inequalities can only partially account for some aspects of 
protest as the type of grievance alone cannot explain the different nature and trajectory of 
protest seen in these two countries. Instead, to understand these, it is necessary to focus on 
“variations in political structure and in the workings of the political process” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 
26). Accordingly, rather than analysing fixed structural and cultural arrangements, this 
dissertation will “examine the relational dynamics of complex episodes of contention” 
(Tarrow, 2015, p. 99) and their outcomes. I will examine the cycle in a processual and relational 
way, highlighting how the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors worked 
to reshape the political sphere. Thus, the main focus of this dissertation is an examination of 
contentious responses to the crisis within specific national contexts. 
In this introduction, my objective is to delimit the scope and specify the objectives of 
this dissertation by clarifying its research questions and outlining its overarching structure. 
Furthermore, my aim is to contextualise and explore the nature and consequences, both 
economic and political, of the Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis, and particularly in the 
Southern European Countries. This will lay the groundwork for a review of the relevant 
research literature, and an introduction to the chapters to come.  
 
1.1. Great Recession, European Crisis, and Democratic Capitalism 
Let us begin with a contextualization of the crisis in Europe, which is necessary for 
understanding the source of the contentious responses and political transformations that will 
constitute this dissertation’s central subject. Such contextualization requires situating the crisis 
in a broader economic shift that has been taking place since the 1970s. In this section, I will 
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argue that austerity measures are best understood as sharing similar processes of market 
liberalisation, external intervention and structural reform – which go on to  generate 
contentious responses and political change, as seen, for example, in Latin America (Almeida, 
2007; Roberts, 2008, 2012, 2017). This paradigm shift in political-economic policy has taken 
place not only because of the growing importance of International Financial Institutions, but 
also because of the influence of ideas closely related to those of the Washington consensus1 
and neoliberalism (understood here simply as policies that intend to diminish the role of states 
and boost the role of markets), where  debt crises played an important role in transforming 
policy architectures (Babb & Kentikelenis, 2016; Hall, 2012; Kentikelenis, Stubbs, & King, 
2016). 
Emerging in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, and rapidly expanding 
to other sectors of the economy, the Great Recession is considered, within much of the literature 
on political economy, as a consequence of broader historical dynamics affecting the nature of 
democratic capitalism since the 1970s.  From this perspective, two major topics frame the 
discussion: on the one hand, the changing relationship between political and economic 
institutions over the last 40 years, and, on the other, the implications this carries for the 
Eurozone, which has prompted an analysis of the structural imbalances inside the Eurozone, 
the sovereign debt crisis and the impacts of these on political institutions. 
On this view, the current crisis is connected to a gradual shift from embedded liberalism 
to neoliberal policies from the 1970s onwards (Anderson, 2000; Mann, 2013; Streeck, 2012, 
2013). Accordingly, various authors claim that there is a tension between capitalism and 
democracy, very much exacerbated in the neoliberal period (Barber, 2000; Fitoussi & 
Saraceno, 2013; Mann, 2013; Offe, 2013a; Streeck, 2012). Since the 1970s, several significant 
trends are observable, such as the retrenchment of the welfare state, the rise of unregulated 
financial markets, and rising inequalities. This ‘triple crisis’ of banks, public finance and the 
‘real’ economy is the result of the financial expansion of unregulated shadow banks, global 
imbalances and the private debt produced by privatised Keynesianism: stagnant real wages 
leading to dependence on credit for consumption as a means to retain living standards in a 
period of welfare retrenchment (Mann, 2013).  
In other words, as Streeck has observed, post-war democratic capitalism involves a 
tension between the interests of markets and voters:  
                                                          
1 Or in a different version the ‘Brussels-Washington consensus’ - this refers to a term coined in 1989 
that points out to a list of market liberalizing policies developed in this city. 
15 
 
“a tension that had been successively displaced by an unsustainable process of 
‘borrowing from the future’, decade by decade: from the inflation of the 1970s, through 
the public debt of the 1980s, to the private debt of 1990s and early 2000s, finally 
exploding with the financial crisis of 2008. Since then, the dialectic of democracy and 
capitalism has been unfolding at breathtaking speed” (Streeck, 2012, p. 64).  
As a result, market requirements make democratic institutions less responsive to their 
citizens as states have primarily to fulfil the desires of markets, which results in a limited view 
of citizenship, reduced to an elitist and electoral perspective, ignoring social rights (Della Porta 
et al., 2016; Roberts, 2008; Schäfer & Streeck, 2013). 
In recent years, in terms of policy, this tension has translated into what has been termed 
austerity. As Blyth (2015) shows, austerity is not a new phenomenon. It has had different 
manifestations throughout history, such as structural reforms, liquidation, and so forth. More 
than a precise concept, it is, in essence, a buzzword, or a discourse, used to disguise 
liberalisation and class politics under the veil of morality, simplicity and virtue (e.g. live within 
our means, compensate hard-working people, etc.) (Blyth, 2015). It is a discourse used to 
justify ‘TINA’: that there is no alternative to retrenchment and privatisation policies, which are 
viewed as a unique and mandatory solution in order to regain market trust (Reis, 2013). As a 
policy regime, then, austerity involves the reduction of the state’s budget, which entails a 
combination of welfare retrenchment, privatisation, a roll-back of universal social policies, and 
labour market protection. Austerity thus incorporates the ideas of extending market 
competition while limiting state activity, leading to such outcomes as diminishing labour costs 
and increasing capital accumulation. 
But austerity seems not only to have economic consequences, such as rising 
unemployment, low growth, and economic stagnation. It also has political ones: electoral 
volatility, resentment, and discontent, leading to protests against mainstream political parties 
and technocratic governments. As it derails social rights, it brings back the social question 
(Judt, 1997). Class politics reemerges, creating a crisis of legitimacy and the emergence of 
extra-institutional actors that contest these policies. It becomes visible in the progressive 
decrease in electoral turnout, rising political disaffection, detachment and the emergence of 
populist parties (Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2006; Schäfer & Streeck, 2013). Policies that are 
detrimental to most of the population result in growing inequality and tensions between the 
national and global arena, diminishing the capacity of those with fewer economic resources to 
make use of state power to implement change (Mann, 2013). Simultaneously, responses outside 
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the institutional sphere emerge in the form of alternative political movements and counter-
movements, with subsequent effects on the institutional sphere (Della Porta et al., 2016; Flesher 
Fominaya, 2017). 
The European financial crisis that emerged from 2009 is embedded within this 
paradigm shift and the resultant tensions described above.2 It is the most severe political and 
economic crisis since the creation of the EU and it questions both the nature and future of 
European integration. It is not a simple extension of the global financial crisis, even if it follows 
from it, but rather an unusual financial crisis that develops within a supranational monetary 
union among developed countries. 
The way the national crises evolved was deeply embedded in European dynamics. 
Three major phases can be identified, involving the interplay between markets, the EU 
institutions, and the countries’ responses, particularly of those most affected by the crisis.3 In 
the aftermath of the 2008 crash, the main measures of a first phase concerned the bailout of 
banks to protect the financial system. These expansionary policies were followed by a second 
phase of what has been called a brief neo-Keynesian moment at the inception of the crisis, that 
lasted until the beginning of 2010: EU countries were incentivized to pass expansionist policies 
that pushed for public investment to prevent recession (Copelovitch, Frieden, & Walter, 2016; 
Hall, 2012, 2014). 
 Nevertheless, at the end of 2009, the Greek debt crisis erupted. After the 2009 general 
elections, the new Greek government revealed that their budget deficit was higher than 
predicted. This third phase triggered a reorientation of policy at the European level and at the 
national level, as market pressures started to mount. As the risk of contagion increased, the 
weakest links of the Eurozone – Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland – shadowed by the EU, 
followed a “budget consolidation” strategy to reduce their debts and deficits to “gain market 
trust”. The austerity phase thus began (Reis, 2013), with these countries adopting programmes, 
either imposed or self-implemented, to pursue these objectives. 
                                                          
2 This dissertation is only a small part of a wider and as yet incomplete story, as the processes that I 
have sought to situate in this chapter are still unfolding. Over the last ten years, within the broader 
context of the 2008 financial crash, three different crises have pressured the European Union and that 
contribute to a great extent to its architecture: (1) the referendum of 2016 in the United Kingdom that 
is predicted to lead to the exit of the this member state from the EU; (2) the development of illiberal 
tendencies in multiple countries of the Eastern bloc; and (3)  the monetary crisis affecting the Southern 
European countries. In this context, and answering to these dynamics, a sort of new normal has emerged 
in the form of not only protests, but electoral volatility and new political parties that challenge the ways 
the EU is managed. 
3 See Appendix I for a full chronology of the events considered key in the literature for the development 
of the European Crisis. 
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Then, in 2010, two countries were bailed-out (i.e. being given an official credit line) 
under the auspices of the so-called Troika.4 The first bailout was granted to Greece in mid-
2010; after this came Ireland, at the end of the year. In 2011, Portugal would join the club. 
Finally, in 2012, Cyprus and Spain requested assistance for their banking systems. And 
although Italy was never officially under assistance, since it was deemed “too big to bail” 
(Perez & Matsaganis, 2018), the country undertook emergency measures driven by a 
technocratic government supported by a broad coalition.5 By 2013–14 a post-austerity phase 
began, with all the countries’ assistance programs coming to an end, and the re-start of 
economic growth, even whilst all the restrictions of the Eurozone were maintained. Within this 
story, Greece would continue to be the outlier; in 2012 it would receive a second bailout and 
haircut, and in 2015, after tense negotiations with the European institutions and a referendum 
led by SYRIZA, it would receive its third bailout. 
Almost all the costs of this crisis were imposed on individual countries. However, there 
were also measures taken at European level to facilitate the conditions under which the bailouts 
operated at the national level (even if these can be the subject of many criticisms for not being 
the best solution or for favouring particurlarly the financial sector). Most notably, this included 
the creation of the European Financial Stability facility (May 2010), the ECB’s decision to buy 
sovereign debt on secondary markets, the establishment of a permanent crisis resolution 
mechanism (December 2010) by the European Council, and the beginning of quantitative 
easing (January 2015). Most importantly, there was the declaration of the ECB president, Mario 
Draghi, in July 2012, that the ECB would do “whatever it takes to preserve the Euro”.  
Overall, the crisis in Europe was a result of a combination of imbalances within the 
currency area, allied to deficiencies in the design of the EMU that were known since its 
inception, such as: (1) macroeconomic divergence, resulting from imbalances between zones 
with different economic structures being an incentive for the cash-strapped half of the union to 
borrow from the other half, reinforcing differences; (2) lack of fiscal policy coordination; and 
                                                          
4 The Troika refers to the joint action decision group comprising the IMF, European Commission and 
the European Central Bank (ECB). 
5 It should be noted that a variety of bailouts and technocratic governments existed in each country. For 
instance, even whilst Portugal never had a technocratic government, the finance minister Vítor Gaspar 
(2011-2013) had no party affiliation and held credentials with several of the international institutions 
(today he holds a post in the IMF). In the same vein, in Spain the PP government elected in 2011 had 
Luís de Guindos, an independent, overseeing the treasury and economy. For about six months Greece 
had Lukas Papademos as prime minister leading an independent government with the parliamentary 
support of the major political parties in the country (November 2011 to May 2012): previously he had 
been vice president of the ECB. 
18 
 
(3) fragmented financial regulation (Copelovitch, Frieden, & Walter, 2016; Hall, 2012, 2014; 
Della Porta et al., 2016). 
Different forms of economic organisation stand out within the Eurozone, which would 
be reinforced by the common currency. If the northern countries have export-led economies, 
the southern ones have domestic demand-driven economies (Hall, 2014). Nevertheless, most 
of these countries, with the possible exception of Greece, displayed good economic 
performance indicators and reasonable budget deficits in the years preceding the crisis. Still, 
data show that the crisis and the consequent liberalisation measures taken under austerity came 
to reinforce a pre-existing liberalisation trend (e.g. levels of employment protection dropped 
more in these countries than in others). This crisis in Europe may therefore be said to have 
exposed the frailties and asymmetries within the Eurozone that were there from the beginning, 
especially trade deficits in the periphery and surpluses in the core. The asymmetric integration 
at the European level led to continuous trade deficits in the south and after that to debt. What 
the affected countries, that is, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Ireland had in common before 
the crisis was their growing trade deficits, not public sector debts (Blankenburg, King, 
Konzelmann, & Wilkinson, 2013; Reis & Rodrigues, 2012). The fiscal imbalance was thus a 
symptom, not a cause, of the crisis. 
In sum, an economic crisis with weak and uncoordinated responses led to a political 
crisis, one that is, as many argue, multidimensional (Wieviorka, 2012). This is not only because 
the institutional responses were political, but also because they generated contentious responses 
that need to be considered. In Della Porta’s (Della Porta et al., 2016) view, rather than a typical 
crisis of scarcity or inflation, it was a crisis of redistribution, featuring state retreat from social 
service provision and the erosion of social rights, leading to an undermining of consent, with 
concomitant declines in the levels of trust in institutions. Sánchez-Cuenca (2014b) called this 
a top-down approach, whereby non-elected institutions imposed economic policies on national 
governments – in his terms, an expression of “powerlessness democracy”.6 Rather than an 
institutional crisis at the national level, per se, we are looking at the incapacity of the political 
system to answer the international pressures and constraints posed by non-elected technocratic 
institutions. This implicated different but interconnected analytical levels, such as the national 
context and broader European dynamics. 
Offe (2013b) identified a spectrum of reactions to the crisis, entailing both protests and 
changes in the party system. On the one hand, there was a collapse of the party system and a 
                                                          
6 Translation of Impotencia Democrática. 
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reinforcement of both the far-right and far-left. On the other hand, there was an emergence of 
protest movements alongside “ephemeral eruptions of mass violence” among the excluded. 
Nonetheless, rather than viewing these reactions in isolation, I will suggest later that they 
should be interpreted as part of a longer contentious process, taking into account the interaction 
between institutional and non-institutional actors. 
Even if research reveals similar patterns of political change and reaction, more 
scholarship is needed to understand the nature of the overall processes of contention. Were 
these transformations solely the result of the Great Recession, or do institutions in each country 
mediate this process? And if so, how? In the next section, the Southern European countries 
(SEC) will be analyzed closely. 
 
1.2. Austerity in Southern European 
As seen in the previous section, the Eurozone crisis affected mostly the Southern European 
Countries (SEC) and Ireland. Nevertheless, the impact was different because, despite economic 
resemblances, the political institutions, civil societies, and history of each country diverges. 
As Malefakis (1992; 1995) observes, the SEC were noticed by the scientific community 
because of their common path towards modernisation and democratic politics since about the 
1970s. The SEC can be conceived mainly as a sociopolitical and historical entity, due to the 
remarkable historical parallelisms between the countries, which came to spur a specific field 
of study during the 1980s. As a semiperiphery (Arrighi, 1985), the SEC are distinguishable 
from other European peripheries, like the Eastern countries, due to their social and economic 
heterogeneity, rather than ethnic and linguistic conflicts, with only Spain displaying such 
conflicts (Miley, 2013, 2014). The SEC combined a mix of rural, urban and industrial classes 
until the 1970s following the emergence of democratic regimes and the welfare state, after 
which education levels rose, and the class structure changed: while the rural classes declined, 
professionals and employees grew with the importance of the service sector and the welfare 
state. Even so, previous social dualities did not vanish; instead, they were transformed: though 
a change can be perceived, these continue to be the most unequal countries in Europe (Carmo, 
2010). 
The transition to democracy, in the mid-1970s, is considered for Portugal, Spain and 
Greece to be a turning point (Fishman, 1990; Gunther, Diamandouros, & Sotiropoulos, 2006). 
Gunther, Diamondourous and Sotiropoulos (2006) argue that democratisation, socioeconomic 
modernisation, and Europeanisation led these countries to approximate more closely Western 
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politics and social patterns – a certain leapfrogging occurred, both in economics and politics. 
Despite convergence with the centre, European integration nevertheless led to an asymmetric 
modernisation, due to the specificity of these countries’ integration and position in the EU, 
leading to the current crisis (López & Rodríguez, 2011; Reis & Rodrigues, 2012). 
Regarding the Euro crisis, Hall (2012, 2014) contends that if there was a concerted 
response by the EU, it was still slow and insufficient, with the majority of the costs being 
imposed on these countries to reduce their budget deficits. Furthermore, the EU demanded an 
acceleration of previous structural reforms to the SEC: the focus was mainly on internal 
devaluation by reducing labour costs to restore international competitiveness (Perez & 
Matsaganis, 2018). With that said, even if these countries are demand-driven, that does not 
explain the differences between their austerity policies. Greece and Portugal were tied to 
programs dictated by the Troika, while Italy and Spain, due to the size of their economies in 
the EU context, had more leverage to implement their own responses (Della Porta et al., 2016; 
Perez & Matsaganis, 2018). Yet the government in Spain implemented a harsher program than 
in Portugal. 
Embedded in the European Crisis dynamics, both in Portugal and in Spain, budget cuts 
were announced in the public sector throughout 2009 and 2010 (later extending to the private 
sector through taxation and labour reforms) (Reis & Rodrigues, 2012; Salmon, 2017), 
particularly after the Greek debacle at the end of 2009. These measures were undertaken by 
centre-left parties (PS - Partido Socialista and PSOE - Partido Socialista Obrero Español) who 
happened to be in government until the election in 2011 of conservative/right-wing 
governments in both countries. The new conservative governments delivered similar plans to 
those formulated by the previous governments, as these were in line with their ideology and 
influenced by the markets and the European institutions (Moury & Standring, 2017; Salmon, 
2017). These measures included labour reforms in both countries in the beginning of 2012, and 
the privatisation of strategic sectors but also the bailout of banks.  
At the same time, there were important differences. Apart from the external 
intervention, unlike Portugal Spain had a housing bubble. In addition, as will be shown, in 
Spain there were policies aimed at privatising parts of the health and education sectors. Despite 
the labour cuts in these sectors in Portugal, such measures were never seriously attempted. 
Also, Portugal’s Constitutional Court blocked some of the measures undertaken by the 
government. By 2014, in contrast to Greece, as external constraints began to ease and the 
economic situation improved in both countries.  
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FIGURE 1. 1 UNEMPLOYEMENT RATE (%) IN EU (28 COUNTRIES), GREECE, PORTUGAL, AND 
SPAIN (2006–2017) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
FIGURE 1.  2 ANNUAL IMMIGRATION IN PORTUGAL, SPAIN AND GREECE (2007-2016) 
  
Source: Eurostat 
In this way, a crisis that was initially both economic and political became social, as 
austerity entailed a retrenchment of the welfare state.7 The impact on the labour market entailed 
declining income, rising unemployment and underemployment, and a general erosion of social 
rights. In both countries, unemployment rose: in Spain more than doubling, as shown in Figure 
1.1. Furthermore, the labour devaluation measures led to a sustained wave of emigration from 
these countries to those of Europe’s core (Figure 1.2). Perez and Matsaganis (2018) show that 
                                                          
7 In the empirical chapters, I develop in more detail some of the measures taken. 
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the policies of internal devaluation had distributive consequences, in that inequalities did not 
rise in Portugal, despite the consolidation measures. In this sense, in comparative terms, the 
crisis and austerity had a stronger impact in Spain.  
As such, although the imbalances contributed to the crisis within the Eurozone, the 
responses to it were aimed at national political institutions and hence varied across national 
contexts. The result was not only a decline in satisfaction with democracy, the economy, 
national governments and the EU, but also an increase in levels of discontent, disaffection and 
delegitimisation among citizens (Morlino & Quaranta, 2016). These reactions were directed 
particularly towards national institutions, such as political parties and governments, in 
countries which were already distinguished by political disaffection (Magalhães, 2005; 
Montero, Gunther, & Torcal, 1997)  
Given these findings, a comparison between Portugal and Spain becomes especially 
fruitful due to the similar political scenarios in a time of crisis, with no electoral instability until 
the 2015 elections, and with socialist governments being followed by conservative majorities. 
At the same time, in relation to protest dynamics, in Spain new actors emerged, creating 
disruptive dynamics, while in Portugal traditional actors were dominant. In fact, as I will go on 
to show, these countries displayed differences in both the frequency and nature of their protests 
(Accornero & Ramos Pinto, 2015; Della Porta et al., 2016; Portos, 2017). As for the transition 
to democracy in Portugal and Spain (Fishman, 1990), during the most recent crisis, though the 
semi-peripheral context of these countries (i.e., their positioning vis-à-vis Europe) certainly 
contributed to the paths followed, their political trajectories did not follow a “unified logic”. 
Attention thus needs to be paid not only to features related to the socio-economic crisis, but 
also to the political reactions to it, regarding opportunities, threats and political cultures in each 
country (Della Porta et al., 2016). 
 
1.3. Contesting Austerity in Southern Europe  
A sustained wave of protest emerged in all of the SEC (Accornero & Ramos Pinto, 2015; Della 
Porta et al., 2016; Portos, 2017; Quaranta, 2015). Although initial research on this topic tended 
to homogenise the features of these waves, later on, more nuanced perspectives emerged. As 
with other processes of market liberalisation, there was a plurality of contentious responses, 
involving multiple actors (Roberts, 2008), based on the overlapping grievances of the affected 
precarious youth, public workers and blue-collar workers (Della Porta et al., 2016). In contrast 
to the anti-globalisation movement, these waves of protest were nationally grounded. They 
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made wide use of internet technologies as a means of mobilisation, maintained a horizontal 
character, and proved capable of expanding their bases beyond activists, incorporating new 
people into broad protests (Castells, 2012; Della Porta et al., 2016; Flesher Fominaya, 2017; 
Gerbaudo, 2017). In the course of this wave of contention, a transnational, shared frame 
emerged and thereafter diffused, one based on the idea of “citizenship”, and which developed 
not against democracy, but instead, demanded its renewal. But are these groups really new, or 
made up of old actors articulating a new sets of ideas, at least in certain national contexts and 
junctures (Kanellopoulos, Kostopoulos, Papanikolopoulos, & Rongas, 2017)? This is a 
question to which I will frequently return throughout this thesis.  
Depending on the national context, contentious responses to austerity presented of 
different configurations. In Spain, in mid-2011, the 15M movement emerged, occupying 
squares in cities all over the country, which led to the creation of local grassroots assemblies 
and movements in defence of public healthcare and education among others (Castells, 2012; 
Della Porta et al., 2016; Hughes, 2011; Portos, 2016). Forging links between parties and social 
movements was difficult, because of both the mistrust of the parties, particularly Izquierda 
Unida (IU), towards the movements, and also because of anti-party and anti-union sentiment 
in the movement (Castells, 2012; Flesher Fominaya, 2007, 2014a; Ramiro & Verge, 2013). 
These links developed, but only at a later stage, and under the banners of the movements 
(Romanos, 2016; Portos, 2017). 
However, from 2014 onwards, Podemos, a new political party, took advantage of this 
political opportunity structure to make several breakthroughs, particularly after electing five 
MEPs in May 2014 (Martín, 2015; Miley, 2017; Orriols & Cordero, 2016; Ramiro & Gomez, 
2016; Rodríguez-Teruel, Barrio, & Barberà, 2016; Sola & Rendueles, 2018). At the local and 
regional levels, new political forces such as Ahora Madrid and Barcelona en Comú, closer to 
the activists, also emerged. The ongoing crisis of legitimacy created the opportunity structure 
for these forces to penetrate the state at different levels and thus introduce new political 
dynamics. As such, the link between movements and parties seems to come only later on in the 
cycle, with new parties adopting, or at least feigning to adopt, the horizontal practices of the 
movements from which they were born (Della Porta, Fernández, Kouki, & Mosca, 2017). 
By contrast, in Portugal, even though different social movements also arose between 
2011 and 2013, no new political party was electorally successful. Instead, ‘old’ actors 
dominated the landscape. Baumgarten (2013) divides the 2011 protests in Portugal into union-
led demonstrations and general strikes; independent protest events; and social movement 
platforms or occupations of public spaces. Throughout the cycle of protest, various links 
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developed between institutional and non-institutional actors. The Confederação Geral de 
Trabalhadores Portugueses (CGTP), the dominant trade union in the protests, is directly linked 
to the Partido Comunista Português (PCP).  
During the first phase of protest, these two actors avoided inorganic protest, but later 
on, as their messages evolved, collaborations emerged, though more disruptive actors remained 
sidelined (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019). The Bloco de Esquerda (BE) was a major player 
from the beginning, developing close connections with activists (Lisi, 2013). As Soeiro (2014) 
observes, poli-membership, or belonging to various groups, prevailed throughout the cycle. 
Actors remained very close to each other, as the networks were small and with groups such as 
Que se Lixe a Troika being organically very close to the political parties.  In fact, the occupation 
of public spaces and the creation of public assemblies around Lisbon were merely momentary 
episodes (Carvalho, 2014b). Autonomist and libertarian groups formed the basis of these 
assemblies, and even though they participated in protests, they never led any campaign 
successfully and were not able to reach the same level of success as comparable groups in Spain 
or Greece.  
Directly stemming from this different wave of protests, between 2009 and 2015, a range 
of transformation took place in the party system, in different degrees, with the emergence of 
new political parties and alliances, especially in the form of movement-parties (Della Porta, 
Fernández, et al., 2017). Most notably, a wave of populism emerged with parties such as 
SYRIZA, Podemos and the Five Star Movement replicating, at least discursively, the idea of 
direct democracy that was advocated by the movements. As a consequence, by 2015 in all of 
these countries the parties that held majorities for several decades lost their hegemony (Martín 
& Urquizu-Sancho, 2012; Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016; Rodríguez Teruel & Barrio, 2016; 
Vidal, 2018).  
Adding to this, it is possible to distinguish among more stable and less stable countries 
vis-à-vis their institutional and electoral processes. On the one hand we have Portugal and 
Spain, which from the electoral cycle of 2010-11(Bosco & Verney, 2012; Verney & Bosco, 
2013) up until the 2015 elections, did not change government. Then on the other hand are Italy 
and Greece, which had different governments during this period, some of them of a 
technocratic bent.  
However, these cases diverged after the 2015 elections. In Spain, Podemos and 
Ciudadanos  (Miley, 2017; Orriols & Cordero, 2016; Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016; Vidal, 
2018) emerged, deepening the ongoing constitutional crisis in a parliament with no clear 
majorities, with the PP remaining in power after a second general election in June 2016 (Miley, 
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2017). In Portugal, by contrast, an unprecedented shift in terms of party alliances led to a 
parliamentary pact between the PCP, BE, PEV and Partido Socialista (PS). For the first time 
in history, a minority PS government was supported by the an alliance of the left parties (Lisi, 
2016). Finally, in Greece, SYRIZA formed a government, replacing PASOK as the main force 
on the left of the political spectrum (Tsakatika, 2016). 
As it can be seen, contestation to austerity involved various types of actor. It ranged 
from contestation in the streets, both by traditional actors such as trade unions and newly 
formed social movements, to new political parties. In her cross-country processual comparison, 
Della Porta (Della Porta et al., 2016) points to a combination of institutional and non-
institutional factors driving the contentious cycle such as the political conditions amidst the 
crisis, the way left-wing parties absorbed and managed its fallout, the declining trust in 
institutions (both national and European, the opportunities and threats resulting from the crisis, 
and the different sorts of protest that emerged). In line with this perspective and transporting 
the framework applied in Latin America to Europe, Roberts argues in a similar vein that it is 
“essential to think beyond the short-term political dynamics of crisis management to consider 
the longer-term institutional legacies and fragilities of the different political alignments forged 
around crisis-induced policy reforms” (Roberts, 2017, abstract). 
When considering these cases and scenarios, two sets of competing hypotheses are 
plausible. On the one hand, a more classic model would view these divergent reactions and 
outcomes as the consequence of the different austerity measures implemented, specifically the 
unique set of grievances they generate. On the other hand, a second set of hypotheses focuses 
directly upon national-level political institutions and political processes to propose even if the 
crisis and its impact can be said to explain at least some aspects of contention, nevertheless the 
way that institutions and actors manage the crisis remains key. Within this category of 
hypothesis, a first approach highlights the way austerity and the crisis are managed by 
institutional actors and representative institutions (political parties, parliaments, etc.) and, in a 
second step, their responsiveness and openness to protest grievances: because institutions and 
actors are responsive to protest grievances and demands, they end up channeling discontent 
that leads to demobilisation. Therefore, in this perspective, to give an example, the lower 
number of protests in Portugal when compared to its Southern European counterparts, rather 
than reflecting a less severe crisis impact, reveals not only the capacity of institutions to absorb 
and manage austerity to mitigate its harm, but also the capacity of existing left-wing parties in 
parliament to channel is content. 
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In line with this, Fishman proposes in several writings that this difference is linked to 
the nature of democratic practice resulting from the divergent paths taken in the transition to 
democracy (Fishman, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2017; Fishman & Cabral, 2016; 
Fishman & Everson, 2016; Fishman & Lizardo, 2013). In the case of Spain, though protest was 
essential in shifting the public agenda and in influencing institutional actors, Fishman suggests 
that the potency of the protests was the result of the exclusion and delegitimation that 
institutional actors imposed on protesters. According to this perspective, as a consequence of 
the lack of institutional openness to citizens’ demands and grievances, protest is the only 
remaining channel. Portugal, in this view, presents a contrasting scenario where the openness 
and inclusiveness of the institutions result in deeper collaboration and engagement among 
actors. As such, in Spain, movements must resort more frequently to disruption to attain their 
objectives, whereas in Portugal, institutional and non-institutional actors engage in a 
conversation,8 as institutions are more open due to the institutional legacy of the revolution 
(Fishman & Everson, 2016). 
Adding to this perspective, building on Fishman, Tiago Fernandes (2016)  highlights 
the importance of the specific political context – one that provided allies, voice, and resources 
for social movements – for explaining the singularity of Portuguese protest dynamics in times 
of recession. Another critical aspect lies in the institutional settings that moderated the impact 
of the crisis. In particular, Fernandes refers to the existence of a strong network of state–civil 
society partnerships for policy-delivery to the poor, as well as the Constitutional Court action 
that overturned many of the harshest austerity measures. In other words, the Portuguese 
institutions were more inclusive, since the institutional left comprising political parties and 
trade unions were more receptive to hear and articulate the demands of those protesting in the 
streets. Moreover, a variety of factors are important, such as the country size (both in terms of 
population and area), the intensity of the austerity programs taken and how they were managed, 
and especially the nature and quality of the political institutions that emerged with democracy. 
In Portugal, although there was a specific program of austerity under the auspices of the Troika, 
the program was not only less austere than in Spain, but there were also measures to 
accommodate those in the lower strata of the population (Perez & Matsaganis, 2018). 
Therefore, the distributional impact was, in comparative terms, less harsh, resulting in a smaller 
growth of inequality and unemployment – and thus, fewer protests (Fernandes, 2016).   
                                                          
8 Building on his transitional and culturalist argument, Fishman points out that in a typical conversation 
the demonstrations end up at the doorsteps of Parliament, and that protestors are invited to the 
Parliament during demonstrations. 
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In contrast with these approaches, but not taking precedence over the elements already 
specified, there is a processual-based approach that examines power dynamics within political 
regimes. As the authors of the contentious politics approach propose, democratic regimes do 
not diminish the role of protest and social movements but have a crucial role in its expansion, 
because they are paramount in shaping and redefining the political sphere. Therefore, even if 
both the economic crisis and institutions can account for an explanation of different forms of 
contention, it remains necessary to consider the inner workings of the political process and the 
detailed power relations between actors. Even if perspectives look to the way that different 
national political settings mediate the effects of the Eurozone crisis regarding its contentious 
responses, rather than a more static approach, this last one considers the internal power 
dynamics of the contention cycle, where agency plays a crucial role. In the next chapter, I will 
develop into the analytical framework that guides the analysis of this dissertation.  
 
1.4. Structure of the Dissertation 
Building upon the considerations outlined in this introduction, chapter two will present the 
analytical framework deployed in my empirical analysis. By following a reformulated version 
of the contentious politics approach, I will explore conceptually the plurality of claims and 
actors that develop throughout a cycle of protest and which come to re-shape the political 
sphere. In chapter three, I present this investigation’s research design and methodology. This 
will be based on a paired comparison and process tracing which underlines the idea of “thick 
description” and involved a detailed reconstruction of the case countries’ respective 
contentious dynamics. The methods used provide the fullest scholarly picture to date of the 
mobilisations throughout each of their different stages. 
Guided by a process-tracing approach, the empirical chapters are ordered 
chronologically. In accordance with the questions and analytical framework of this dissertation, 
chapter four, Preludes to Mobilisation, aims at situating and reconstructing the dynamics and 
structures of mobilisation in Portugal and Spain from the transition to democracy to the 
austerity years. My objective here will be to identify continuities and ruptures within the two 
countries. I will show that, rather than spontaneous reactions to political and economic crises, 
many of the features identified in the following chapters were present previously and helped to 
shape the configuration of discourses and actors throughout the austerity years. On this, there 
is a clear contrast between the two countries. In Portugal, the conflict was centred around labour 
issues with protest dynamics dominated by trade unions. Movement actors remain small in 
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number, closed and conflictual, with a strong presence of political parties among them, with 
small, reactive and more disruptive local movements emerging in response to changes in the 
welfare state. In Spain, the autonomy of social movements in relation to political parties and 
trade unions led to more open and horizontal repertoires, in which movements, in addition to 
focusing on labour precarity, also developed a critique of democratic institutions, later 
transferred to the 15M.  
Chapters five and six deal with different aspects of mobilisations under and against 
austerity. These comprise two moments, involving different actors and discourses, between 
2010 and 2014. In the first phase, denominated Turning Points (for the year 2011), we see a 
redefinition of the contentious field, with the emergence of social movements contesting 
austerity. These brought new dynamics and claims into the political sphere of both countries. 
Nevertheless, after this turning point, the two countries follow different paths: in Spain there 
was a crescendo of mobilisations, with social movements becoming dominant, while in 
Portugal, the social movements never became leading actors and, only emerged within 
particular political opportunity structures. I will argue that this reflected the capacity of social 
movements in Spain to go beyond the core of activists, while in Portugal the movements proved 
much less capable of doing so. The explanation for this divergence has to do not only with 
different conjunctural and contextual opportunities, but also the different capacities of 
emergent movements to establish an open and broad discursive repertoires and effective 
structures of mobilisation, penetrated to varying degrees by established institutional actors. 
 However, such divergence does not exhaust the anti-austerity dynamics in the two 
countries. To account for the full cycle, other mobilisations must be taken into consideration. 
Thus, chapter seven, From Representation to Redistribution, deals mainly with protest 
dynamics between 2012 and the end of 2013, during which new actors and claims materialised. 
In Spain, multiple and overlapping dynamics would develop, whereby social rights for 
education and health triggered an alliance between social movements and trade unions, with, 
parallel to this, housing becoming one of the main contentious issues. In Portugal, by contrast, 
trade unions and political parties dominated street mobilisations. Indeed, trade unions were the 
main actor, and the reemergence of social movements entailed a strategic alliance and co-
optation of these movements by political parties. Rather than developing a discourse that was 
critical of the regime, as occurred in Spain, mobilisations in Portugal were characterised by 
demands for the defence of the legacy of the 1974 revolution. Together these chapters advance 
a critique of the sole focus on social movement dynamics. The cycle of contention was more 
complex, and the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors were at its core.  
29 
 
 Lastly, Chapter 7, Fragile Realignments, focuses on the dynamics within party systems, 
and specifically in relation to the left-wing parties, as an outcome of the contentious cycle 
during the electoral period of 2014–5.  If research so far has focused on the influence of the 
15M mobilisations on the constitution of Podemos in Spain and the lack of a new party in 
Portugal, I endeavoured to go further, to show that these transformations do not result solely 
from the challenges introduced by the movements, but also from the internal dynamics of the 
left. In this way, Podemos results from the combination of both social movements and internal 
struggles within the pre-existing party Izquierda Unida, while in Portugal, with the social 
movements domesticated and at the backstage, the whole debate in various forums was around 
the question of the unity of the left against austerity. 
To conclude, many seem to analyse the current epoch from an “end of history” 
perspective, whereby contention is disruptive of liberal democracies. But contention is no 
abnormalilty. Rather, it is at the very heart of processes of political change. Contentious politics 
is the process through which a range of actors struggle to define meaning in the political sphere. 
The ‘turbulence’ of the current period thus provides the analyst with the valuable opportunity 
to study the dynamics of contention. By offering a longitudinal cycle-based approach to analyse 
the dynamic configurations and reconfigurations of the political field, I hope to contribute to 
our understanding of the intricate process of political change in the Iberian Peninsula during 
the peak of the austerity years. But first, it will be necessary establish an analytical framework 
that is fit to analyse these preoccupations. That is the purpose of the following chapter. 
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2. Crisis and Contentious Politics: An Analytical 
Framework 
That is why a symbiotic relationship exists between and social movements and democracy or 
democratizing politics: Democracy gives scope to the conventional and disruptive activities of social 
movements and their characteristic properties - broad, alliance-building and consensus-building - 
expand the range of democratic politics. 
Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p.167 
         
In this chapter, I aim to present the conceptual framework that will resolve the research 
questions established in the introduction. For this, I will situate the development of anti-
austerity dynamics within national forms of resistance to market liberalisation, suggesting that 
to fully understand these dynamics, there is a need for a cycle-based approach which considers 
a plurality of actors and claims. In fact, to understand the contentious responses to austerity 
and its political transformations we need to examine both the way the political process unfolds 
as well as the configurations of actors throughout the process. I will start by reviewing the 
approaches to the movements of the crisis that have developed as a consequence of the Great 
Recession by looking at distinct aspects such as actors, claims, levels of analysis, types of 
explanations and their shortcomings.  
 
2.1. Mapping the Field 
The initial literature on the movements of the crisis was characterised by an over-simplistic, 
mostly descriptive analysis of the phenomena. For the most part, it failed to consider the 
structures facilitating why and how movements emerged, focusing instead only on its 
immediate causes. In many cases, the literature emphasised the break with previous 
movements, and stressed the relative homogeneity across countries, ignoring historical context, 
national and transnational networks of actors, as well as specific cultures and repertoires of 
protest. As such, the following subsections will consider these three overarching issues: the 
first relates to the types of claims and actors, the second to the levels of analysis and the last 
examines the types of explanations given. It should be clarified that this will not give a unified 
approach but rather will explore trends in the field to contrast with what I propose afterwards. 
 
2.1.1. Actors and Claims 
Overall, when considering actors contesting austerity from the various branches of literature, 
the focus has been placed almost entirely on spontaneous social movements with claims on 
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representation. Part of the literature advanced a culturalist, idealist and technophile perspective, 
stressing the role of new technologies, as well as attitudes towards democracy, and emphasizing 
the precariat as the social base or core constituency for the wave of protest. (Castells, 2012; 
Kaldor & Selchow, 2013). The outbreak of protest was interpreted as a “bubbling up” of 
subterranean politics, and as a form of emancipatory activism that emerged from the crisis. 
According to these groups, neoliberal policies resulted from a crisis of democratic 
representation and as such their objective was recovering the political sphere for citizens. To a 
certain extent, this crisis of democracy expresses itself through displays of indignation: “all 
these poignant manifestations of an unjust society and of an undemocratic polity were present 
in the protests. But it was primarily the humiliation provoked by the cynicism and arrogance 
of those in power, be it financial, political or cultural, that brought together those who turned 
fear into outrage, and outrage into hope for a better humanity” (Castells, 2012, pp. 2-3).  
From this perspective, the social media allows autonomous communication and 
connects groups around the world (Castells, 2012). Still, even if formed on the web, it is 
through occupying the public space that these movements manifest and become levers of social 
and political change. Even though the role of the web cannot be denied, the spontaneity of the 
movement was only a matter of appearance. Rather than spontaneous, the contentious 
responses to the Great Recession reflected previously existing structures of mobilisation and 
frames (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a). 
In this sense, most approaches focus almost exclusively on the study of social 
movements’ reactions to the crisis (i.e., new actors, without considering old actors such as trade 
unions or political parties). However, to fully understand how the political processes have 
unfolded, one must consider that the anti-austerity mobilisations were wider than social 
movements and included a variety of actors and alliances. Moreover, the interactions between 
these various actors throughout the process also helped shape reactions and outcomes found at 
the end of the cycle. For instance, Flesher Fominaya (2017) points out that reaction to the crisis 
in Europe came from both the institutional left and autonomous movements. Despite this, she 
does not consider the interactions between these two groups as fundamental to how the field is 
structured. Departing from contentious politics, the interaction between non-institutional and 
institutional actors will be considered in the following sections and throughout the empirical 
chapters as shaping the cycle of protest. 
 
32 
 
2.1.2. Between National and Globalised Contestation.  
Longitudinal approaches that consider past experiences allow for the detection of resemblances 
to past mobilisations like the transnational Global Justice Movement (GJM) of the late 1990s 
and 2000s. If one takes a genealogical perspective accounting for national and contextual 
particularities, it is easy to see important continuities regarding “actors, social movements, 
activist networks, master frames, ideological influences and participatory repertoires of 
deliberation between the two” (Flesher Fominaya, 2017, p. 7). 
However, whereas the anti-globalisation movement developed from a local and national 
basis to a transnational one, the direction was now reversed, shifting from transnational to 
national mobilisations (Della Porta, 2012; Flesher Fominaya, 2014a). The level of transnational 
coordination was lower, even though throughout the cycle there were some events with 
transnational features. Concurrently, there was a shift in the framing and targets of protest: in 
contrast to the broader, more diffuse anti-corporate, anti-neoliberal, anti-capitalism of the GJM, 
linking apparent local and disperse problems to global patterns, the wave of contention that 
emerged during the Great Recession was centered on the nation-state. Even if both waves 
tended to focus on democracy (“another democracy is possible” or “they called democracy, but 
it is not”), the emphasis was on a different level. Overall, there is a shift to the discourse of 
citizenism (Gerbaudo, 2017): the repercussions of the Great Recession at the national level, 
channelled through the austerity measures of national governments, even if internationally 
guided, meant a move towards national politics. In this sense, the move to country-based 
protests arguably expanded the possibilities of mobilisation beyond elite activists and small 
groups to appeal to broader swathes of the general population, including those affected directly 
by the cuts. As Della Porta puts it:  
“Differently from the global justice movement, which had presented itself as an alliance 
of minorities in search of a broad constituency, the anti-austerity movements have 
constructed a broad definition of the self, as a large majority (contrasted with the network 
of minorities of the global justice movement) of the citizens. Backward looking, the anti-
austerity protests called for the restoration of lost rights, vehemently denouncing the 
corruption of democracy. However, they also looked forward, combining concerns for 
social rights with hopes for cultural inclusivity.” (Della Porta et al., 2016, p. 27) 
Adding to this, despite the visibility and media impact of the GJM mobilisations these 
were only a small percentage of the overall protests. Counting the number of protest and 
participants between 1990 and 2005 in Western Europe, Hutter demonstrates that “nearly 80 
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percent of all coded events are purely domestic protests, and these events involve around 70 
percent of all reported participants” (Hutter, 2014b, p. 75). As such, the locus of conflict was 
situated predominantly at the national level, as is the case for the anti-austerity protests.  
Moreover, there is still the need to consider the relations between these two dynamics 
closely. The aforementioned discontinuity neglects similar processes in other regions of the 
globe. As with austerity, the so-called structural adjustment programmes led by the IMF in 
Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s led to protest mobilisations and political transformations 
(Ortiz & Béjar, 2013; Roberts, 2008, 2012). There is thus the need to consider the relationship 
between neoliberal globalisation and its counter-currents in a different way. Rather than 
focusing on the continuities between different waves, we should focus on the different levels 
in which market liberalisation happens and to what kind of resistance is it conducive to. 
When considering such processes of market liberalisation and political transformation, 
and how they operate at different scales of governance, one should consider Polanyi’s proposal. 
As Buroway observes:  
“Polanyi’s account of different national responses to the self-regulating market can be seen 
as a movement from local, to national, to international levels. The market revolution first 
took root in England where the response was a spontaneous reactive growth of society that 
especially protected labor against commodification. The responses were rooted in the local 
although they could combine into a national movement. The second response to the self-
regulating market took place later in the nineteenth century, preeminently on the Continent 
of Europe. This was state regulation not only through welfare legislation but also tariffs 
and land laws that protected agrarian classes. The third response, triggered by the gold 
standard that was wreaking havoc with national economies, was withdrawal from the 
international economic system in favor of economic autarky. There are some signs of a 
similar resurgence of national protectionism today but nothing of the scale of 1930s 
reassertion of state regulation and planning, whether based on social democracy, state 
socialism, or fascism. Instead, one can detect a return to Polanyi’s first market reaction, 
namely, spontaneous self-defense of society. Only now the self-defense is of a 
transnational character, linking together nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
environmental movements, women’s movements, labor networks—a veritable 
transnational public designed to protect constituencies against market devastation.” 
(Burawoy, 2003, p. 240)  
Despite the plurality of groups within transnational movements highlighted by Buroway 
and the emergence of the so-called new social movements and identity politics since 1968, 
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market liberalisation at the national and transnational level continues to be a transversal aspect 
of contentious mobilisations. Anti-austerity mobilisations and anti-globalisation movements 
can be seen as reactions at different levels to similar issues.  Repertoires, strategies and 
discourses appear to be continuous over time, transferable and adaptable, depending on the 
locus and phase of the conflict. National and transnational campaigns can overlap and coincide. 
Indeed, the anti-austerity mobilisations under investigation in this dissertation bear 
resemblance to the Latin American cases and should be considered as national reactions to 
liberalisation processes. 
 
2.1.3. Between Idealist and Materialist Explanations.  
Another essential division present in the literature is between idealist and materialist types of 
explanations. The former highlights post-materialist issues and converges with new social 
movements’ approaches regarding grievances and cleavages, emphasising individualist and 
psychological explanations of protest, without considering broader contexts or power 
structures. As with the collective behaviour approach (Della Porta & Diani, 2006), protest 
movements are seen as emerging out of irrational outbursts, leading to the aggregation of 
individuals and emotions over the internet. This view gives more attention to virtual networks 
and social media rather than structures of power and specific national contexts; but 
mobilisations do not operate in a cultural, social, economic or political void.  Rather, they have 
to be situated in longer processes that articulate national and transnational spaces. As 
Koopmans argues, a network of actors able to mobilise grievances is necessary, since the 
“parameters of contention are first and foremost relational and defined by conflict lines, 
network links, and power relations among actors, both elite and extra-institutional” 
(Koopmans, 2004, pp. 22-23).  
With materialism economic structures are emphasised as the primary determinant of 
political change and protest mobilisation. Quaranta’s assessment (Quaranta, 2015) of the 
European Social Survey Data shows the impact of the economic crisis on the emergence and 
increase in political protest across Europe. However, even though economic factors certainly 
trigger protest mobilisations and political change, such factors on their own are not sufficient 
to explain or determine the political paths and processes followed in each country (Della Porta 
& Diani, 2006; Flesher Fominaya, 2014a; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2011; 
Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Instead, these paths and processes are more closely linked to existing 
structures of mobilisation, as well as other features of the political context. Therefore, even if 
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various countries all found themselves under similar structural conditions of economic crisis, 
their respective political fields would work to mediate the path taken, and thus to condition 
social and political outcomes. To invoke a distinction often made in social movements studies, 
economic factors are crucial for answering why questions but are insufficient for answering the 
how questions that I intend to study here, simply because protests are not mechanical reactions 
to crises. Della Porta and Diani have insisted that “collective action does not spring 
automatically from structural tensions (…) Numerous factors determine whether or not this 
will occur. These factors include the availability of adequate organizational resources, the 
ability of movement leaders to produce appropriate ideological representations, and the 
presence of a favorable political context” (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 63). 
 Even so, as I argued in the introduction, the existing tensions of the institutions of 
democratic capitalism are the expression of economic and political reconfigurations, in which 
markets become dominant over political institutions. Furthermore, since the onset of the crisis, 
austerity policies have been at the heart of the political game and are thus an essential element 
for understanding how the political process unfolds. Consequently, the Great Recession 
provoked a resurgence of debates about capitalism in mainstream social movement studies. 
Authors such as Della Porta (Della Porta, 2015, 2017; Della Porta et al., 2016), Hetland and 
Goodwin (2013) and Císař & Navrátil  (2017) have criticised the oblivion on the topic in the 
field, which came to be dominated by the study of new social movements and identity issues.  
Goodwin and Hetland (2013) emphasise that exactly when capitalism became more 
powerful, popular movements and labour disappeared from social scientific analysis.9 They 
argue that capitalist dynamics still shape the so-called post-materialist movements. Espousing 
a Gramscian perspective, they insist that it is not only that the objective and economic nature 
of class dynamics, labour and - I would add - austerity, need to be taken into account, but also 
the manner in which these dynamics are sociologically and politically constructed must also be 
considered. In such a vein, this study of the dynamics of resistance to neoliberalism, crisis and 
austerity in Portugal and Spain will provide evidence regarding how political actors reacted, 
adapted and managed the crisis and its impacts in the political sphere, leading to a deeper 
understanding of how social movements influence the realm of Political Economy. As 
                                                          
9 There is a parallel between this disappearance of economic issues in social movements and social 
classes. As I have shown in previous work on the relation between social classes and political citizenship 
(Carvalho, 2014a), and following the literature in the field (Atkinson, 2010a, 2010b) - include this, 
various strands of literature on modernity and politics point out the disappearance of social class as an 
important and predictive variable.  The demise of analysis of class and capitalism in mainstream social 
sciences is the result of the move towards perspectives that focus on individuals. 
36 
 
suggested by Hetland and Goodwin (2013), social movements are not only reactions to the 
dynamics of capitalism, but they also shape them. 
Adding to this Della Porta (2017) has commented that many of the tools in social 
movements studies were developed in times of affluence, particularly in advanced democracies 
with stable political systems. Nevertheless, the emergence of the Great Recession renders 
urgent the introduction (or re-introduction) of analytical instruments that allow for the study of 
capitalism in relation with social movements, leading to a distinction between “movements of 
affluence” and “movements of the crisis”. This means a return of sorts to class cleavages, after 
a focus on new social movements which typically highlighted issues related to daily life and 
personal autonomy. More than a crisis of scarcity, this is a crisis of redistribution, in which 
austerity has led to cuts in social services and social rights, in turn eroding consent and leading 
to distrust in institutions (Della Porta et al., 2016). The result was a crisis of legitimacy since 
citizens do not see their needs as being met. In this sense, as Della Porta (Della Porta et al., 
2016) has argued, a comparative effort needs to be made to bridge contentious politics with 
other fields. The interaction between crisis, market liberalisation and national contexts 
produced different countermovements in the context of a crisis of hegemony. A broad 
perspective combining the features of the socioeconomic crisis and austerity, the political 
cultures of these countries, and the political reactions in terms of political opportunity 
structures and threats is thus required. 
Taking these elements into account, Polanyi provides a framework for understanding 
the ongoing dynamics of market liberalization. Rather than taking them as constituting separate 
spheres, in the Great Transformation, Polanyi (1944) considers political and economic 
dynamics together, describing how they interact in a double movement: a movement of planned 
liberalisation, of domination of the market over society, and is opposed by a spontaneous and 
plural countermovement for protection in a variety of social and political movements. As 
Buroway remarks, in Polanyi’s approach, society is in “contradictory tension with the market” 
(Buroway, 1994, p. 199) and that generates multiple opposition actors. As such, in his view 
“the market tends to destroy society, but on the other hand, society (re)acts to defend itself and 
to subordinate the market” (Buroway, 1994, p. 198). Market liberalisation imposes and 
stretches itself beyond all spheres of life, thereby imposing its own logic. In this sense, this 
framework can be transposed to the study of the anti-austerity cycle, for understanding the 
plurality of counter-movements for protection against further economic liberalisation that has 
emerged with it (Roberts, 2008). Furthermore, in his interpretative scheme, this plurality 
included both movements and political parties (i.e., actors that opposed the liberalisation 
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movement). Nevertheless, these have varied depending on the specific structures of 
mobilisation and configurations of actors of each country. As it has been already noted, 
contention and counter-movements are not automatic.  
 In this sense, and considering what has been discussed so far, Latin America can be 
seen as a locus and model of the effects of neoliberal market reforms in the transformation of 
the political system and protest. Using a Polanyian framework, these have been widely studied 
and add a broader understanding of these “defensive mobilisations” (Almeida, 2007). Going 
further and considering changes in the political landscape brought by market reforms, Roberts 
(2008, 2012) shows how market reforms in the 1980/90s work as critical junctures that 
transformed the party system being “triggered by the spread of social and political resistance 
to market liberalization during the critical juncture” (Robert, 2012, p. 1424). In his view 
“democratic regimes are reasonably stable, economic dependence and vulnerability to 
exogenous economic shocks can generate forms of political uncertainty that are highly 
disruptive for party systems” (Robert, 2012, p. 1424). As a result, the programmatic alignment 
and dealignment of the party system and its transformation depends on the process of market 
liberalisation. In his work, Roberts finds three types of critical junctures:  
“Programmatic alignment occurred where conservative actors took the lead in the adoption 
of market reforms and a major party of the left existed in consistent opposition, creating a 
political legacy that I call contested liberalism. Dealigning critical junctures occurred 
where established populist or center-left parties, or other independent populist figures who 
campaigned against structural adjustment policies, played a major role in the 
implementation of market reforms. Neutral critical junctures occurred where conservative 
actors led the process of market reform, but no major party of the left existed to offer 
consistent opposition.” (Roberts, 2012, p. 1435-36) 
 Roberts’ work brings political economy and the transformations of the party system 
together. Not only that, he integrates a relational dimension by which the result depends on 
who implements the market reforms and who opposes it. As it will be seen later in this 
dissertation, this is a crucial aspect in understanding the ongoing processes in the cases here 
under analysis. Still, despite these contributions that make the need to integrate and consider 
capitalism dynamics within contentious politics evident, there is a need for a more fine-grained 
approach that considers simultaneously not only the process but the dynamics between 
institutional and non-institutional actors. Roberts’ work shows that capitalist dynamics have to 
be framed by the ongoing and existing political dynamics and how they are politicised, leading 
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to alignment or dealignment and political change, rather than being automatic. Furthermore, 
despite departing from a Polanyian point of view, he is able to show that resistance is not  
spontaneous and results from a set of conditions under which it emerges. 
 
2.1.4. Summary 
In this section, I reviewed the main trends on the anti-austerity mobilisations have been 
interpreted to develop a broader approach in the following sections. As described, this focused 
mainly on social movements with claims on representation at the national level, which contrasts 
with the transnational wave of protest of the GJM. I argued that despite the importance of the 
social movements, to understand the full picture of the anti-austerity mobilisations and the 
political changes they encompass we need a framework that considers the various actors in the 
field and how these came to shape the cycle. Furthermore, despite the importance of economic 
crisis in setting the scene for the development of the wave of protest, at the national level 
reactions seem to be dependent on the way political actors interact with austerity processes. In 
this sense, in the following sections, based on contentious politics I will develop an approach 
that provides answers to the critiques I have pointed out here. 
 
2.2. Contentious Politics 
Contentious politics, more than a theory, is an all-encompassing prescriptive research program 
that brings together a variety of strands of literature in the field of social movements into an 
open-ended, relational, processual and dynamic conceptualisation that focus on uncovering the 
internal mechanisms of an episode of contention. While following a tendency of theoretical 
synthesis that it is characteristic of Sociology, it cannot be considered a grand-theory, since it 
is specific to the field of political conflict. Nevertheless, because of its realist position, it aims 
for universal explanations rather particular ones. In this way, episodes of contention, despite 
their differences, follow similar patterns.  
The term was first coined by Charles Tilly during the 1970s, and gained preponderance 
with the publication of the seminal Dynamics of Contention, written together with Sidney 
Tarrow and Doug McAdam (McAdam et al., 2001). Contentious politics can be defined as the 
“interactions in which actors make claims that bear on someone else’s interests, leading to 
coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are as 
targets, the objects of claims, or third parties” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 236). Their main 
concern was to push the study of non-routine forms of politics and political action beyond 
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social movements, incorporating into this perspective other forms of conflict such as riots, civil 
wars or nationalism. Adding to this, against the dominant static and single actor approaches, 
the contentious politics framework analyses the interactions between multiple actors across 
time. As such, its concepts are open-ended and broad, intended to facilitate the analysis of a 
vast array of episodes of contention both in their variations and regularities. Additionally, this 
framework breaks from disciplinary boundaries, integrating history, sociology and political 
science into the “study of contentious politics with the study of political regimes and regime 
change” (Tarrow, 2008, p. 226). 
In sum, the contentious politics approach incorporates a variety of different features 
that facilitate a more systematic interpretation, while remaining non-dogmatic and open-ended. 
By considering the dynamic relations between a plurality of actors over the cycle of protest, 
and taking into account repertoires and claim-making, this approach helps to understand 
political change far better than interpretations based on exclusively social movements. Plus, if 
the Polanyian perspective developed in the previous section allows for the identification of the 
political and economic dynamics that lead to the eruption of countermovements under market 
liberalisation, the internal dynamics and agency of the contestation movements are hardly 
explored by this perspective.  
In the following sections, I will explore and devise an alternative and a revised approach 
to contentious politics. This entails a definition of its processual, relational and symbolic 
aspects. Therefore, I will discuss and conceptualise tools that will be present throughout the 
dissertation such as the cycle of contention, actors, claims and repertoires. 
 
2.2.1. A Cycle-Based Approach 
Taking into account not only this temporal dimension but also the multiple actors that emerge, 
a cycle-based approach seems to be the most convenient way to tackle the questions at hand, 
as it implicitly deals with internal dynamics of the cycle where a variety of actors are present. 
Tarrow defines it as a: 
“phase of heightened conflict across the social system, with rapid diffusion of collective 
action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors, a rapid pace of innovation in the 
forms of contention employed, the creation of new or transformed collective action frames, 
a combination of organized and unorganized participation, and sequences of intensified 
information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities. Such widespread 
contention produces externalities, which give challengers at least a temporary advantage 
and allow them to overcome the weaknesses in their resource base. It demands that states 
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devise broad strategies of response that are repressive or facilitative, or a combination of 
the two. And it produces general outcomes that are more than the sum of the results of an 
aggregate of unconnected events.” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 199)  
A cycle of contention tends to constitute a transformative moment that condenses 
previous latent tensions, while at the same time it introduces new political dynamics and 
repertoires. Therefore, it is not a mere reproduction and mirror of previously existing political 
structures, but it starts itself a process of change. It is constituted by a pluralist set of actors in 
a multi organisational-field that goes beyond social movements (Koopmans 2004). This comes 
in line with the processual turn in social movements studies that point out for the need of a 
relational and dynamic approach (McAdam et al., 2001; Tarrow, 2008; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015).  
Despite the terminological differences, both Koopmans (2004) and Tarrow (2011) 
agree that a cycle of contention is constituted by different sets of phases, where protest unfolds 
with diverse intensities. Koopmans points to expansion, transformation and contraction, while 
Tarrow to a process of diffusion, exhaustion and radicalisation/institutionalisation. 
Nonetheless, it should be clear that no unilinear model exists and that the analysis of the internal 
processes of the cycles should instead recognise the more or less recurring patterns found in 
different cases. Even so, understanding how the sequence of events and mobilisations unfolds 
is a central aspect of this analytical framework. 
Therefore, rather than a static approach, contentious politics it is a relational, processual 
and dynamic endeavour. It takes episodes of contention as “bounded sequences of continuous 
interaction (…) for purpose of systematic observation, comparison and explanation” (Tilly and 
Tarrow, 2015, p. 39). This means to relationally consider a variety of actors within a particular 
contextual regime and across-time that can assume a variety of configurations. In this way, this 
paradigm developed from a more structuralist onset (e.g., studying the impact of economic 
structures in collective action) to a relational realist one that focus on contention, its dynamics 
and internal processes. For Tilly, relational realism was the “the doctrine that transactions, 
interactions, social ties and conversations constitute the central stuff of social life” (Tilly, 2016, 
p. 7) and as such the outcomes of a contention cycle must take into consideration the not only 
the preexisting configurations but also how these develop across the cycle. This comprehends 
the way networks and mobilising structures work. More importantly, is to consider that, as it 
will be seen below, that political issues go beyond institutions and institutional actors and that 
contentious politics play a fundamental role in political transformation. 
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Central to this approach, and more specifically to this dimension, is that all these 
features combined result in an explanatory mode that focus in the political dynamics and 
interactions between non-institutional actors and institutions as targets and in setting the 
context, which rather than being structurally defined is open to agency and process. In fact, the 
political opportunity structure (POS) emerges as the main explanatory concept. Changes in the 
political environment seem to explain the opportunities and threats that trigger contentious 
actors’ actions. It is the way these different opportunities change over time that provides the 
context that affects and trigger mobilisation. 
However, over time, the POS started to accommodate and designate any specific type 
of events that transformed the political context. But by integrating any class of factors into the 
explanation, it loses explanatory power by becoming less specific. That is why Tilly and 
Tarrow do not include any kind of symbolic or discursive elements, remaining exclusively 
relational and actor focused regarding the openness of the structure of power. Still, this does 
not mean that opportunities are objective per se, as they should be perceived and attributed to 
become a source of mobilisation (i.e., an unseen opportunity does not exist). In their view, this 
concept is more useful if restricted to environmental factors that visibly open up the prospect 
of mobilisation (objectively or subjectively): 1) opening and increasing access to new actors; 
2) evidence of political realignment in shifting alignments/electoral instability; 3) availability 
of influential allies; 4) emerging splits within the elite (Tarrow, 2011). 
In line with what I have written so far, and partially ignoring the proponents of this 
approach, I am going to explore two additional dimensions: political economy opportunity 
structure, and the discursive opportunity structure. In considering these two additional 
dimensions, I am suggesting that economic and discursive changes generate opportunities and 
resources for critical actors which influence the structure of opportunities. Furthermore, taking 
into account what has been discussed so far and the context of this dissertation these are useful 
tools to add to the analysis.  
Regarding the first, it should be noted that Tilly’s seminal work already demonstrates 
how changes in capitalism transform the repertoires of protest. As such, following a Polanyian 
logic of progressive institutionalisation of capitalism and changes in its structures, Cisar and 
Navril (2017) propose the study of political economy opportunity structures. This means that 
considering their case study (Czech Republic), they are able to evaluate how different 
configurations of political economy transform and “trigger different popular responses” (Cisar 
& Navril, 2017, p. 83). In their study, the opportunity structure is the result of the specific 
configurations and changes in the economic and political elite, in the institutions (e.g. 
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financialisation and changes in the banking system), but also specific measures such as 
austerity. As they explain:  
“political economic opportunity structure is a set of political and economic factors that 
shape the conditions for the involvement of movement actors in protest politics. These 
factors cluster in particular patterns or ‘models’. Consequently, we specify how these 
particular models shape what social movement studies identify as the relevant dimensions 
of political protest, such as organizers, cooperation among organizers in protest events, the 
frequency of protest events, the action repertoire, the targets and frames used, and we look 
at these models in the particular context of the development of Czech capitalism” (Cisar 
& Navril, 2017, p. 84).  
Considering both the contextualisation given so far, as well as the changes in southern 
European capitalism, this will serve to situate the economic context and how austerity changed 
throughout the period under analysis. As it will be seen, particular changes in the economic 
conjuncture led to transformations in protest dynamics. Additionally, a complementary concept 
is of discursive opportunity structure that 
 “provides social movement scholars with a conceptual tool to understand which social 
movement frames are likely to have the greatest capacity to mobilize existing and new 
recruits, to convince the public of a movement’s demands, and to persuade authorities to 
alter policy and practices in line with the movement’s agenda. The conceptualization of 
discursive opportunities synthesizes theories of social movement framing and political 
opportunity structure” (McCammon, 2013).  
This allows the integration of essential discursive, symbolic and cultural elements into 
the analysis. As it will be seen throughout this thesis, there are particular inflection points where 
the perceived discursive opportunity structure changes and actors change that discourse. As 
explored with Ramos Pinto (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019), and as will be seen in later 
chapters, if Portuguese frames barely included any reference to the 1974-1975 revolutionary 
moment until the summer of 2012, after the decisions ruled by the Constitutional Court against 
particular austerity measures, these became central for all the relevant actors that recovered the 
imaginary of the revolution.  Furthermore, it helps to understand the symbolic dynamics of the 
regime and why particular elements have more prominence than others. I will further explore 
the symbolic elements related to discursive repertoires and claim-making in the following 
sections.  
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A cycle-based approach is therefore central in contentious politics and enhances the 
detailed understanding of the political processes. Its temporal element contributes to a dynamic 
and dense reading of the episodes of contentions under study here, as it allows the identification 
of different phases and factors behind it. Still, even if institutions and institutional actors are 
considered, they seem to set the scene without being active players. I will discuss this in more 
detail in the next section. 
 
2.2.2. Institutional and Non-institutional Actors: a Multi-Actor Perspective 
As previously mentioned, the literature on movements of the crisis has focused almost 
exclusively on the ‘new’ emerging actors such as the 15M, without taking into consideration 
the plurality of actors that have contested austerity since the emergence of the Great Recession. 
These constitute invaluable contributions to the literature and detailed knowledge about the 
initial moments of the wave of contestation. Nonetheless, multiple actors co-exist, and the 
relationships between them were central to shaping the anti-austerity cycle of contention.  
Most of the studies on democratic regimes tend to focus solely on social movements, 
without taking into account the role that actors such as trade unions and political parties might 
have. During the Great Recession, political parties only started to be considered in the field of 
social movements, with the resurgence of far-left and far-right parties across Europe. Many of 
these parties have populist traces and can be connected to movements of protest that preceded 
them. Nonetheless, institutional actors are hardly considered active actors throughout other 
phases of the cycle. Furthermore, if anything they are never at the centre of the analysis and 
are only seen as external actors that either constrain or allow the opening of the opportunity 
structures. However, as it will be seen, there have been calls to include these actors further into 
the analysis and new literature is beginning to emerge that can expand the potential of 
contentious politics analysis (e.g., Piccio, 2016, 2017).  
Contentious politics presents itself as a multi-actor perspective. For these authors, social 
movements are the typical form of contention under democratic regimes. Phenomena like 
strikes, civil wars and revolutions exist concurrent or in combination with movement’s actions. 
Social movements are taken as “sustained campaigns of claim making, using repeated 
performances that advertise that claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and 
solidarities that sustain these activities” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 237). These authors suggest 
that these are divided into campaigns and bases. The former term refers to public challenges 
and claim-making to power holders, and the latter to the “social background, organisational 
resources, and cultural framework of contention and collective action” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, 
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p. 237). Therefore, actors are not simply constituted through the mobilisation of resources or 
as a response to political opportunities, but they must be perceived in context, with their 
repertoire and in interaction with other actors. Actors are “recognisable sets of people who 
carry on collective action in which governments are directly or indirectly involved, making 
and/or receiving contentious claims.” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 236). Focusing on a multi-
actor perspective Koopmans suggests:  
“(…) what we need is an approach that transcends the isolated view of single movements 
and inserts them in time and space, but treats the latter not as dimensions on which to 
sample ‘‘cases,’’ but as variables that are an intrinsic and central part of the analysis of 
contention. (…) Against the focus on single movements, this approach argues that 
contention is always a multi-actor process that cannot be adequately understood by 
focusing attention on one actor and reducing the others to the role of context variables. 
Instead, inter-actions between actors become the fundamental units of analysis” 
(Koopmans, 2004, p. 40). 
Invaluable work has been done on the most recent wave of contention by engaging with 
this perspective to consider a variety of different actors (Accornero & Ramos Pinto, 2015; 
Diani & Kousis, 2014; Kanellopoulos et al., 2017; Kousis & Karakioulafi, 2013; Portos, 2017). 
However, in many aspects, the study of contentious dynamics remains a black box regarding 
the interactions between institutional and non-institutional actors and the way this determines 
how cycles of contention unfold. As Piccio (2016a) remarks, even if there have been calls to 
more thoroughly explore the relationship between these different actors in this field, a dearth 
of research remains and the gaps in knowledge have yet to be filled. Adding to this issue, when 
reviewing the contributions of this approach, Tarrow (2015) calls for a broader inclusion of 
political parties in the contentious processes as this has not been actively researched and could 
lead to other developments (proactive electoral mobilisation, reactive electoral mobilisation, 
movements induce shifts in electoral fortunes, movement induced polarization). Moreover, 
Tarrow (2011) suggests that the “Iron Law” of the Oligarchy tends to be the only way through 
which institutionalisation of social movements are observed, but there are many other paths 
that social movements not only can take but also assume when relating to political parties.   
As such, the contentious politics approach offers the opportunity to go beyond the 
apparent non-institutional novelty and focus on the assemblages of contention and how the 
national context, institutions and actors mediate this outcome. These reactions should be part 
of a longer contentious process and interaction between institutional and non-institutional 
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actors (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Goldstone, 2004, 2003b; McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly & 
Tarrow, 2015). This brings in to question not only how they transform along the cycle, but also 
how they interact within a cycle-based approach. Moreover, within the unexplored capitalist 
dynamics, Roberts (2008) shows that market liberalisation tends to fragment and pluralise the 
already existing contentious actors across both the institutional and non-institutional groups. 
The distinction between institutional (or insiders) and non-institutional (or outsiders) 
actors is of importance and it is at the heart of the main distinctions surrounding power theories 
and debates between elitists and pluralists. As Scott suggests protest, or non-institutionalized 
collective action, constitutes an alternative perspective in these discussions: “While ‘parties’ 
are groups that follow conventional, institutionalized patterns of political participation, protest 
groups are organized around collective resistance to the very structures that underpin party 
politics” (Scott, 2001, p. 111). Protest is then taken as form of collective action directed towards 
political parties, even though this is still a rigid way of looking into actors. Considering both 
actor types along a cycle of contention, whereby they are both active players, allows us to close 
the gap regarding this aspect, as there is no dialogue between social movement studies and 
political parties. Even if contentious politics investigates institutional actors and institutions, it 
rarely presents them as being active players. 
This division of labour seemingly results from assumptions within particular strands of 
democratic theory and specific power theories. Kitschelt (1993) remarks that implicit to the 
conceptualisation of protest cycles is the idea of institutional (un)responsiveness. As 
institutions fail to meet the demands and grievances of various social groups, protest becomes 
an alternative channel to express their discontent. As the cycle unfolds and institutions become 
responsive, the criticisms are incorporated, either through the creation of new political actors, 
institutional changes, or repression leading protests to fade out. Goldstone (2004) points out 
that in most research on social movements there is a distinction between social movements and 
political parties, whereby the former is taken as an extra-institutional actor and an outsider to 
the political sphere that, if successful, transitions to the institutional sphere. Even if simplistic, 
it is a useful idea as a starting point, to conceptualise the relationship between different types 
of actors along the cycle of contention in both their nature and outcomes. 
Nonetheless, engrained in this perspective there is a normative stance whereby protest 
actors are perceived as an anomaly and disruption and outsiders are not a legitimate part of the 
democratic process. This constitutes a unidirectional perspective where extra-institutional 
actors target institutions and if successful are incorporated into the institutional sphere. 
Furthermore, this is the principle behind the ‘channelling hypothesis’ which has been the basis 
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of most interpretations of the Southern European Politics of Austerity. This idea seems to be 
expressed, even if in different ways, in Roberts (2013) work on Latin America and Fishman’s 
(2011, 2012b) research on Portugal and Spain: discontent occurs differently depending on the 
contingent arrangements between political parties and their responsiveness in the protest arena.  
As such, the relations entailed between institutional and non-institutional actors are 
more complex than simply exerting pressure on politicians and governments (Kriesi, 2015). 
Social movements are some of the cornerstones of modern political participation and they 
shape the nature of democracy and citizenship. In fact, democracy not only contributes to the 
diffusion and development of social movement, as these players are fundamental in the 
continuous struggle to redefine the political sphere (Eisenstadt, 1998; Goldstone, 2004). As 
Goldstone remarks: “social movement activity is not so much an alternative to institutionalized 
politics, diminishing as the latter increases; rather it is a complementary mode of political 
action, which increases even as democratic politics spread” (Goldstone, 2004, p. 336).  
Therefore, Goldstone suggests that the relationship between actors is blurred and less 
clear-cut than it would be expected. Institutional and non-institutional actors are mutually 
dependent and deeply intertwined (Goldstone, 2003a, 2004; Kriesi, 2015). Nevertheless, it 
could be argued that more complex and intricate mechanisms are in place. There is the need to 
consider both the transformative capacity of protest, as well as the interaction between 
movements and parties along the process, instead of understanding it through a channelling 
mechanism. A bi-directional configuration could be taken where institutional and non-
institutional actors interact. However, this would maintain a rigid approach whereby two 
separate arenas are in place. 
In this sense, it could be pointed out that the political field is replete with a variety of 
actors that do not fit this model, entailing a more complex chain of interactions between them 
(Piccio, 2016a, 2016b). Institutional and non-institutional actors’ interactions can take different 
modalities, being intricate and involving a diversity of forms and entry points. One specific 
example is that of “hybrid” actors such as movement-parties that mix features traditionally 
associated with both parties and social movements (Della Porta, Fernández, et al., 2017), or 
social movement unionism that brings aspects of social movements into the field of labour 
(Köhler & Calleja Jiménez, 2015). Reinforcing this idea, Goldstone identifies that Tilly’s work 
is, in fact, representative of the symbiotic nature between social movements and democracy:  
“Social protest repertories emerged in England at roughly the same time as repertoires for 
influencing elections to Parliament, and with the same purpose – to influence the outcomes 
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of Parliament’s deliberations. This was not a coincidence but represented a fundamental 
evolution in the nature of politics: both democratisation and social movements built on the 
same basic principle, that ordinary people are politically worthy of consultation.” 
(Goldstone, 2014, p. 342) 
In another example, in the context of crisis, Kanellopoulos and colleagues (2016) have 
shown that multiple actors were involved during the anti-austerity campaign. The 
polycephalous nature of the protests splits between three camps that involve trade unions, 
political parties and emerging social movements. It is the relation between these actors that 
entail and defines how the cycle will unfold. As they remark, old and new actors coordinate 
and the so called ‘new social movements’ seem to be more of a  
“new logic of collective action carried out by ‘old’ actors since the whole organization of 
square occupations rested in resources and activists linked to political organizations 
heavily engaged at that period at coalitional modes of coordination. These ‘old’ actors soon 
returned to their usual duties as the anti-austerity campaign continued and climaxed aſter 
the summer of 2011” (Kanellopoulos et al., 2016, p. 115).  
Therefore, linking with the previous section, the emergence of protest is not 
spontaneous as some seem to imply, but rather one needs to take into account pre-existing 
networks that converged into the first phase of the campaign and evolved over the cycle of 
protest. Although they are often ignored, ‘old’ actors are required in order to sustain a protest 
campaign due to their resources and mobilisation capacity (Kannellopoulos et al., 2016; Portos, 
2016).  
Therefore, processes like alliance building, institutionalisation, co-option, movement-
parties or political articulation are specific forms of interaction that can occur along a cycle of 
contention that should be included among our analyses - it is precisely this interaction which I 
intend to demonstrate throughout my thesis. Different configurations and assemblages of 
contention would then be the focus of research that entails cooperation, competition and 
hierarchy (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Consequently, rather than taking for granted which 
sets of relationships exist, empirical research should investigate the specific nature of the fields 
of contention and the configurations of actors across time. This would serve as a base for 
comparative research where both positive and negative cases help to comprehend the nature of 
the process. I will examine to the symbolic aspects regarding repertoires and claim-making. 
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2.2.3. Repertoires, Discourses and Claim-Making 
The argument presented above regarding actors can and should be extended to the domain of 
claim-making. Focusing solely on political claims for democracy obliviates the fact that if 
multiple actors are involved in the process, then multiple interests and claims are being 
articulated as well. Not only that, these must be understood contextually by taking into account 
the nature of the regime, institutions and actors. Furthermore, if neoliberalism and austerity 
mean, as described before, a limited conception of citizenship whereby the markets and 
commodification take over labour and social rights, then these should be included in the 
broader formations of meaning. As such, this challenges the proposals for transversal and 
transnational frameworks that focused on representation and were present in many of the works 
analysed in previous sections. 
In this section I will propose an analytical framework through which claim-making can 
interpreted beyond (mis)representation. This will allow for the creation of a typology of 
citizenship claims that will later be applied to the data. This is not to say that claims on social 
rights are not political claims, but it should be considered that when they originate from certain 
actors they might not be conflated with claims for representation: for instance, if trade unions 
make claims on social rights, these claims will probably not entail the same meaning as with 
social movements. As such, this framework opens the door to the diversity of claims throughout 
the period under analysis and observe their evolution, as in which types of claims were more 
prevalent at one time over another. I will discuss and depart from central concepts of the 
contentious politics approach such as repertoire and claim-making, to propose a broader 
understanding of citizenship to counter the analysis that focuses almost solely on 
representation. Following my critique of previous literature, by the end of this section, I will 
develop a framework to categorise the various citizenship claims that were encountered in this 
research. For this, I will establish a parallel between the way the authors of contentious politics 
approach repertoires and criticise the lack of a similar framework for discourses. 
A repertoire constitutes a historical script, embedded in the political culture, that people 
follow in their protest actions and performances. Repertoires can be defined as “claim-making 
routines that apply to the same claimant-object pairs: bosses and workers, peasants and 
landlords, rival nationalist factions, and many more” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 16). In this 
way, it can be relationally defined as it involves not only what people do when engaged in 
conflict but also what they know how do to and expect others to do. 
Two types of repertoires can be historically distinguished due to the historical shifts 
brought about by capitalism and state-building.  There is a fundamental change from parochial 
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to modular forms of protests that directed itself to a confrontation with the authorities in a 
variety of different ways rather than attacking the perpetrators directly. In this way, repertoires 
evolved from local, non-standardised and parochial to modular and cosmopolitan that target 
central authorities. Tarrow (2011) points out that this distinction involves three dimensions: 1) 
parochial vs cosmopolitan: from local interests and interactions in a single community to 
interests that span across many communities; 2) segmented vs modular: from addressing local 
issues and nearby objects to easily transferable settings; 3) particular vs autonomous: it varied 
a great deal from group, issue and locality to establishing more nationally linked protests. The 
latter were violent, direct, brief and specific. They were not apolitical or pre-political but 
“against evidence that authorities were ignoring their inherited rights” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 46) 
(e.g., food riots, religious conflicts, peasant revolts, and death rights). The modern repertoires 
changed and have taken on other forms such as boycotts, mass petitioning, public meetings, 
strikes, marches, demonstrations, and occupations.  
It is important to notice that, as with repertoires, there is not a proposal regarding the 
how claims develop alongside capitalism and the state. As proposed by Bourdieu (1991) the 
political field is the site where the collective actors articulate, impose and oppose their visions 
of the world as a way to mobilise support and accumulate political capital. Transposing the 
idea of political field already established in the previous section, there is a sort of homology 
between actors and discourses developed. In this sense, the language of contention results from 
conflicts and interaction between actors. Politics, with contention included, is above all a 
discursive action. 
Therefore, claim-making as demands directed towards targets should be considered 
more broadly about the way actors’ relationships shape the political field and its meanings. 
Furthermore, when considering this symbolic dimension, the idea of discursive opportunity 
structures delineated above should be taken into account. This is closely linked with the idea 
of language of contention as developed by Tarrow (2013) in an attempt to explain how and 
why particular frames and discourses of contention have become more prominent than others.  
For this, Tarrow relies on the term coined by Steinberg (1999) of discursive repertoires, 
which “are reciprocally linked to the repertoires of collective actions that groups develop to 
realize their goals” (Steinberg, 1999, p. xxi). These are historically constructed and politically 
bounded not only to how regimes are built, but also the relation of forces between institutions, 
institutional and non-institutional actors. 
In this way, even if it departs from an approach to social movement framings, Tarrow’s 
perspective goes beyond it by proposing two sets of variables to analyse the problem at hand: 
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symbolic resonance and strategic modularity. The latter departs from the conceptualisation 
proposed by Benford and Snow (2000) on frameworks and emphasis the “core meaning of a 
specific term”. It shows how it resonates within processes of mobilisation that will ensure 
diffusion beyond the core members. However, though resonance is important, Tarrow remarks 
that it is not enough to understand the success and persistence of discourse over time, requiring 
adaptability as well as resonance. As such, strategic modularity refers to “the degree to which 
terms that emerge in one strategic context can be repeated without losing the strategic 
advantages they originally possessed” (Tarrow, 2013, p. 17). These discursive repertoires tend 
to be persistent due to their adaptability to different contexts and political opportunity 
structures, as they are embedded in a network of meaning that corresponds to the way it was 
built by actors and regimes. As such, discoursive repertoires need to be malleable and open to 
interpretation to ensure persistence over time. 
As with the assumptions initially written above, language in contentious processes is 
taken as relational and dynamic, that develops through the interaction between actors during 
the contentious process (McAdam et al. 2001). Tarrow argues that “the deployment and 
diffusion of contentious language respond to both cultural and strategic incentives through the 
constitution of actors who draw upon a battery of language to describe their identities, their 
claims, their opponents, and their forms of action” (Tarrow, 2013, p. 20). With this 
conceptualisation, it is possible to go beyond not only the perspectives on symbolic resonance 
in social movements studies, but it also allows for post-structuralist approaches that focus 
solely on discourse or even the populist approach of Laclau (2005) that focus on articulation 
and hegemony. These are insufficient methods of analysis as they do not account for the rooted 
and conflictive nature of the language of contention within the political field. 
However, Tarrow’s approach to discursive repertoires lacks an understanding of how 
these evolved historically in the same way as repertoires as a protest action developed parallel 
and in interaction to the State and Capitalism. Tarrow only proposes a way to read why and 
what discursive repertoires tend to persist. As such, I will argue that to evaluate processes of 
claim-making throughout a cycle of contention there is the need for an approach that fits not 
only a historical analysis of how movements and contentious politics evolve, but also the 
development of Capitalism, State-structures, Citizenship and the language of rights. Thinking 
of discursive repertoires alongside the development of citizenship opposes the more recent and 
seemingly ahistorical perspectives that focus solely on the development of a broad and open 
discourse for democratic regeneration. This myopia of the present within the movements of the 
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crisis tends to forget the importance of historical struggles that developed throughout the last 
centuries and that continue to shape current contestation cycles.  
Furthermore, as it was argued in the introduction of this dissertation, austerity corrodes 
democratic legitimacy as it diminishes social rights. Therefore, it can be argued that not only 
political claims to democracy are in play, but also claims for social rights. Claim-making is 
multidimensional and can address several demands simultaneously, however past approaches 
only study one particular dimension. As Roberts establishes, the processes of economic 
liberalisation represent “responses to a set of common problems that are rooted in the 
contradictions between democratic citizenship and socioeconomic exclusion—the central fault 
line of democracy in the aftermath of market liberalization in the world’s most inequitable 
region.” (Roberts, 2008, p. 319) As such, as I will show throughout this dissertation, the anti-
austerity cycle of contention was comprised of multiple actors with different conceptions of 
citizenship and democratic rights. As such, in this sense, embedded in Contentious Politics, I 
argue for the need to go beyond the social movement perspective that takes into account the 
multiple conceptions of citizenship and democracy present throughout the cycle of protest. This 
resulted in different sorts of claim-making being made at different stages of the process and 
deepens the understanding of modularity in discursive repertoires, but also the ideational 
aspects behind claim-making such as regime-type, the configurations and interactions between 
actors and the stage of the cycle of protest.  
Historically, citizenship rights are at the centre of the development and centralisation 
of the modern state. The creation of social citizenship resulted not only from movements 
struggles to expand democracy and citizenship rights, as it led to state centralisation 
(Eisenstadt, 1998; Mann, 2012; Mouzelis, 2008). Following this argument throughout the 
dissertation, I will use the various dimensions of citizenship rights even if loosely and broadly 
defined to understand how claim-making develops throughout the cycle of protest more 
thoroughly. In this sense, I will define protest claim-making as demands made in the public 
sphere by contentious actors. I will breakdown citizenship into three main dimensions that tend 
to be present in both social movements and citizenship theories. These are constitutive of 
democratic dynamics and will be used to interpret the evolution of citizens claims and demands 
through time.  
Citizenship, more than a discourse or ideology, assumes a relationship between the 
State and citizens. Furthermore, ensuring rights for citizens is central to the development and 
sustenance of democracy. What is at play is how conflicting actors in the political sphere 
discuss and argue about the content of these particular rights in a democracy. The constitutive 
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categories will then provide a loose and adaptable classificatory scheme to analyse and interpret 
claim-making throughout the cycle of contention.  
The classical conceptualisation formulated by Marshall defines citizenship as ‘status 
bestowed on those who are fully members of a community. All who possess the status are equal 
with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal 
principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship 
is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement 
can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed’ (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992). 
Based on the English case, Marshall puts the expansion of rights on a continuum over 
three centuries. In the 18th century, civic rights develop: these relate to individual liberties, like 
freedom of expression and thought, rights of property and the right to due process. In the 19th 
century, political rights matured as the right to participate in the exercise of political power as 
a member of the political body. Finally, in the 20th century, social rights guaranteed an 
economic and social safety net that ensured a decent living for all. Marshall demonstrates that 
until the concession of social rights, no principle safeguarded citizens equity towards class 
inequalities nor guaranteed the social and political inclusion of the working class. Furthermore, 
this is in line with conceptions of democracy that go beyond civil liberties. For instance, Tilly 
defines democracy by stating that “a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations 
between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding 
consultation” (Tilly, 2007, pp. 13-14). This could be translated into equality, voice, inclusion 
that is ensured by more specific types of rights. 
However, other perspectives can be adapted to the understanding of claim-making and 
its diversity in contentious politics. Fraser (2008) proposes an approach to social justice based 
on three major families of justice claims: redistribution, recognition and representation. Even 
if connected by participatory parity, these cannot be reduced to each other. For all of these 
justice means the dismantling of the institutionalised obstacles associated with each one, and 
in this sense, it is similar to the way that Marshall approaches citizenship. As such, they 
constitute basic categories that allow the reading of claim-making in a broader sense. 
Claims for redistribution target distributive injustice or maldistribution and deal closely 
with the dynamics of capitalism and class structure. Recognition discusses and opposes the 
discourses against status inequality or misrepresentation, being related to the impediment of 
participating due to “institutionalized hierarchies of values”. Lastly, representation constitutes 
a political dimension of this grammar of claim-making, that it is directly connected with the 
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“scope of the state’s jurisdiction and the decision rules by which it structures contestation”. 
(Fraser, 2008, p. 17) It is related with who is included and excluded in the political community. 
TABLE 2. 1 GRAMMARS OF CLAIM-MAKING AND CITIZENSHIP 
Marshall Tilly Fraser 
Social Equality Redistribution 
Civil Inclusion/integration Recognition 
Political Voice Representation 
 
Combining these perspectives into a single framework allows for a multi-faceted 
perspective whereby multiple claims and interests are considered and recognised in the political 
field. This provides a broader scope of understanding the demands made throughout the cycle 
of contention and how discursive repertoires evolve in the different phases, which allows going 
beyond social movement perspectives that through their participatory conceptions of 
democracy ask for an expansion of voice, political citizenship and representation in order to 
improve other dimensions of citizenship. Even if these dimensions do not perfectly overlap, 
there are multiple connections in the way that they try to approach similar issues. In this way, 
I will be better equipped to deal with the variety of claims throughout the cycle.10  
 
2.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I provide an analytical framework that enables me to look into contentious 
responses in two cases of implementation of austerity. Following a dynamic approach, this 
considers both the nature of the actors and of claim-making throughout the cycle of contention. 
The primary objective is to go beyond a perspective that solely examines specific actors and 
events and instead takes into account the full scope of the political process. In this way, I will 
be considering multiple actors and a variety of claims, but more importantly, I will also 
consider how the interaction between multiple actors and claims shapes the cycle of contention. 
To fully understand the configurations that the contentious paths took, this period needs 
to be considered as a moment of “thick history” whereby history compresses and accelerates 
with high levels of contention (Tilly, 1978). As the crisis becomes a moving target, the 
challenge here is, therefore, to have the necessary tools to analyze these shifting sands and for 
that the perspective espoused by authors such McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001) on 
contentious politics provides an approach that it is open-ended, relational and processual, 
                                                          
10 I will develop the operationalisation further in the methodological chapter. 
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considering a multiplicity of actors and their links. So far, there is not a process-based approach 
that fully draws the connections between the actors and the disparate elements presented here.  
Case studies on Portugal and Spain present a quantitative difference of work published. 
While a vast array of publications discusses the protest mobilisation during this period in Spain, 
as it was one of the most potent cycles of contention, Portugal has not been studied nearly as 
in-depth and there are fewer researchers working on the topic. The apparent less intriguing and 
explosive nature of the protests received less attention in books and international research 
projects. Nonetheless, this is arguably what makes it a compelling case of study as it displays 
different contentious configurations, even if displaying similar conditions for protests to arise. 
The comparison should help us to understand how the previous institutional arrangements are 
necessary in mobilising against austerity and neo-liberal policies and how the process between 
2011 and 2015 plays a role in understanding this outcome.  
The puzzle here is less about the impact of the economic crisis and how it leads to 
protest and more about the political dynamics in which protests are embedded. In the following 
chapter, the methodological tools based on these principles from a contentious politics 
approach will be considered in order to approach these questions. This crisis constitutes a 
critical juncture that redefined the political field and relations in the time to come in these 
countries. Thus, these cases will help to illuminate the trajectory and the factors of change 
under democracy, market reform and the tensions between them. Therefore, this work 
examines the internal dynamics of the contentious cycle by assessing the dynamic relations 
between “social movements, political contention and regimes, and at the embedding of national 
patterns of contention in world politics” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 179). 
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3. Methods 
My entire scientific enterprise is indeed based on the belief that the deepest logic of the social word 
can be grasped only if one plunges into the particularity of an empirical reality, historically located 
and dated, but with the objective of constructing it as “a special case of what is possible”, as 
Bachelard puts it, that is an exemplary case in a finite world of possible configurations 
Bourdieu, 1998b, p.2 
  
As Bourdieu (1998b) states in the above citation, scientific work in social sciences requires a 
deep immersion and knowledge of the realities under study. This means not only considering 
variables but also having an anthropological and historical awareness that allows a 
contextualisation of events and phenomena under observation. Taking this into account, 
together with the assumptions and rationale established in the previous two chapters, in this 
chapter I will describe and reflect on the methodological tools used in this dissertation. 
The discussion that follows takes into consideration the analytical dimensions that were 
established in the previous chapters in order to analyse the contentious responses to austerity. 
Besides time and space, I study on the one hand actors and their networks and alliances, while 
on the other hand I consider movement practices such as their repertoires, strategies and 
discourses. In designing the methodological apparatus, I have also taken into account the fit 
between theory, questions and data to be collected. Regarding this, I will first discuss the 
general approach to the research process and how this is translated into a paired comparison in 
which process tracing is used, followed by a more detailed examination of the tools used and 
how the process of data collection unfolded. 
  
3.1. Spain and Portugal, 2008-2015: Paired Comparison and Process Tracing 
The overarching research design is based on a combination of paired comparison and process 
tracing. Both falls under the scope of tools generally used in Contentious Politics. Before 
presenting the methodological strategy followed, I will briefly comment on the set of 
epistemological principles that guide this work. This will help to situate the methodological 
and empirical work developed here within the framework of critical realism. 
Brante (2001) defines three fundamental principles of critical realism. First, an 
ontological principle that establishes that social reality is independent from our representation 
or our conscience (even though social reality is both material and mental). Second, an 
epistemological one sets that it is possible to acquire knowledge about reality. Finally, that 
methodologically all knowledge is fallible and therefore amendable. For this author, each 
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theory is directed towards different levels of social reality, and rather than finding “the basic 
and all-encompassing formula by which all social phenomena can be explained’, what is 
important in social sciences is to “map out the respective mechanisms for each structure in 
order to be able to explain social phenomena” (Brante, 2001, pp. 177-178). Therefore, 
cumulative knowledge is not only empirical but also consists in the identification of 
mechanisms and social processes. In this way, if empirical data allows us a detailed and 
meticulous acquaintance with reality and the testing of hypothesis, it is through systematic 
reflections that we can identify operating mechanisms. As Berthelot observed there is a need 
to “conceive Sociology as an effort for reflected description of social world, of puzzle-solving, 
of elucidating constitutive mechanisms, of gauging interpretive schemes based on a common 
problematization area, where the objective is the “clear indexation of results and conflicting 
benchmarks” 11 (Berthelot, 2000, p. 127). 
As such, research design vary along with the context, object and objective. 
Methodologies should be developed as flexible and adaptable tools, and not as a formula. As 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), I argue that research does not entail a positivist path, 
but rather a continuous cycle between evidence and theory, that focuses on theoretically 
oriented empirical research (Rueschemeyer, 2009). This is not to say that epistemic relativism 
is followed, but rather that the field of possibilities is opened by combining different forms of 
data and methods to build a solid object through clear epistemological vigilance and reflexivity. 
Instead of following a prescriptive recipe, the research design should adapt to fit the 
problems under research. As Abbott (2004) suggests, scientific discovery is as much about 
rigour as it is about creativity. Even if scientific work establishes detailed and systematic 
procedures that does not mean erasing creativity; imagination plays a crucial role in articulating 
and generating ideas. The vast array of methods developed in social sciences over the last 100 
years are a toolbox open to be mixed and triangulated. With this approach it is possible to 
strategically combine and integrate multiple sets and sources of information, allowing the 
observation of complementary processes. 
Moreover, opting for a pluralist and open set of methodologies makes it possible to 
overcome and complement the limitations of each one. In line with this, the analytical 
principles and research design that guide this endeavour are firmly established in what can be 
described as methodological pluralism (Abbott, 2004; Brady & Collier, 2010; Della Porta & 
Keating, 2008; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Briefly, it is advocated here that problem-driven 
                                                          
11 Translated from Portuguese. 
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research is not led by methodologies, but instead that these are tools that can be creatively 
combined to answer the questions at hand. Against positivist hegemony (and to a certain extent 
its reductionism), methodological validity is given not by methodologies itself, but rather by 
research problems. 
Therefore, my research strategy aims at understanding and comparing how the 
contentious process developed in Portugal and Spain from 2008 until 2015. In the tradition of 
historical sociology, it involves both pattern identification and process analysis. If the former 
“searches for recurrent structures and sequences across time and space”, the latter  
“examines how social interactions impinge on each other in space and time. Instead of 
considering space and time as additional variables, it presumes that space-time 
connections define social processes and that social processes operate differently as a 
function of their placement in space and time” (Tilly, 2001: 6754).  
Therefore, to uncover political change, I opted for a processual comparative analysis 
inspired and grounded in the work developed by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2015). In 
line with the theoretical chapter and of the critical realism above mentioned, the contentious 
politics approach centres itself on mechanisms as factors that explain political change. These 
are not laws, but rather recurrent patterns (relational, cognitive, environmental) found 
throughout cycles of contention. These do not need to happen necessarily in the same sequence, 
but instead they appear in different combinations. The purpose of this type of comparative 
approach is to - rather than focus on the different factors behind processes of change - explore 
the processual black-boxes beyond these causes. In this sense, it is an interesting method for 
exploring patterns between countries and to study them in a more comprehensive way (Ragin, 
1987). 
In regard to contestation of neoliberal austerity policies, Portugal and Spain are 
contrasting cases that have been feeding ongoing discussions about their democratic practice 
(Fishman, 2011, 2012b; Fishman & Lizardo, 2013). However, it should be said that the 
trajectory and sequence of political and historical events between Portugal and Spain was very 
similar. During the 20th century, these countries went through a long period of authoritarian 
regimes, with the transition to democracy happening in the mid-1970s. This was followed by 
simultaneous access to the EU (1986) then more recently by the economic crisis and austerity 
which hit them around 2010. In the face of the Great Recession, both countries faced a critical 
situation with regards to the international crisis, the European responses, and domestic policies. 
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Socialist governments were in power until conservatives took over in 2011 in both cases, and 
launched austerity reforms. Trade unions spearheaded initial reactions with calls for general 
strikes at the end of 2010, and in 2011 new actors emerged. After this point, as it will be seen, 
both cases followed distinct paths when it comes to the contentious responses to austerity. 
Therefore, Portugal and Spain seem to be historically bound due to their “periphery of 
the centre” or semi-peripheral status (Santos, 1990) which results in their being exposed to the 
same global dynamics. Nevertheless, despite these resemblances, their political trajectories 
under austerity do not follow the same path. Even if it is possible to detect a political change 
in most European countries - particularly those most affected by crisis and austerity - the 
processes of change seem to be mostly bound to their political structures, with institutional and 
non-institutional actors reacting in different ways. 
Two major comparative methodological devices are combined to uncover the 
mechanisms behind these episodes of contention. Firstly, within these broader epistemological 
and methodological contexts, a strategy of paired comparison (Tarrow, 2010). This allows the 
clarification of distinct dynamics and trajectories in each case. Tarrow argues that paired 
comparison is a “method of political analysis distinct from both single-case studies and 
multicase analysis” (Tarrow, 2010, p. 231) that allows for an in-depth comparison of two cases. 
This strategy provides deep background knowledge of the cases and causal-process analysis 
that a large-N strategy would not provide, pushing the theoretical arguments further. By 
emphasising the process, it increases the observation points making the empirical work more 
intense and detailed and thus providing the tools for uncovering more intricate and complex 
mechanisms and relations between actors. Furthermore, Tarrow justifies the two-case strategy: 
“The answer, I think, is that the move from single-case to paired comparison offers a 
balanced combination of descriptive depth and analytical challenge that progressively 
declines as more cases are added. The moment we go from one case to two, I would 
argue, we are in the realm of hypothesis-generating comparative study, while also 
enabling ourselves to examine how common mechanisms are influenced by the particular 
features of each case; as we increase the number of cases, however, the leverage afforded 
by paired comparison becomes weaker, because the number of unmeasured variables 
increases.” (Tarrow, 2010, p. 246) 
Adding to this, when studying contentious processes, there is a tendency in the literature to 
focus only on positive, more importantly, visible cases of contention (Zamponi, 2012). The 
Portuguese case, despite the similar economic situation to their southern counterparts, reveals 
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a different outcome that helps to shed light on different types of contentious cycles and their 
constitutive mechanisms. Moreover, taking into account one of the central questions of this 
dissertation (the relations between actors) this adds to the variety of types of relations that can 
be studied. It could then be said that the analysis is built over a negative case (Emigh, 1997) 
considering that Portugal displays a lower level of protest that would be expected. 
A second central methodological element of this dissertation is process tracing; a type 
of within-case methods comparison, which investigates the constitution of a causal narrative 
and sequence that tries to link two related phenomena and their mechanisms (Lange, 2013). 
Therefore, a core insight of process tracing is that it allows the analysis of temporality by 
exploring causal ordering, covariation over time, and path dependence. The interplay between 
sources is at the core of this approach: 
“In process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is 
in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case (…) 
The process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the 
causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable or variables and 
the outcome of the dependent variable” (Tansey, 2007, p. 206) 
The combination of a variety of sources for process tracing and consequently the building up 
of analytical and causal narratives and conceptual articulation is central here. These can be 
conceptualised as causal process observations which are defined as: 
“Pieces of data that provide information about context, process, or mechanism and 
contribute distinctive leverage in causal inference. They are contrasted with data-set 
observations (DSOs), which correspond to the familiar rectangular data set of 
quantitative researchers. In quantitative research, the idea of an ‘‘observation’’ (as in 
DSO) has special status as a foundation for causal inference, and we deliberately 
incorporated this label in the idea of CPOs to underscore their relationship to causal 
inference. Obviously, we do not thereby mean that one directly observes causation. 
Rather, this involves inference, not direct observation.” (Brady & Collier, 2010, p. 202) 
All these elements give preponderance to what could be called “thick description” and 
in-depth knowledge of the case studies. Being process rather variable-oriented leads to 
immersion and reliance on multiple sources of empirical data in a fine-grained and detailed 
reconstruction of processes and mechanisms. This culminates in the usual distinction, albeit 
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defensive, between the why and how questions. As is often argued by authors from interactionist 
perspectives, an alternative to examining long trends and chains of causality in social structures, 
is to focus on deconstructing chains of interactions and its effects on political outcomes. 
 
3.2. From Conceptualisation to Data Collection 
The research design aims at understanding and comparing how the contentious process under 
austerity developed in Portugal and Spain between 2009 and 2015. Departing from social 
movements methodological problems such as myopia of the visible (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a) 
in which collective action is equated with visible protest and mobilisations, hardly considering 
symbolic and unseen elements, I distinguish between two complementary levels of data 
collection. Inspired by Goffman’s (1990) distinction between front and backstage, I suggest 
that research on contentious politics should combine both a seen dimension of mobilisation 
present in public protest with an unseen dimension regarding movement culture, discourses 
and most of all interactions between actors that are not visible in the public sphere. 
The data collection involved a protest event analysis and interviews with key actors 
involved in the process of mobilisation. In the first step, the protest event analysis (PEA) 
allowed me to map and perceive the changes in protest during this cycle of contention regarding 
actors, repertoires and claims. This was followed by interviews with members of political 
parties, trade unions and social movements which helped to define and understand the unseen 
dynamics of mobilisation in the backstage, such as the links between actors and their strategies. 
If triangulated, these constitute complementary forms of data collection, as will be seen 
in the following sections. Interviews were particularly valuable to my understanding of the 
quantitative data. They elucidated for many features of the political life in both countries, 
especially in Spain whose politics I had less insight into prior to commencing this work.  
As remarked in the preceding chapter, some of the perspectives and analysis of the 
movements of the crisis fall into overgeneralisation and romanticisation that exaggerates their 
transformative potential (Roberts, 2008). One of the reasons behind this is the overly biased 
samples that studies tend to rely on. Focusing solely on ‘new’ social movements without paying 
attention to the diversity of responses to market liberalisation is a limitation that affects our 
understanding of anti-austerity mobilisations. Hence, a full and detailed account of the events 
and groups that mobilised against austerity is needed and that can only be achieved through a 
systematic collection of data looking into the variety of contentious responses, not only from 
institutional and non-institutional actors but also how these interacted along the way. 
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3.2.1. Protest Event Analysis: Actors and Protest in the Public Sphere 
PEA is a technique developed explicitly in the field of social movement, related to the political 
process approach, contentious politics and directly translating its assumptions (Earl, Martin, 
McCarthy, & Soule, 2004; Hutter, 2014a; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2008). Not only does it 
serve to make an accurate description of the political process, but also to enlighten and read 
the mechanisms of contention as suggested by authors like McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
(2008).12 Additionally, it is flexible enough to encompass other research traditions such as 
resource mobilisation or new social movements (Earl et al., 2004). As it stands, it is a tool that 
focuses on a systematic data collection of protest from one or various sources of data. This 
avoids cherry-picking and allows the analysis of evolution and changes within the protest cycle 
regarding actors, claims and repertoires. 
The PEA is a type of quantitative content analysis that “turns words into numbers” 
through which it is possible to understand “how protests co-vary with the changes in their 
environment” (Hutter, 2014a, p. 336). Hutter adds that as “an unobtrusive technique, it can 
handle unstructured matter as data, it is context-sensitive, and it can cope with large volumes 
of data” and that “the ability to move beyond a few cases and illustrative examples is also what 
made PEA so attractive to social movements scholars” (Hutter, 2014a, p. 337). By covering 
multiple dimensions of the mobilisation process such as actors, claims, repertoires, time and 
space, it allows to establish a chronology and to perceive the dynamics and proprieties of the 
protest cycle (Hutter, 2014a). Examining data across time allows moving to procedural and 
mechanistic forms of explanation, focusing on action rather than organisational views of social 
movements (Earl et al., 2004; Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). This means that it is possible to 
identify action repertoires and waves of protest, allowing several contentious actors to be 
studied simultaneously. Regarding research design, it moves from a qualitative to a quantitative 
approach, that allows comparative and historical analysis due to “the relative simplicity and 
standardisation of procedures” (Fillieule & Jimenez, 2003, p. 258).  
Regarding the unit of analysis, this methodology focuses on events. By concentrating 
on events rather than organisations/actors, it considers a plurality of claim-making actors that 
goes beyond social movements. In the Acts of Dissent it is written that “from an analytical 
standpoint, we should not equate the study of protest with the study of social movements. Social 
movements tend to protest but not all protests are conducted by social movements” (Fillieule 
                                                          
12 I will not give a historical approach of this technique here since it is not the objective, rather I will 
make a reflection on how this fits my questions and objectives. For a historical overview see: Earl et 
al, 2004 and Hutter, 2014a. 
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& Jimenez, 2003, p. 272). In this way, following the codebook of the project Dynamics of 
Collective Action I will consider an event: (1) it is collective act (more than one person); (2) it 
is a public act; (3) it is a protest event (as some movement activities can include e.g., 
fundraising); (4) and it involves claim-making and desire to change society.13 
In this way, and in line with the definition given by Tilly, a protest event constitutes a 
collective and public claim-making endeavour. With this wider definition, a broad spectrum of 
actions must be considered: there are several ways of expressing disagreement and discontent, 
both from institutional and non-institutional actors, allowing the study of different actors and 
their emergence across time. Alongside this, a vast repertoire of actions will be considered, not 
only protests and strikes but also manifestos, petitions, occupation and squatting to name a few. 
Regarding the delimitation of time and space, a long period of time was chosen: from 
the USA financial collapse in 2009 to the 2015 general elections in Spain and Portugal (2009-
2015). To understand the changes in mobilisation, I have defined three distinct phases of 
contention: (1) between 2009 and 2010 - from the beginning of the global crisis until the 
beginning of austerity in both countries; (2) between 2010 and 2014 in which austerity 
packages were applied in both countries; (3) finally, an electoral period between the years of 
2014 and 2015. Therefore, I will be comparing three different periods where there is a mix of 
distinct economic and political circumstances: pre-austerity, austerity and pre-elections. 
Establishing an extended period helps to compare the nature of the mobilisations within the 
same contexts but along different circumstances. 
Critiques of this technique point out that media selectivity might bias the results. 
However, it is widely recognised by researchers in the field that it “should not be equated with 
the universe of protests that occur daily in many places” (Koopmans & Rucht, 1999, p. 246). 
Despite not being wholly representative, this technique helps to envisage the whole sequence 
of events in a clear and systematic way and take into consideration the plurality of protest 
actors, claims and repertoires in the field. 
Regarding data collection procedures several considerations should be made. Even if 
other records or sources can be used, the PEA makes typically use of newspaper sources. It is 
usual to triangulate sources, and as such to use different newspapers covering the same period 
and territory in order to complement and corroborate the information collected. However, due 
to a combination of time constraints, the time span and numbers of cases covered I have 
selected only one source in each country. Adding to this, as I only use one source, following 
                                                          
13 See the codebook in: https://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/.  
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Franzosi (1987), I have not used sampling techniques and proceeded to an exhaustive, 
systematic and daily collection of protest events, as sampling can distort final results. This 
allows a full mapping of protest events reported ensuring more diversity. 
Regarding the sources, I have used one large-scale circulation newspaper in each 
country with an online edition. Instead of using keywords, I have made daily search allowing 
a more detailed analysis and collection of events. In Portugal I have used Diário de Notícias 
and in Spain El País.14 
Diário de Notícias was created in 1864 and is the oldest national newspaper in Portugal 
to have national coverage. Accornero observes that despite the various phases of the 
newspaper, it can be said to have a conservative positioning. The online edition of the 
newspaper had eleven million views and it was the third most viewed in Portugal. In addition, 
it had a circulation of 43 thousand at the beginning of 2011 and circa 21 thousand at the start 
of 2018 . El País was founded in 1976 and ever since, despite some distance in the last decade, 
has been a newspaper closely associated with PSOE. Its coverage is nationwide with regional 
supplements in Catalonia, Valencia, Andalucia, Basque Country and Galicia, which could 
serve to explain the higher numbers in protests reported in these regions (Portos, 2016). 
These resulted in a database with 4566 events spanning between January 2009 and 
December 2015. In Portugal I have collected and coded 1345 events, while in Spain this 
resulted in 3221 protest actions. Taking into account the questions and conceptualisation 
established in previous chapters, the database is composed of four dimensions with the 
corresponding variables. In developing these, I took inspiration from works in the field that use 
a similar methodology, adjusting it to the objectives at hand. Moreover, many of these were 
adapted not only considering the countries and their particularities but also ensuring that the 
variables and categories would fit both cases. In that sense, many of the variables had to be 
open and broad, while being comparable and significative for the analysis. Even if a pre-
established codebook existed, this had to be refined progressively at different stages of the 
research based on protest events found.   
The following dimensions and variables were considered: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 http://www.dn.pt/; http://elpais.com/. 
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TABLE 3. 1 DIMENSIONS AND VARIABLES OF THE PROTEST EVENT ANALYSIS 
Dimension Variables 
Time and 
Space 
• Country, Location 
• Year, Half-year, Three Months, Month 
Actors • Movements and Civil Society 
• Labour and Trade Unions 
• Political Parties and Groups 
Claims and 
Issues 
• Economic (Austerity, Work, Consumption, Production) 
• Political (Representation and Participation, State and Inclusion, International 
Relations) 
• Social (Education, Health, Housing, other) 
• Cultural (Identity Politics, Neighborhood, Urban and Environment, Other) 
Modes of 
Protest 
• Repertoires 
• Target 
• Place 
• Length 
• Violence 
• Dimension 
 
As visible in table 3.1, the four dimensions are the following.15 
1. Time and Space: these are critical variables regarding situating protest events in the 
different phases of contention. These correspond to the geographical location, and have 
been further coded in terms of year, half-year, three months and month. 
2. Actors: this corresponds to the type of organisation or group that organised the protest. 
I have split them into three major groups, with each one being an independent variable. 
Therefore, as will be seen, there is the possibility of two or more actors being involved 
in the organisation of events. Initially, the decision was to code them thematically, 
taking into account the type of groups organising, for example environmental, women, 
or anti-austerity groups However this resulted in an unmanageable number of groups 
in a single variable that was not comparable. Thus, I decided to a have broader and 
more inclusive categories in multiple binary variables. Therefore, movements and civil 
society actors correspond to all groups outside the institutional arena; labour and trade 
unions contains all the groups related with work issues, either large and national trade 
                                                          
15 More detailed description of the codebook in the Appendix III. 
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unions or groups that organise independently from them at the factory level; finally, 
political parties and groups refers to party organisation or other institutional actors. 
3. Claims and Issues: translates the grammars of protest that I have discussed in the 
analytical framework as the language of rights and social justice. Similarly, to the actors 
I have refined the variable along coding process. If initially, I intended to have only one 
variable, I have later followed the same strategy; plus I did not predict many of the 
claims categories I have found (e.g. production and consumption). Following what was 
discussed in chapter two, I have operationalised and refined the categories proposed in 
the framework. In this way, redistributions correspond to both economic and social 
claims, while representation refers to political claims. Recognition was integrated 
within cultural claims. I have divided this into four primary dimensions: 
a. Economic claims are related to economic issues ranging from austerity to 
labour, but also questions related to consumption and production. The first 
distinction that should be noted is between austerity and work. The latter refers 
to protests against austerity, as policies of liberalisation and cut down of labour 
costs, it is understood here as macroeconomic policies of the right hand of the 
State (Bourdieu, 1998a). The former is related to questions around labour such 
as precarity and unemployment, both at the public and private level. 
Consumption related claims related to demands by and around private 
consumers such as banks. Finally, to deal with small business owners that 
protest for legislation in their sectors or benefits, I classify them with claims 
around production. 
b. Political claims are linked with questions around the state and democracy, 
political citizenship and representation. I have divided them into national and 
international demands. The latter denotes issues, for example relating to other 
nation-states. Concerning the former, I have divided them between claims on 
representation and participation, and state and inclusion. This comprehends the 
regional nationalism in Spain, and is absent in Portugal. 
c. Social claims refer to social rights at large in relation with the retrenchment of 
the welfare state or the left-hand of the state (Bourdieu, 1998a). In this sense, it 
gives a perspective over claims of redistribution on education, health and 
housing.   
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d. Lastly, cultural claims are associated with demands typically related to new 
social movements and recognition such as identity politics, but also 
environmental issues. 
4. Modes of Protest refer to all the variables referring to non-symbolic features of the 
protest. This allows further identifying of the characteristics of these such as repertoires, 
target, place, length, violence and dimension of the protest. 
 
Various problems emerged in the construction of this database. The reference 
newspaper for Portugal, Diário de Notícias, had its website and search mode changed in 
October 2015, limiting the PEA of this country until that date as it did not allow for data 
collection after this point. Also, it should be noted that the quantification of numbers of 
participants in the Portuguese protests was of low quality. Reports were often imprecise 
referring merely to hundreds or thousands. 
This vast array of variables allows for a detailed description and depiction of what the 
evolution of the protest cycle looked like. Nonetheless, as Tarrow observed when commenting 
on Tilly’s methodological endeavours, simple event counts are weak in “relating sequences of 
events to non time-series variables like institutions, political processes, and the contingent 
factors (…) it also made it difficult to detect the internal mechanisms of particular events or 
chains of events, such as escalation, factionalization, radicalization, moderation, and 
institutionalization. It was also insensitive to the internal dynamics of episodes of conflict” 
(Tarrow, 2008, p. 234). Taking this into consideration, and to counter the effects of merely 
studying the process through event-counts, I have collected and systematised data on what has 
been termed as eventful protests (Della Porta, 2008) or large protest events (Diani & Kousis, 
2014): massive events of protest that have symbolic impact and that change the trajectory of 
the political process. As cited, methodologically this gives several points of observation that 
allows for a more systematic and in-depth story telling.16 
Moreover, complementary to this and to make more sense of the internal dynamics of 
the contentious episode, I have constructed a chronology of the main political and economic 
events between 2007 and 2015, through a variety of sources in Portugal, Spain and Europe. 
Beside using similar data, in chapter 4 - Preludes to Mobilisation - I have used secondary data 
sourced from the European Protest and Coercion Data collected from international news 
                                                          
16 I have included this data in Appendix I. 
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agencies by Ronald Francisco between 1980 and 1995 (Francisco, 2000). I will develop further 
how I have use this data in the chapter accordingly. 
  
3.2.2. Interviews and Fieldwork Strategy: Underlying Structure of Mobilisation 
The second stage of the data collection process involved interviewing members from different 
political parties, trade unions and social movements. This technique constitutes a qualitative 
research procedure that involves in-depth questioning of respondents to explore their 
perspectives on particular situations or facts. Despite the non-representativeness of the PEA 
sources, by triangulating it with the interview data, there is potential not only to confirm the 
trends and patterns identified but also to complement them. 
While the PEA allows for the systematisation of information regarding protest in the 
public sphere in terms of what is seen, it provides little reliable data about the unseen aspects 
of these mobilisations. As Flescher Fominaya (2014a) points out, the contentious politics or 
political process approach and by extent their methodological tools, tend to focus merely on 
the active phases of contention without considering their continuity over time through the 
“survival of activist networks, a repertoire of goals and tactics and a continued sense of 
collective identity” (Fominaya, 2014a, p. 147). This is reflected in two aspects of this research, 
as on the one hand the PEA provides insufficient evidence on the relations between actors, and 
on the other hand does not allow to uncover the emergence of non-protest actors, despite their 
connections, and how particular groups develop, such as Podemos. 
The interviews allow for an analysis of the backstage and to conduct a broader historical 
reconstruction of the process under study. Therefore, they illuminate aspects of the 
mobilisation process such sequences of events, framing and claims, and relations between 
actors. Furthermore, interviews with well-positioned actors allowed me to access information 
that would not be accessible otherwise and elucidated me on questions that I was not aware of 
before. 
I have conducted semi-structured elite interviews with well-positioned people in the 
field to gain an overview of the events and organisations. The interviewee was given the chance 
of talking freely over predefined topics. This would occur almost as a conversation, where I 
would rarely intervene unless it was to introduce a new question or a comment. In this way, no 
fixed interview script existed and rather changed depending on the interviewee position in the 
field, and according to the material and knowledge I had acquired in previous interviews. These 
were done mostly off the record, to ensure confidentiality and were instrumental in 
reconstituting the events, narratives and facts previously missing from my analysis. 
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Nonetheless, the interviews followed the themes already approached in previous 
chapters and that constitute the main analytical dimensions of this dissertation. With the intent 
of uncovering causal mechanisms, I focus on obtaining specific information about the events 
under study. Interviews focused on different themes to reconstitute the mobilisation process 
through different perspectives: (1) constellation of actors, their alliances and conflicts; (2) the 
nature of the claim-making, frameworks, narratives and how they evolved throughout the cycle 
of protest; (3) repertoires of action and different forms of movement culture and organisation. 
Other dimensions covered included an introductory question regarding their past political 
trajectories to reconstruct previous episodes and campaigns of contention and connect them. 
I have interviewed people from three types of actors, namely trade unions, political 
parties and social movements. The latter is to be divided in events, groups and platforms, such 
as the gathering of several groups around a specific issue. In addition, if the institutional actors 
are more permanent, the social movements could sometimes be more ethereal and demobilise 
quicker. Due to the nature of this, many of the interviewees had multiple belongings along the 
process contributing to a more efficient reconstruction. This was accomplished both by talking 
with leaders and public figures, but also with second lines of the movements and groups whose 
discourse would not be compromised and could eventually reveal more information. It is 
important to notice that in contrast to the PEA there was no attempt to be as systematic, but 
rather to collect multiple perspectives within and across groups to allow the triangulation of 
different and conflicting discourses in the field. This objective of this principle is to: 
“Obtain information about well-defined and specific events and processes, and the most 
appropriate sampling procedures are thus those that identify the key political actors— 
those who have had the most involvement with the processes of interest. The aim is not 
to draw a representative sample of a larger population of political actors that can be used 
as the basis to make generalisations about the full population, but to draw a sample that 
includes the most important political players who have participated in the political events 
being studied.” (Tansey, 2007: 765) 
I have established a purposive sample, in which the gathering of informants was based 
on pre-established networks and creation of new ones especially through other scholars and 
informal contacts. Adding to this, snowballing also played an important role. 
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Nevertheless, it should be added that there were differences between countries, as in 
Portugal I already had a previously established contact network,17 which meant easier access 
and significantly less time to conduct interviews than in Spain. In Spain this occurred through 
a prolonged stay in Madrid whereby I was able to establish multiple contacts while observing 
and getting acquaintance with the political landscape: this accomplished by an attempt of 
anthropological emersion in which I attended political events and rallies.18 
To analyse the interviews I developed a codebook whose purpose was to organise 
information in each group. This revolved around two main aspects. On the one hand, I would 
ask each interviewee about their trajectories of activism to identify the main movements and 
political dynamics preceding 2008. This feeds directly into the chapter of the antecedents of 
protest and shows that many activists were already politically involved in the 1990s and there 
are multiple continuities from those years. On the other hand, I have analysed each actor 
separately taking into account the relevant analytical dimensions such as: origins; relations 
between actors; internal dynamics and organisation; frameworks and claims; repertoires. 
With the information organised for each group, I have produced summaries for each 
group involved in the cycle of contention that supported the writing up of the dissertation. It is 
important to note that in writing these I have taken some caution in not reproducing actors’ 
discourses. Instead, I have filtered them and cross checked them with multiple testimonies and 
sources I have collected. 
  
3.3. Conclusion 
The breadth of the research and data collection here is important as it bridges distinct theoretical 
and methodological approaches. This mixed-methods approach whereby I triangulate 
information allows for a detailed and in-depth analysis of the contentious process in two 
countries both in terms of the public sphere and the backstage interactions. Moreover, its 
saturated nature links the field of social movement studies with the field of political parties, 
                                                          
17  In between 2011 and 2014, I participated in a European research project (MYPLACE - 
https://myplaceresearch.wordpress.com/) that allowed me access to the field of social movements in 
Portugal at the height of the crisis. This was important to the process of data collection, as due to 
multiple interviews I was acquainted with many of the actors on the ground. Nevertheless, the process 
of data collection gave me a new perspective on the field and shed light on many aspects that I was not 
aware. A list of the people interviewed is in Appendix II. 
18 I attended the BE convention and the first Constituent Assembly of Podemos - both at the end of 
2014. During my time in Spain (October 2015 to May 2016) I followed the electoral process closely 
and attended various rallies and demonstrations. 
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which as will be seen later in this dissertation is central to the understanding of the field and 
the regimes of contention studied here. 
In a way, in the attempt to fully reconstruct the process, I follow a Gramscian method 
of political analysis: I consider the whole social formation and the different relation of forces 
between actors. Not only that, but in a context of political and economic crisis it is important 
to keep in mind the distinction proposed by Gramsci between organic crisis, referring to the 
relatively permanent nature of structures, and to the conjunctural, denoting the more immediate 
and occasional events that despite the contextual circumstances end up reflecting in-depth 
power relations. 
However, this is not without limitations. This comes both from insufficiencies of the 
methods that even through triangulation cannot compensate for, and problems that emerged 
during fieldwork. One such example is the balance between the PEA and the interviews in the 
two countries. In Spain, due to the dimension of its territory and dispersion of protest, the PEA 
database is significantly more diverse than in Portugal, where protest tends to be less varied 
and as a result reports have less descriptive thickness. Nevertheless, the Portuguese interview 
set was richer, not only because of my previous knowledge of the field, but also due to its 
smaller extension it was possible to have more description. This was not the case in Spain, 
where my interviews were restricted to Madrid, which introduces bias in the description and 
understanding of the process. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that this city was central 
in the mobilisation process across the country. There might be other studies that also make 
these points regarding the different levels of mobilisation and processes that I can use to inform 
my research. 
The methodological tools described in this chapter, combined with contextual and 
theoretical considerations done previously, will be developed in the following chapters for the 
context of the Portuguese and Spanish anti-austerity contentious processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
4. Preludes to Mobilisation: from Transitions to 
Democracy to Anti-Austerity Protests 
 
In this chapter, I reconstruct the structures of mobilisations in Portugal and Spain from their 
transitions to democracy to the austerity years. While this chapter contributes to a broader 
understanding of the processes that prepare and operate at the opening of cycles of contention, 
it also examines the links between different episodes over time (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a; 
Tarrow, 1993; Zamponi & Fernández González, 2017), encouraging scrutiny of interpretations 
that portray the 2011 mobilisations in the two countries as spontaneous or novel. In light of the 
debates discussed in the introduction and analytical framework chapter, I argue that despite 
being unpredictable, the protests that emerged during the anti-austerity years followed patterns 
established in previous decades. 
Building on a genealogical approach, I will show not only the “survival of activist 
networks, a repertoire of goals and tactics and a continued sense of collective identity” (Flesher 
Fominaya, 2014a, p. 147), but also how these networks, repertoires, and identities change over 
time. In the words of Flesher Fominaya: “we need to pay more attention to movement 
genealogies, including the configuration, spaces and resources of pre-existing networks, and to 
the role of movement cultures and discursive processes in mobilisation” (Flesher Fominaya, 
2017, p. 8). Despite the existing analysis that identifies distinct features of protest mobilisations 
in these countries, we lack consolidated meso-level theory, such as analysis of actors and their 
interactions over time. 
I argue that despite the apparent unpredictability of the 2011 protests, mobilisation did 
not emerge spontaneously (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a). Instead, it resulted from (1) the 
interaction between mobilising and connective structures, openness and configuration of 
institutions in democratic settings and (2) conjunctural and contingent elements (Portos, 2017; 
Tarrow, 2011, 2015; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015; Zamponi & Fernández González, 2017). If the 
former refers to the configuration of actors that results from past contentious processes, the 
latter considers political opportunities, structures, and threats (Kriesi, 2007; McAdam et al., 
2001), such as economic or/and political crises, market liberalisation, or globalisation. 
Furthermore, being rooted in mobilisation experiences and having a genealogy of its own that 
cannot be ignored, a discursive and symbolic dimension is to be considered in both how it 
reflects already existing cleavages (Hutter, 2014b), or how these are politically articulated (De 
Leon, Desai, & Tugal, 2009). 
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Portugal and Spain offer distinct paths that help to elucidate the processes, conditions 
and configurations behind the emergence of cycles of contention. The overview given in the 
following sections will allow me to trace the continuities and changes regarding past 
mobilisations within each country, while also exploring and situating the relations between 
institutional and non-institutional actors from the transitions to democracy to the anti-austerity 
years. In this regard, the two countries show different patterns over the last four decades that 
we see reproduced in the anti-austerity cycle: in Portugal institutional actors dominate the 
landscape, intervening and embedded in social movements, while in Spain, the two arenas 
display more autonomy. Additionally, there are differences regarding movement practices and 
discourses: in Portugal the movement actors remained centralised, small, closed and conflictive 
between themselves, while in Spain there was a strong stream of decentralized, local, horizontal 
organisations. Regarding discursive repertoires, in the years preceding the crisis, Portuguese 
demands focused on labour precarity without questioning the regime foundation; in Spain, a 
strong critique of the institutions that emerged with the transition to democracy. 
I will make use of secondary literature literature,19 secondary data, and interviews to 
synthesise and identify transformations in the contentious field involving political parties, trade 
unions and social movements until the emergence of the anti-austerity mobilisations. 
I have organised the chapter into three sections. The first encompasses the two decades 
of mobilisations from the transition to democracy until the end of the governments of Felipe 
González in Spain (1996) and Cavaco Silva in Portugal (1995). Consolidation of democracy 
and admission to the European Economic Community (later the European Union) are the main 
events that marked this period. The second deals with the Global Justice Movement and the 
political dynamics from the late 1990s to 2005. The final period describes the mobilisation 
immediately preceding the Great Recession, from 2005 to 2011, when Socialist parties were in 
government in both countries. By shedding light on the histories of mobilisation, we can better 
understand the contentious configurations that emerged during austerity years. 
 
4.1. Dynamics of Contention in the 1980s and 1990s in Portugal and Spain 
The decades following the transitions to democracy in both countries share some aspects 
regarding contentious processes. A first identifiable trend is the absence or weakness of the so-
called new social movements. During the 1980s, contrary to other Western European countries 
                                                          
19 The reconstruction of the Portuguese of the mobilisation processes before the crisis is harder. The 
literature on social movements and protest is scanter than in Spain, where reflections on social 
movements and protest have been ongoing since 1980s. 
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where feminism, environmentalism or pacifism became part of the social movement landscape, 
labour and political issues were still at the fore in the recently formed Iberian democracies. For 
instance, despite the multiple protests against nuclear energy, especially in Spain20 (Cruz, 
2015) but also in Portugal (Barca & Delicado, 2016), these outbursts were essentially local in 
character and never coalesced into a larger movement or political party, like the Green parties 
elsewhere.21  
Nevertheless, each county displayed different cycles and dynamics of protest that 
developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s.22 
FIGURE 4. 1 PROTEST ACTIONS (PER 1000 PEOPLE) IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN PER YEAR 
(1980-1995) 
 
Source: Francisco (2000) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, it is possible to the number of contentious actions per year 
differs between the two countries. In Portugal, 1982 was the year with most protest, followed 
by 1994 and 1989. In Spain, the 1980s were quite conflictive due to the violence perpetrated 
                                                          
20 Rafael Cruz (2015) compiles a useful chronology of contentious events in his book “Protestar en 
España, 1900-2013” that allows for in-depth analysis of the main trends of protest in Spain. 
21 Instead, leftist political parties either adopted this issue or integrated fringe political forces into their 
lists. For instance, in Portugal, the equivalent of the Green party allies with the PCP since the 1980s. 
22  The data presented here comes from the “European Protest and Coercion Data” collected and 
systematized by Ronald Francisco. It is available at http://web.ku.edu/~ronfrand/data/. I use this data to 
investigate some of the main contentious trends in Spain and Portugal. Some caution is necessary as the 
data comes from international news agencies and not from national sources. Therefore, it might be less 
diverse and biased towards protests with international visibility. I have also cleaned and changed the 
database to exclude coercion events (i.e., repressive actions by the authorities) and kept solely protest 
events. I have reduced all multi-day events (repeated in the database) to single events. 
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by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), but the number of protest actions per 1000 people dropped 
to about half after 1987. 
FIGURE 4. 2 CONTENTIOUS ACTORS (%) IN PORTUGAL (1980-1995) 
 
Source: Francisco (2000) 
In Portugal, as shown in Figure 4.2, labour and trade union actors were dominant until 
1990, apart from 1984 to 1986. Furthermore, the primary type of tactic was the strike, as intense 
labour mobilisations marked the first two decades of democracy in Portugal (Accornero & 
Ramos Pinto, 2015). The highest number of protests occurred in 1982 in the context of a 
deteriorating economic situation that preceded the second IMF intervention (1983).  It was also 
the year of the first two general strikes in Portugal (February and May) organised by the CGTP 
union federation (the third happens in 1988, with the collaboration of both CGTP and UGT). 
These trade union federations shared close ties with different political parties (in ways that 
have not changed to this day). Founded in 1971, CGTP was directly linked with the PCP. On 
the other hand, the PS, and to some extent the PSD, were involved in creation of UGT in 1978 
to dispute the communist hegemony in the world of labour. Stoleroff (1988) observed that the 
CGTP, the main trade union in Portugal, advocates a class unionism that is anti-capitalist, while 
the UGT, the minority trade union, pursues a reformist and neocorporativist strategy. As such, 
‘the Portuguese syndicalism is a politicised syndicalism, oriented to state intervention, and 
even dependent on it’23 (Stoleroff, 1988, p. 148). 
 
                                                          
23 Translated from Portuguese.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Social Movements and Civil Society Trade Unions Political Parties and Actors
75 
 
FIGURE 4. 3 CONTENTIOUS ACTORS (%) IN SPAIN (1980-1995) 
 
Source: Francisco (2000) 
Figure 4. 3 shows that trade unions were dominant as a protest actor in Spain in the 
1980s, with exception of the period between 1984 and 1986, when political actors such as ETA 
were active. In addition, social movements only start gaining preponderance in the 1990s.  
Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) was created in 1962 by the PSOE, while it was still under 
Franco’s regime. The Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) dates back to 1888 (it remained 
in clandestinely during Franco’s dictatorship). These actors led strong labour mobilisations that 
shaped the period of the transition to democracy and continued to be important afterwards 
(Cruz, 2015; Jiménez Sánchez, 2011; Romanos & Aguilar, 2016; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2014a). 
Nevertheless, as the main parties on the left, the PSOE and the PCE (Partido Comunista 
Español), integrated the negotiations during the transition to democracy, trade unions (CCOO 
and UGT) were demobilised not only because their overall demands were accepted, but also to 
facilitate the negotiation process. As institutional actors became ingrained in State structure, 
trade unions started demobilising their members and civil society actors gained more 
autonomy. Before the year 2000, Spain saw general strikes in 1981, 1985, 1988, 1992, and 
1994. 
Trade unions membership progressively declined and, as politics became increasingly 
institutionalised, mobilisation in the street became less important. Nevertheless, the trade union 
retained some of its trademarks: horizontal practices (expressed in open assemblies) and direct 
actions (such as occupations). Notably, even initially built as a political and social movement, 
the CCOO abandoned that project as it institutionalised further in the late 1980s (Cruz, 2015). 
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An important difference in the evolution of the political arena between the two countries 
is that in Spain, unlike in Portugal, the link between political parties and trade unions was 
progressively disrupted. The liberalising character of the policies taken by PSOE government 
after the 1982 election led to fracturing with the UGT; the latter even mobilised against the 
government’s labour law of 1984. At the same time, the Communist Party and the CCOO ended 
up acting more independently from each other as a result of the formation of the new left-wing 
party Izquierda Unida (IU) in 1986. Nevertheless, a third element to be considered is the  close 
collaboration upon institutionalisation and embededness in the state of the so-called 
majoritarian trade unions (CCOO and UGT) (Gunther & Montero, 2009): rather than in 
conflict, these had very close ties. This institutionalisation does not mean that these actors were 
not conflictive: during Aznar’s governments, they opposed to several of the policies 
implemented. Nevertheless, this oppositional stance diminished under Zapatero’s PSOE 
government. 
FIGURE 4. 4 UNION DENSITY (PER ACTIVE POPULATION) IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN (1977-
2015) 
 
Source: OECD - Administrative data; Note: data for the years: 1977, 1991-1994, 1996. 1998-2001, 2005, 2007, 
2009, 2012-2013 in Portugal is not available: a continuos line fills the gaps. 
 
Adding to these dynamics, as shown in the Figure 4. 4 below, membership in trade 
unions followed distinct patterns since 1977, when data is available. In Spain after a steep 
increase from 1977 to 1978, density suddenly falls to 11% in 1981. From then onward it 
increases slowly until 1998 when it reaches 18%, and remains relatively stable from then until 
2015. Portugal starts with higher levels of union density, circa 60%. However, it declines 
steeply stabilising around the year 2000.  
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Labour was not the sole issue or actor of contention. In both countries, political 
organisations pursued violent and disruptive actions, although they had different objectives: 
political violence in Spain was associated with nationalist projects, while in Portugal it served 
revolutionary and radical purposes.24 
 Political actors associated with the nationalist question were predominant in Spain 
throughout the 1980s. Terra Llibre (Catalonia), Ejército Guerrillero de Pueblo Gallego Libre 
(Galicia) or, the principal group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country) were only 
contained or decreased their action by the end of the 1980s. Notice the large proportion of the 
political actors (Figure 4. 3) and violent repertoires in Spain (Figure 4. 6) throughout the 1980s 
which started to shift from the 1990s onwards.25 
FIGURE 4. 5 REPERTOIRES (%) IN PORTUGAL (1980-1995)26 
 
Source: Francisco (2000) 
In Portugal, there were also several violent groups active from the years of the 
revolution onwards. In the 1980s, the FP2527 emerged as the expression of radicalisation of 
those whose post-dictatorship view for society was rejected. The action of this group is visible 
                                                          
24 Furthermore, there were instances of far-right and anti-communist violence in both countries, see: 
Palacios (2003) for Portugal. In Spain, Cruz (2015) shows how the far-right remained active and 
demonstrated until 1981 (23F) but then its activity decreases. 
25 It is interesting to notice that these actions generated counter-mobilisations against terrorist violence 
that would become closely associated with PP (Díez & Laraña, 2017, p. 170). 
26 Besides strikes, these repertoires include the following: 1) demonstrations - demonstrations, marches, 
rallies; 2) violence - forms of political violence such as bombs, taking hostages or assassinations; 3) 
civil disobedience - hunger strike, boycott, vandalism, occupation and riots. 
27 Forças Populares 25 de April - Popular Forces April 25th was a revolutionary group that operated in 
Portugal between 1980 and 1987. They were against the path of parliamentary democracy and 
capitalism taken after 1975. 
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between 1984 and 1986 in Figure 4. 5 when political actors using violence increased. State 
action led to the imprisonment of the members of this group and their disappearance. 
FIGURE 4. 6 REPERTOIRES (%) IN SPAIN (1980-1995) 
 
Source: Francisco (2000) 
The end of the 1980s brought about a change in contention. New protagonists, issues 
and repertoires, particularly non-institutional actors, emerged. In Spain, two main processes 
seem to co-exist. On the one hand, trade unions institutionalised further, demobilising their 
respective bases. At the same time, urban neighbourhood associations, which were relevant 
during the transition, also began demobilising (Cruz 2015; Romanos & Aguilar 2016). 
Nonetheless, the cultural elements and movement practices that pervaded these groups – such 
as horizontal, decentralised and local actions – persisted in future movements. However, even 
if small and based on local, decentralised cultural practices and repertoires, alternative 
autonomous and radical groups developed. These would later become the basis for the Spanish 
Global Justice Movement (GJM), which will be discussed in the next in the section of this 
chapter. The most important mobilisations of the 1980s were the pacifists and the movement 
against the NATO (with significant mobilisations against the referendum to decide on the 
permanence of the organisation in 1986) (Díez & Laraña, 2017). This went hand in hand with 
the movement against conscription that spread to the whole country (Sampedro, 1997). This 
period also saw the development of housing squats (Martínez López, 2018). Finally, after a 
year of campaigning in 1994, a demonstration promoted by more than 200 organisations 
followed by a weeks-long encampment in Madrid pressured the PSOE government to allocate 
0.7% of the GDP to foreign aid (Cruz, 2015; Díez & Laraña, 2017). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Strike Demonstration Violence Civil Disobedience
79 
 
In Portugal, the mid-1980s marks the rise of Cavaco Silva’s PSD centre-right 
government and his liberalising economic policies, such as privatising national economic 
sectors28. By the end of his mandate in 1995, contestation was high and marked by several 
disruptive events, and for the first time since the revolution, labour issues did not dominate 
protest activities.  
One example of this was the set of protests against educational reforms, which had both 
a national and a local character (Drago, 2003; Mendes & Seixas, 2005; Seixas, 2005). 
Nationally, these mobilisations were initially against the introduction of a new university 
access exam (in 1989) and later against the introduction of tuition fees in higher education (in 
1991).  These protests formed and ‘trained’ a generation of activists who would be present in 
future mobilisations (including the anti-austerity cycle of protest).29 The movement delayed 
the implementation of tuition fees for several years and led to the overthrow of several 
ministers. Locally, Mendes and Seixas (2005) show that basic education was one of the main 
protest issues in Portugal between 1992 and 2002. Most of these local protests were rooted in 
problems related to education, housing, living conditions, and fundamental social rights of 
citizenship.  
Another important mobilisation was the 1994 mobilisations against the toll increase on 
the (then) only bridge over the Tagus River in Lisbon. As the population and truck drivers 
conducted roadblocks to protest against the increases, the government answered with a police 
charge that deeply delegitimised the government and arguably led to its demise. 
The 1990s brought about new trends in Portugal. At both national and local levels, 
contentious actors in this decade were largely outside the institutional actors’ circuit and 
displayed some degree of autonomy and innovation. It is particularly important to note that the 
actors were outside protest in the labour world and involved a reaction to welfare retrenchment 
and rising taxation. 
These trends are visible in the data from the European Protest and Coercion data. In the 
period between 1991 and 1995, social movements carried out demonstrations, but also 
disruptive civil disobedience actions. This survey of contentious processes that developed in 
                                                          
28 During the Revolutionary period (1974-75) various economic sectors were nationalised (e.g. banks). 
Cavaco Silva, with the support of the PS, reverted many of these. 
29 The link between different cycles of protest in Portugal is not clear, but from my interviews there 
seems to be some continuity in time that would be worth exploring in future projects. This is important 
since, despite the lack of an important history of protest, social movements and political citizenship in 
Portugal, it is possible to trace links between the activists that were present in anti-fees education 
movement of the 1990s and later in the anti-austerity one. 
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both countries in the decades following the transition to democracy reveals a number of 
patterns and contrasts. Even if ‘weak’, new issues became increasingly prominent in the protest 
sphere. When stronger labour mobilisations developed, these were embedded in different 
configurations: in Portugal, unions maintained strong links to political parties, while in Spain, 
even if unions became progressively institutionalised, the links with parties were progressively 
disrupted. Political violence was particularly visible in Spain with the ETA, and in Portugal 
with FP25 (although on a markedly different scale). With the demise of political violence by 
the late 1980s, new and alternative forms of mobilisation developed throughout the 1990s 
outside the world of labour. In Portugal, reactions against welfare retrenchment and 
liberalisation, for example in education, grew in importance as an alternative to traditional 
actors. In Spain, local groups, even if small, developed horizontal practices that would become 
important later. In both countries, these would become mainstream forms of mobilisation 
fuelled by global economic and political dynamics. 
 
4.2. The Global Justice Movement in the Iberian Peninsula 
New dynamics of protest emerged at the turn of the millennium. The Global Justice Movement 
(GJM), active throughout the 1990s and 2000s, appeared as a response to political and 
economic globalisation and led to a shift in the contentious fields in Portugal and Spain. It 
introduced new repertoires, discourses, and organisational forms. 
 The GJM was a transnational social movement, involving a global network of actors 
from NGOs, grassroots organisations, labour unions and political parties (Della Porta, 2007). 
Despite their heterogeneity, the different actors shared a critique of neoliberal globalisation, 
resistance to hegemonic economic models, and proposals for radical changes (Baumgarten, 
2017c). While their campaigns were global in nature, covering a range of economic, social, 
political, and environmental issues, local networks committed to participatory democracy were 
responsible for putting their agendas into practice (Della Porta, 2013). Facilitated by the 
developments of new communication technologies, these diverse groups initiated contentious 
events of resistance such as in Seattle (1999) and Genoa (2001) in addition to joint events or 
meetings such as the Social Forums in Porto Alegre (World Social Forum, since 2001) and 
Florence (European Social Forum in 2001) (Baumgarten 2017c, Della Porta, 2013).  
Emerging at the intersection of national contexts and transnational protest dynamics, 
the GJM was crucial in leading nationally focused social movements to adopt similar 
repertoires, practices, and issues, forming a generation of activists with similar references and 
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experiences (Romanos & Aguilar 2016; Flesher Fominaya, 2014a). Nevertheless, each country 
integrated these dynamics into pre-existing cultures and structures of mobilisation. As a result, 
the configurations that the GJM took in each country varied. More importantly, the 
antiglobalisation dynamics came to influence not only the formation of later protest 
movements, but were also crucial to renewing and introducing new ideas and practices to 
political parties.30 
This reformulation is particularly visible in Portugal, where the end of the 1990s and 
the 2000s brought about a reconfiguration of the political field and the relations between social 
movements and institutional actors. For example, a new party on the left, the Bloco de 
Esquerda (BE, or Left Bloc) emerged in 1999. Drawing activists from many of the 
mobilisations in the 1990s (e.g., anti-tuition fees), the BE became one of the expressions of the 
GJM in Portugal. Formed as a movement-party it incorporated deliberative and participatory 
democracy into its practices and organisation (Soeiro, 2009). Going beyond the usual platform 
of redistribution in Portuguese democracy, it introduced recognition and representation into 
their discursive repertoire. The new party presented itself as a strategic ally that could 
collaborate, leverage, and support the growth of various new movements.31 
The creation of the BE was not the only change at the party level that contributed to the 
reorganisation of the political sphere during this period. Starting with the disintegration of the 
USSR,32 dissident voices began criticizing the Portuguese Communist Party’s stiffness and 
hierarchical organisation, culminating in the 2002 party congress. Not only did dissidents 
critique the lack of pluralism and internal debate within the party and the punishment of any 
deviation from the official line, but they also called for a collaboration of the PCP with other 
left organisations. 33 The PCP hardliners considered such calls to be reformist and refused to 
                                                          
30 I do not intend to overstate the importance of the GJM. Rather, I am reconstructing mobilisations that 
influenced those I will be looking at in following chapters. 
31 It is important to notice that BE was formed after the collaboration of three radical left parties 
throughout the campaigns of liberation of East Timor and for the 1st referendum for the 
decriminalization of abortion, both in 1998. I will develop the history of the party more thoroughly in 
the last empirical chapter. 
32 Aligning with the same critics, after the dissolution of the USSR there was an internal movement for 
renewal of the PCP. Many of these militants left the Communist Party and formed the Plataforma de 
Esquerda in the 1990s. Later they either joined PS or founded BE. Contrary to the cases of Spain or 
Italy, the Portuguese Communist Party never followed a Eurocommunist line and remained in tune with 
the Leninist approach. 
33 To this day the Communist Party plays a crucial role in the formation of political cadres: more than 
half of my interviewees were part of the party at some point. At the same time, the PCP is close to the 
CGTP. 
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make concessions. This resulted in well-known militants, known as renovadores,34  being 
expelled or leaving the party. These dissidents formed small groups for reflection, created 
associations such as the Renovação Comunista35 or, in some cases, joined the BE.36 
 Concurrently, the GJM had consequences outside the sphere of political parties. 
However, there is little published research on these groups in Portugal, and no full description 
of their characteristics other than agreement that, in comparison with other countries, the 
network of civic organisations was limited and precarious (Lima & Nunes, 2008).  
The attempt to form a Portuguese version of the World Social Forum reflects these 
features. As Nunes (2011) reports, the idea for the Fórum Social Português37 (FSP) first came 
about in 2002 from activists, intellectuals and personalities linked to the BE and the PCP who 
had participated in international events associated with the GJM. Throughout 2002 there were 
several preparatory initiatives,38 in which various actors and tendencies participated, leading to 
the first FSP in June 2003. The establishment of the FSP brought organisations linked LGBT 
and women’s rights, human rights and development, and the environment together with 
political parties and trade unions. The objective was to form a unitary platform that could 
coordinate their actions oriented towards global aspects of political and economic life. 
Contrary to the principles established in the World Social Forum, the BE and the PCP 
were present and involved in in the FSP’s organisation from the start. Nunes (2011), as well as 
some of my interviewees, point out that their participation was controversial.  
“[…] in the FSP, from 2003 to 2006 […] I experienced assemblies where the PCP 
brought buses with people to win debates, where you would have one person telling a 
hundred how to vote.” (interviewee 12, Portugal) 
There is a widespread notion among the social movements groups that political parties 
monopolised the FSP, which could be why it did not become a permanent platform for debate 
and discussion (Nunes, 2011). Various groups’ attempts to limit the participation of political 
parties and trade unions failed. Considering the characteristics of Portuguese civil society in 
                                                          
34 Translated as renovators. 
35 Translated as Communist Renewal. 
36 This tendency defended a closer relation or pacts with other leftist forces and came to be crucial in 
left pact formed in 2015 (I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 7). 
37 Translated as Portuguese Social Forum. 
38 See for example the following published in Público - “Movimento anti-globalização junta PCP, BE, 
associações e sindicatos”: https://www.publico.pt/2002/05/30/politica/noticia/movimento-
antiglobalizacao-junta-pcp-be-associacoes-e-sindicatos-147469 
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which polimembership is common (Soeiro, 2014), (activists or militants with multiple 
affiliations simultaneously belong to political parties and social movement groups), social 
movement groups decided not to break with parties, since their members would be present due 
to overlapping memberships. 
Paradoxically, Nunes (2011) shows that the confrontation between political parties in 
this platform allowed Portuguese GJM groups some autonomy to develop their actions in the 
first Forum. While it was active, the FSP participated in international protest events such as the 
demonstrations against the war in Iraq and the contestation of the 2001 G8 meeting in Genoa.39 
Nevertheless, the BE decided not to participate in the second gathering in 2006, allowing the 
PCP and its satellites to gain dominance over the organisation. Shortly afterwards this led to 
the extinction of the FSP platform (Nunes, 2011).  
Overall, GJM-linked movements never gained much traction in Portugal.  Institutional 
actors subjugated the attempts to build a Portuguese version of the movement. Nevertheless, 
the GJM introduced new ideas and repertoires of action that reshaped the political field, even 
if institutional actors appropriated them. 
In Spain, in contrast, the GJM was stronger and more autonomous, comprising a 
heterogenous set of groups and networks that emerged after the transition to democracy 
(ecologist, radical feminist, antimilitarist, squatters, etc.). As such, the movement of the 
movements in Spain was shaped by a political culture among activists that favoured 
decentralisation. A leftist and decentralized culture marked the Spanish GJM identity and 
repertoires. When compared with the GJM in other countries, it presented higher levels of 
informality and localism. Despite the Spanish GJM movement’s heterogeneity, at the heart of 
its identity and practice lay a unifying principle based on participatory and radical democracy 
that reinforced the characteristics they introduced. This led to an important renewal and 
resignification of repertoires and practices with new forms of street actions and performances, 
which translated into a broader global framework and the use of civil disobedience as a 
repertoire (Jiménez Sánchez & Calle, 2007). 
                                                          
39  See “Marchas contra a guerra no Iraque: 80 mil pessoas em Lisboa e 5 mil no Porto”: 
(https://www.publico.pt/2003/02/15/mundo/noticia/marchas-contra-a-guerra-no-iraque-80-mil-
pessoas-em-lisboa--e-5-mil-no-porto-280140) and “Portugueses à margem do movimento 
antiglobalização” (https://www.publico.pt/2001/07/28/jornal/portugueses-a-margem-do-movimento-
antiglobalizacao-160242) 
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It was in this context that the “open social centres”40 became popular. This combined 
the GJM transnational influence with long-standing traditions of local and grassroots activism 
that sprang out of neighbourhoods across the country, also in addition to the numerous squats 
that had formed since the 1980s (Martínez López, 2018; Rubio-Pueyo, 2016). As these spaces 
emphasised openness to the community and activist-based forms of knowledge creation, they 
came to constitute the backbone of the infrastructures of mobilisation for the core participants 
of the GJM movement. These centres provided – and continue to provide - spaces for 
interaction, meeting, and socializing activists in new ideas and practices (Alonso, Betancor 
Nuez et al. 2015; Rubio-Pueyo 2016). 
With exception of CGT, an anarcho-syndicalist union that shares similar organizational 
practices and repertoires with the grassroots movements, trade unions and political parties 
barely collaborated with social movement actors; when they did the relationship was strained. 
Social movements aspired to autonomy from institutional actors such as the IU and the major 
trade unions (CCOO and UGT), which they saw as wanting not only to capture them, but also 
as being complicit with the economic policies they opposed (Díez & Laraña, 2017; Flesher 
Fominaya, 2007, 2014a). 
In line with precedent set in previous decades, political parties and trade unions were 
mostly absent from the protest movement field during this period. Two points seem to confirm 
the idea of autonomy and lack of cross-pollination between institutional and non-institutional 
actors in Spain. First, Flesher Fominaya (2007) observes that in Madrid at the beginning of the 
20th century, the division between political actors was along autonomous and institutional lines: 
despite left wing parties’ (IU) attempts at collaboration, social movement actors avoided it. 
Second, my interviewees barely mentioned the presence of parties in the social movement 
milieu or simply discarded their importance. Nevertheless, Flesher Fominaya (2007) points out 
that despite the tensions between groups, instances of collaboration did exist: While the 
autonomous social movements retained discursive legitimacy based on their principles of 
horizontality, openness and integration in global networks, institutional leftist remained 
hegemonic at an organizational level. Thus, autonomous groups collaborated with and relied 
upon parties for space and financial and legal support, resulting in some cases of overlapping 
militancy. 
                                                          
40  Social centers constitute self-managed community centers that are run democratically and 
horizontally. They tend to be closely affiliated with anarchist or autonomist groups. 
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Politically, this period was characterized by several large protest events that shifted the 
political process and imaginary and marked the second term of the Aznar government (2000-
2004). The first, the movement Nunca Máis41  resulted from the mobilisations against the 
mismanagement of the accidental oil spillage on the coast of Galicia in 2002. This platform 
organised demonstrations in Galicia and Madrid throughout 2002 and 2003 (Cruz, 2015; 
Fernández & Peña, 2004). Second, in line with the GJM, was the protest against the war in Iraq 
and the Spanish government’s support for it in 2003. Protests occurred in over 55 cities across 
the country, and conservative estimates report that over three million people mobilised 
(Jiménez Sánchez & Calle, 2007). These protests were not an isolated, and a network of trade 
unions and social movements campaigned for more than a year afterward (Cruz, 2015).  
However, the most emblematic and remarkable mobilisations were the actions 
preceding the 2004 general elections in the wake of the terrorist attack on Atocha (three days 
before the elections).42 Following the attack, the PP led a misinformation campaign, initially 
pointing the finger at ETA, even though Al-Qaeda had already assumed responsibility. 
Commentators explain this attempted misdirection by positing that PP figured that admitting 
the attack was perpetrated by Islamic terrorists would have political consequences in the 
upcoming elections due to the party’s involvement in the war in Iraq. Spontaneous calls for 
protests started emerging in the GJM network (Flesher Fominaya, 2011). The protests occurred 
right before election day, and the mobilisation relied on SMS (Flesher Fominaya, 2011; 
Sampedro & Sanchez, 2011). Consequently, knowledge of the protests expanded beyond the 
usual networks of activists and spread quickly from Madrid to other cities to become a national 
protest. This mobilisation relied on broad generic frames that expressed distrust in political 
parties and excluded them from mobilisation; the famous “they [the parties] do not represent 
us” or “they call it a democracy, but it is not” were heard for the first time (Flesher Fominaya, 
2011). 
Flesher Fominaya (2011) argues that these protests were crucial in exposing the 
campaign of misinformation and pressuring the government. More importantly, they came to 
influence public opinion, leading to the end of PP’s rule and the victory of the PSOE. 
In this section, I have shown the emerging processes and transformations in the political 
field of the early 2000s. These characteristics are critical to understanding the mobilisation 
structures present later in the anti-austerity cycle. I have also highlighted how the GJM 
                                                          
41 Translated as Never Again. 
42 In his chronology, Cruz (2015) points out that almost 12 million people in whole country protested 
on the day immediately after the attack. 
86 
 
reflected existing features of movements in each country: in Portugal, change was driven by 
political parties, which constrained and shaped the way conflicts in the field emerged and 
progressed; in Spain, movements displayed autonomy from political parties and centrally 
organised protests. 
While there were continuities regarding movement culture, practice, repertoires at the 
national level between the GJM and the anti-austerity movements emerging from 2011, there 
is not a direct link (Della Porta, 2012; Flesher Fominaya, 2014b). Broadly speaking, the GJM 
‘demobilised’ not just in the Iberian Peninsula, but also transnationally. As centre-left parties 
came to power in both Spain and Portugal (2004 in Spain and 2005 in Portugal), new sets of 
demands and struggles emerged that would more directly shape the post-2011 mobilisations. 
 
4.3. Precursor Mobilisations (2005-2011) 
Cycles or waves of contention tend to follow specific dynamics of protest from expansion to 
transformation and, finally, contraction (Koopmans, 2004; Tarrow, 1989). Contention does not 
emerge out of thin air, but it is a political process that evolves over time that involves multiple 
actors (Koopmans, 2004; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). In this sense, the period from 2005 to 2009 
was a precursor to the mobilisations against austerity. Besides the patterns that developed 
throughout the GJM, other factors came to the fore, namely the development of a structure of 
opportunities during the 2008 financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis and austerity from 
2009/10 onwards. These were political opportunities created by both top-down and bottom-up 
processes. 
 The centre-left parties in Spain and Portugal pushed for liberalising and market-oriented 
policies (López & Rodríguez, 2011). Apart from these reforms, they also enacted a number of 
socially liberalising policies that fulfilled the aims of social movements and contributed to a 
decrease in the number of protests. For example, with regard to LGBT and feminist demands, 
both countries legalised same-sex marriage and abortion (Alonso, Betancor Nuez, & Cilleros 
Conde, 2015; Jiménez Sánchez, 2011; Monteiro, 2012). As a result of Zapatero’s reforms (e.g., 
allowing gay marriage and abortion), Spain experienced counter-mobilisations pushed by a 
network of right wing and conservative organisations (Cruz, 2015; Díez & Laraña, 2017; 
Fernández, 2012). Although they did not overlap with the networks that formed the 15M and 
anti-austerity mobilisations, they were also present.  
In Portugal, the BE brought many of the demands on same-sex marriage and abortion 
to parliament with multiple goals: first, the BE wanted to be able to articulate their views on 
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issues of recognition. Second, and more strategically, the BE wanted to ensure a media space 
where it was prominent and competed with both the PCP and the PS by going beyond labour 
issues. As previously noted, the BE had worked to amplify social movements’ messages. The 
second referendum on abortion (2007)43 was was an example of this strategy, as it mobilised 
the institutional and non-institutional actors equally and also, most importantly, saw an alliance 
between various groups on the left (Melo, 2017). Despite the involvement of multiple social 
movement actors, institutional actors also played a major role (Monteiro, 2012): political 
parties supported many of the campaigning platforms with resources and personnel.  
 More importantly, new issues developed and came to mark the anti-austerity 
mobilisations in Portugal. First, the Socialist government pursued policies that entailed the 
closure of public services such as schools and health care services around the country. As a 
result, reflecting a trend in the 1990s, protests erupted all over the country, especially in the 
countryside where, due to depopulation, there was a retrenchment of educational and health 
care services (Nunes, 2008). At the trade union level, in the period between 2007 and 2009, 
teachers contested the reforms undertaken in the education sector (Stoleroff & Pereira, 2008) 
and organised large demonstrations that mobilised most of their professional class. Also, a 
reform of the labour law passed in 2008 was met with protests in the streets and a general strike 
in 2007 while being discussed in parliament and before approval. 
Secondly, in the years preceding the crisis the most important dynamic was the 
formation of networks around the issue of labour precarity; throughout the 2000s, both 
transversal and sectorial initiatives developed (Soeiro, 2015).44 Additionally, the BE was also 
a central actor in bringing the discussion of precarity into the public domain with multiple 
campaigns (Lisi, 2013).  
Both the literature (Cairns, Alves, Alexandre, & Correia, 2016; Soeiro, 2015) and 
interviewees agree that the adoption of the EuroMayDay45 in Portugal, in 2007 was central to 
the formation of networks around precarity.  
                                                          
43  The first referendum on this issue happened in 1998 – and had resulted in defeat for the 
decriminalization proposal. 
44 In his dissertation, Soeiro (2015) extensively describes the mobilisations against precarity. FERVE 
(Fartos destes Recibos Verdes - tired of this precarious condition) is an example of a transversal group 
that deals with all activity sectors, while ABIC (Associação de Bolseiros de Investigação Científica - 
group to attend research assistants precarity issues) is an example of a sectorial one. 
45 The EuroMayDay was a parallel event organised as part of the traditional celebrations of the Mayday 
all over Europe against labour precarity since the mid-2000s. Rather than organised by trade unions, 
autonomist and libertarian collectives were the ones that mobilized for this event. 
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“It is impossible to understand the 12th of March without understanding all the 
movements of precariousness that were formed since 2000, since Stop Precarity […] 
when a demonstration like the 12th of March happens, it does not happen spontaneously, 
it emerges from a set of networks, themes that were constantly on the agenda” 
(Interviewee 10, Portugal) 
 
“What the 12th of March did was to continue these processes: if experiences like the 
MayDay did not happen before, the Geração à Rasca46 could have happened but it would 
not have happen in the same way […] there was a lot of collective work developed in the 
Portuguese social movement between different organizations and issues that allowed the 
GaR to happen […] a  lot of the mobilisation structures and knowledge already existed 
since 2007”  (Interviewee 11, Portugal) 
The EuroMayDay in Portugal resulted from the confluence of activists coming from 
different sectors, namely from students associated with the BE, the GJM and the more 
autonomist groups. Their main objective was to create a collective identity not based on labour 
sectors, as trade unions do, but rather on a transversal, shared and lived experience of precarity 
by all workers. This broad alliance of collectives adopted a more spontaneous and fluid 
repertoire, as well as an assembly style of organisation typical of the GJM and the autonomist 
movements. On the 1st of May, they would organise a picnic and party and later an independent 
march that joined the march organised by the CGTP, even if not without conflicts and resistance 
from the union. Interviewees report that from 2007 to 2011 the annual march grew not only 
territorially (e.g. to Porto), but also numerically. 
The EuroMayDay protest in Portugal could be considered an early experience of the 
conflicts that would emerge in the anti-austerity cycle of contention. The interviewees I 
contacted refer to a division between a group closer to the BE, who would later create the 
Precários Inflexiveis47 group, and a more autonomist sector. Within the EuroMayDay the 
central tension was, as in the FSP a few years earlier, about the group’s relationship toward 
institutional actors, (i.e., trade unions and political parties). If the first group defended starting 
with an independent action followed by joining in the CGTP march, the second group preferred 
to go further and constitute an autonomous space outside the institutional arena with its own 
                                                          
46 Protest that happened in March 2011 in Portugal and was central to contesting austerity. I will discuss 
it in detail in the next chapter.  
47 Precários Inflexíveis was created in 2007 with the EuroMayDay. As an organization close BE, it was 
one of the main contenders of austerity and precarity in the public sphere (Alves, Cairns, Alexandre & 
Correira, 2016). 
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language. This divergence led to a split (see Soeiro, 2015, pp. 186-7; Alves, Cairns, Alexandre 
& Correira, 2016; Interviews), which ultimately stemmed from a fundamental conflict within 
the Portuguese left: some see any participation of institutional actors as an intrusion into or 
interference with the autonomy of the social movements. This approach is significantly 
different from the myriad of groups close to the BE, such as Precários Inflexíveis, which saw 
such collaboration as fundamental to their activities. Nonetheless, the CGTP was also reluctant 
to collaborate with the EuroMayDay: not only was the PCP-aligned union federation critical 
of alternative movements and forms of activism calling them pejoratively inorganic, they were 
also aware of the connection of these groups to the BE. 
“A lot of people connected to the BE […] then people coming from the autonomist 
space, like RDA, that left the MayDay organization due to political disagreement, 
because they wanted a different type of relationship with the trade unions […] they lost 
that battle. In 2009, the biggest year of the Mayday there was an assembly - since the 
beginning there is an important issue about trade unions because the Mayday at the 
European level develops a critique to trade unions. The idea behind the Mayday, as fluid 
movement of representation of the precariat, of the precariat as a different from the 
working class […] what we did here was to think about precarity as a labour relation, our 
understanding is that precarity is not a new thing […] it is the loss of rights conquered 
during the 20th century. (…) On the other side, there was an understanding of precarious 
workers as being a class in itself and a strong critic to trade unions […] the connection 
with trade unions was a strategic question of the Mayday, because there was a different 
understanding of what was precarity.” (Interviewee 11, Portugal) 
From 2010 onwards, in the context of austerity, protest became more visible. By the 
end of this year, two crucial mobilisations started to set the scene for the upcoming anti-
austerity protests. Some social movements mobilised to support the general strike (jointly 
organised by the CGTP and the UGT) against the ongoing cuts in the public sector. 
Traditionally trade unions had not organised street protests during general strikes. However, in 
this General Strike, there was a march and rally in Lisbon organised by non-institutional actors 
and with the support of the BE. Furthermore, at the end of 2010, multiple protests, including 
trade unions and autonomous groups, confronted the NATO summit in Lisbon. 
In Spain, apart from the dynamics already discussed with the GJM and the autonomous 
sector, several sectorial mobilisations developed less visibly in the mid-2000s. In contrast to 
Portugal, where public finances were already under strain and public sector cuts were felt 
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before 2010, Spain was going through a period of economic growth in which a housing bubble 
developed (bursting in 2008/9). As reported by Portos “a multi-organizational field of activist 
networks proliferated and consolidated during the low peak of the mobilisation wave, between 
2003 and 2010”, which “created a deposit and developed an expertise on which protesters in 
the shadow of austerity built” (Portos, 2016, p. 191).  
There were five types of movements active in this period that would also be central 
during the main-anti-austerity cycle: (1) the housing movement; (2) student and anti-precarity 
movements that developed outside the institutional sphere; (3) groups that directed criticisms 
at the political system against the main parties, the electoral system, corruption or the 
management of the historical memory; (4) internet-based mobilisations; and (5) nationalist 
movements, especially in Catalonia.  
Regarding the last issue, in the years immediately before the crisis as the Basque 
conflict settled, mobilisations for the referendum in Catalonia emerged (Della Porta, O'Connor, 
Portos, & Subirats, 2017). These would become a central aspect of the political crisis in Spain. 
This set of political and nationalist groups were absent from Portugal and constitute one of the 
main differences between the two countries. 
The mobilisations against Ley Sinde48 are usually named one of the main predecessors 
(Morell, 2012) of the 15M due to the activism around the use of the internet. The online 
activism of the Free Culture and Digital Commons Movement shaped the 15M movement 
practices decisively, not only in its composition but also in its framing and organisation. 
 Concerning the housing movement, there had been mobilisations since the mid-2000s 
against rising costs and unaffordable housing by immigrant collectives in Madrid, V de 
Vivienda, and later PAH (2009). The persistence of assemblies and horizontal organisation 
were two of their main features. Nonetheless, the radical framework and the lack of alliances 
with other actors limited their mobilisation potential (Aguilar & Fernández, 2010).  
The student movement enjoys a long tradition in Spain (Diez & Laraña, 2017). In the 
years preceding the crisis, students mobilised against the Bologna Reform using occupations 
and assemblies. Claims were both economic and political in nature: if, on the one hand, the 
reforms were considered a commodification of higher education, on the other hand, they 
regarded the reform as anti-democratic due to its top-down and mercantilist nature. More 
importantly, these political claims already called for an alternative democratic model of the 
university (Alonso et al., 2015; Zamponi & Fernández González, 2017). Zamponi and 
                                                          
48 “Sinde Law”, named after minister of culture, intended to regulate and limit online downloads. 
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Fernandez (2017) argue that the student movement shaped the anti-austerity mobilisations in 
Spain: they were initiators and “brokers in the adaptation of the anti-neoliberal discourse in the 
new context, with the goal of addressing a wider audience” (2017, abstract). By 2010, Spain 
had some of the highest levels of unemployment and precarity among young people in Europe. 
As a result of these disheartening statistics and building on accumulated experience from the 
anti-Bologna movement, by the end of 2010, the group Juventud sin Futuro grew in various 
universities. Using the direct transfer of activists skills, these groups created a broader 
discourse that went beyond youth and built transversal loyalties (Alonso et al., 2015; Zamponi 
& Fernández González, 2017). 
Parallel to this, between 2005 and 2010 various initiatives took aim at the political 
system, echoing some of the criticisms of 2004 at the demonstrations against PP in the 
aftermath of the attacks in Atocha (Flesher Fominaya, 2011). Although small and relatively 
underground, the groups such as No les Votes and Rompamos el Silencio49 (active since 2005) 
denounced the concentration of power under two main parties (PP and PSOE) and how that 
contributed to corruption and the complicity between business and politics (Cruz, 2015). 
Moreover, these groups implicitly critiqued the pacted transition to democracy, which they 
considered incomplete (Diez & Laraña, 2017). 
 In both Iberian democracies, in the years immediately preceding the crisis and under 
the control of centre-left parties, the openness increased around questions of recognition. The 
new policies dealing with abortion and same-sex marriage mobilised many groups. 
Simultaneously, the on-going economic liberalisation, the future financial disruption and Great 
Recession in 2008, and the 2010 austerity measures meant a deterioration of labour conditions 
in both countries. Not only did unemployment rise steeply, but precarity and underemployment 
disproportionately affected youth, leading to new forms of mobilisation and contestation. 
While trade unions continued to confine themselves to the protection of the insiders (i.e., 
workers with stable jobs), outsiders had to look for alternative forms of mobilisation. In 
response, the countries’ paths diverged. In Portugal, the emerging movements were restricted 
to the themes of labour and precarity, without elaborating on the political conditions in which 
they developed. In Spain, besides economic issues, multiple sectors were already questioning 
the regime. 
 
                                                          
49 Translated as Do not vote them and Break the Silence. 
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4.4. Conclusion 
Despite some superficial similarities, Spain and Portugal present two distinct paths of 
mobilisation up to the 2008 financial crisis. Even if embedded in the same international 
scenario, with some parallels between protest cycles, different contentious responses erupted. 
Between the transition to democracy and the emergence of the crisis, a complex picture of 
mobilisations emerges. Differences stem from multiple interactions not only between 
institutional and non-institutional contentious actors, but also between structures of 
opportunities, networks, and cultures of mobilisation. 
The main contrast is in the relationship between institutional and non-institutional 
actors. In the years before the anti-austerity mobilisations, the space of contentious politics in 
Portugal underwent a constrained renewal, whereby renovation of the social movement field 
was done within the sphere of political parties; in Spain, this renewal entailed autonomy 
between institutional and non-institutional actors.  
In Portugal, protest in the decade preceding the crisis flourished. However, contention 
existed within the limits of a restructured left (with the emergence of the BE and the group that 
left the Communist Party in the 1990s and 2000s). The creation of the BE as a strong 
institutional actor in competition with the PCP was of great importance. It created opportunities 
for the non-institutional actors to grow, allowing them more resources and coordination outside 
the control of the PCP. This would later feed back into the recomposition and creation of the 
groups linked to the BE that intervened in the anti-austerity cycle of contention. 
This contrasts with the picture in Spain. While trade unions were major contentious 
actors during the transition to democracy, upon institutionalisation street politics became 
secondary for these actors. Nonetheless, alternative and autonomous vehicles sprang out from 
already existing cultures of protest in combination with transnational forms of mobilisation that 
emerged during the 1990s/2000s. Rather than linked to political parties, movements in Spain 
tended to have an open character that integrates assemblies at every step. Many of these features 
will re-emerge during the anti-austerity protests, even if they come to be transformed and 
resignified. 
Besides the repertoires and configurations of contention, another important aspect to 
consider is the nature of the conflict per se. In Portugal, this, in the years before the crisis, was 
almost solely focused on labour and precarity and the retrenchment of the welfare state, and 
did not develop a critique of the regime. These activist groups were not able to expand beyond 
core militants and become a transversal movement, as they did in Spain. The movements that 
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emerged in Spain were more diverse thematically (housing, youth, and critique of the regime), 
and developed a frame that went beyond labour issues and became immediately transversal 
upon the explosion of the crisis. As such, movements in Spain articulated a new discourse that 
criticised the regime, while in Portugal there was an acceptance, to a certain extent, of the 
regime status quo. 
 
TABLE 4. 1 ACTORS, PRACTICES AND DISCOURSES IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN SINCE THE 1970S 
 Portugal  Spain 
Actors Trade union strength, connection with 
political parties 
Strength and presence of political 
parties among social movement groups 
– weak GJM 
Local movements that emerge upon 
changes in the welfare state (small, 
reactive and more disruptive) 
State-embedded trade unions, with no strong 
link to political parties 
Autonomy between social movements and 
political parties, with cases of collaboration at 
times 
Strong GJM 
Practices Small, closed and conflictive Horizontal repertoires, localism and 
decentralization 
Discourses Labour precarity emerges before the 
crisis as a grievance 
Besides labour precarity and liberalisation, a 
critique of the regime 
 
As a result, in both countries, the political field that emerged between 2008 and 2011 
solidified and crystalised the axis of contention that developed in the years before the crisis. 
While in Portugal new forms of protest and institutional actors cooperated, in Spain the conflict 
kept the groups independent. In Portugal, parties play a role connecting with other actors (the 
PCP with the CGTP; the BE with their satellite organisations, e.g., the Precários Inflexíveis), 
while autonomous groups tried to develop outside their sphere of influence. In Spain, beyond 
local dynamics of protest, social movements were autonomous and stronger than in Portugal. 
As I will show in the following chapters, all these features will be present and essential in 
understanding how contentious responses to austerity developed.  
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5. Turning Points: between a Stuttering Start and a 
“Trigger of Energy Spilling” 
 
Several aspects of the functioning of democracies are currently a source of intense discontent among 
their citizens. There is widespread dissatisfaction that democracy has been unable to generate 
socioeconomic equality, to make people feel that their political participation is effective, to ensure 
that governments do what they are supposed to do and not what they have no mandate to do, and to 
balance public order with noninterference in private lives  
Przeworski, 2016, p.4  
 
In this chapter, I compare the turning points of the cycles of contention in Portugal and Spain 
in 2011. By turning points, I mean the first protest events during the cycle that successfully 
mobilise beyond trade unions and whereby latent contentious issues and networks, described 
in the previous chapter, scaled up to mass protests. Following Tarrow (1993, 2011), the 
intensification of conflict, its geographical diffusion, and the emergence of new actors, 
symbols, frames and repertoires of action lead to new phases of the cycle of protest. 
After 2011 the character of mobilisations changed decisively. Before 2011, apart from 
small protest actions from autonomous movements or general strikes from trade unions, large 
protest events from non-institutional actors were non-existent. Nonetheless, with the 
introduction of austerity measures between 2010 and 2011, social movements became a central 
player in the political process and introduced a particular set of repertoires and discourses. 
Therefore, in this chapter, I analyse the mobilisations between January and December 
2011, highlighting the two eventful protests of this period: the Geração à Rasca in Portugal 
and the 15M in Spain. This means that I analyse not only the events at hand, but also their 
impact on the overall cycle of protest in each country. Due to the movements’ stuttering nature, 
in the Portuguese case this involves not only the Geração à Rasca, but also a series of 
subsequent events such as the Acampada and the 15O. In Spain, I analyse the 15M and its 
decentralisation to the locally based assemblies in neighbourhoods. 
While in Spain a sustained crescendo of mobilisations “spilled” the protests' “energy” 
(to use an expression of one of my interviewees) into contentions actions until 2013, the 
Portuguese movement was unable to generate momentum and followed a stop-and-go pattern. 
I argue that the fundamental difference concerns the ability of the emergent non-institutional 
actors to sustain their mobilisation continuously over time. If in Spain the 15M movement’s 
frames and repertoires became dominant and shaped future mobilisations’ actors, practices and 
discourses, in Portugal institutional actors became the leading force in the protest field by the 
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end of 2011. Thus, my question is why did the paths differ? More importantly, why were 
Spanish protest movements better able to generate and sustain mobilisation independently of 
institutional groups? 
I argue that the capacity for movements to sustain mobilisation in the long run is linked 
to their ability to go beyond the core of their activists, expand and politicise new members, and 
diffuse new repertoires and discourses. When comparing Spain and Portugal, both endogenous 
and exogenous factors affected the protest field. Endogenous factors include: (1) the ability to 
establish connective structures and build networks that ensure permanent mobilisation 
(Tarrow, 2011), rather than intermittent ones, and (2) the openness of movement culture and 
an appealing and inclusive frame. Exogenous factors include (1) the strength of institutional 
actors and their capacity to control “insurgencies”, and also of the non-institutional actors to 
maintain their autonomy and (2) the overall political and economic context.  
Departing from the interviews, the protest event analysis, and survey data, I reconstruct 
this period’s main features: actors, discourses, and capacity to build a connective network. With 
this paired comparison, I aim to identify essential factors in mobilisation, how claims evolve 
during the cycle of contention, and how institutional actors get involved. Therefore, in this 
chapter, I first identify the main actors and features of the movements and their capacity to 
sustain protest over time. Building on this, in the second part of the chapter, I expand on how 
both endogenous (movement culture, frames, and connective structures) and exogenous 
(political opportunity structure) factors come to structure contention during the first phase of 
the cycle. 
 
5.1. Networks and Actors: Going Beyond the Core 
In 2010, Spain and Portugal, led by their respective Socialist Parties, pursued austerity policies 
that envisaged wage cuts and welfare retrenchment. As a result, like in many other countries 
between 2010 and 2011 following the financial crisis of 2008, they experienced part of the 
global wave of contestation that emerged with the Great Recession. This wide range of protests 
that started with the “pots and pans revolution” in Iceland (2008) was followed by the Arab 
Spring in the Middle East and North Africa, Indignados in the southern European countries, 
and the Occupy Wall Street in the USA (2011); it went as far as Turkey and Brazil (2013) and 
later to France with Nuit Debout (2016). These protests affected the political process by 
introducing new discourses that, as Przerworski (2016) puts it in the quotation above, attacked 
rising inequality and citizens’ feelings of ineffectiveness and lack of influence over the political 
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system and their representatives. In most cases, this discontent resulted in prolonged 
occupations and re-claiming of the public space. The emergence of new protest actors shaped 
the political process, in both the short and long term. 
In Portugal and Spain, two eventful protests (Della Porta, 2008) mark this moment: 
Geração à Rasca50 (GaR) in Portugal (March 2011) and 15M (May 2011) in Spain. These 
inflections can be considered the turning points of the cycles of contention that constituted 
“moments of madness” (Zolberg, 1972). The objective of this section is to introduce in more 
detail the process, key actors, and events throughout this stage and to show how social 
movements in Spain were able to go beyond the core in a way that Portuguese movements 
could not throughout or after 2011. I describe this phase of the cycle of protest and focus on 
how the groups in Spain and Portugal either were or were not able to expand their protest 
participants beyond their usual membership.  
As shown in Figure 5.1, the number of protests per month in both countries follows a 
similar trend between 2009 and 2011. However, after 2011, protest in Portugal deflates and 
follows a stop-and-go pattern, while in Spain it escalates into an unceasing and sustained wave 
of contention until the end of 2013.  
FIGURE 5. 1 NUMBER OF PROTEST EVENTS PER MONTH IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN (2009-
2015)  
 
                                                          
50 Usually translated as “Screwed Generation” or “Desperate Generation”. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Portugal Spain
97 
 
 
5.1.1. Turning Points in Portugal 
In Portugal, at the beginning of 2011, seemingly out of nowhere, the self-named group GaR 
used social media (Facebook) to call for a demonstration the following March. The name was 
a play on the term used by a journalist (Vicente Jorge Silva) to designate the young people 
protesting against the introduction of tuition fees in the early 1990s who lowered their trousers 
and showed their bottoms to then Minister of Education, Couto dos Santos. Geração Rasca has 
a negative connotation that means ordinary or without value: lousy. But adding à changes the 
meaning to a generation with difficulty to making ends meet. With this wordplay, the group 
linked the struggles of two different generations and cycles of protest.  
The GaR preceded most of the movement of the squares in Europe. Together with the 
“pots and pans” revolution in Iceland, it was the first significant protest event that touched upon 
the conditions of youth – and overall population - as a consequence of austerity. It was a clear 
precursor for the mobilisations that followed in most Southern European countries, influencing 
their repertoires and discourses (Flesher Fominaya, 2017; Baumgarten, 2013). 
The mass media in Portugal picked up the GaR’s call, and the exposure led to the initial 
large protest event outside the trade union circuit (Baumgarten, 2013; Estanque, Costa, & 
Soeiro, 2013; Soeiro, 2015). The official story propagated by the mass media at the time, was 
that a group of friends not known to the public and without established networks of activism 
formed the GaR. Despite not being prominent activists, the four friends had political experience 
either in their universities or in short periods of political party membership. Inspired by the on-
going mobilisations of the Arab Spring, they joined forces with more established and 
experienced social movement militants who had been active since the tuition fees protest in the 
1990s. 
As a media strategy, the actual group was divided in two: one group (the four friends) 
was visible to the mass media, while another group of activists was responsible for setting up 
the media strategy and mobilisation of other groups behind the scenes. 
“The GaR is organized by eight people, those four appeared publicly […] and then there 
were other people: mainly in the part of media training to prepare them for the hardest 
TV interviews, since it was something some of us already did for LGBT movement […] 
it was a group of eight to ten people, between people that collaborated in the graphic part 
etc., behind the guys that would appear publicly […].” (Interviewee 12, Portugal) 
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 Although the GaR protest (March 2011) was initially scheduled only for Lisbon, as 
political tension in the country rose due to austerity measures and conflicts between the main 
political parties, it attracted broader involvement: groups in the main cities of the country joined 
the movement and organised local protests. Even though initial estimates counted three 
hundred thousand people in the streets, one of my interviewees recounted that after giving that 
number to the press, the organisers realised that it was incorrect; they claim that slightly over 
five hundred thousand people demonstrated across Portugal, which is about 5% of the overall 
population of the country. The organisers reached younger and older generations, both affected 
by the crisis and precarious labour conditions, bridging “social organisations (feminists, LGBT, 
among others), organised sectors of the anticapitalist left (such as the BE), some right-wing 
sectors (like the PSD youth party branch JSD), and also, for example, the then leader of the 
biggest Portuguese Trade Union, Carvalho da Silva, and even some members of the far-right” 
(Soeiro, 2015, p. 308).51 
Despite the initial enthusiasm, the attempt to expand the movement beyond this day 
was not successful. However, as the first major eventful protest of this cycle, it was a turning 
point, showing that there was mobilisation capacity beyond trade unions.  
The next large protest event would only take place in October, the Spanish 15M-
organised Global Action Day. Although there were small and scattered protests between the 
GaR event and October, no large protest performances materialised, aside from the CGTP-
sponsored events. The GaR was followed by a period of “platforms and assemblies” 
(Baumgarten, 2016) that starts with the Acampada do Rossio (May 2011), which I will now 
describe, and expires with the Global Action Day (October 2011), from which the 15O platform 
emerges. 
The Acampada started with activists gathering in front of the Spanish consulate in 
Lisbon in solidarity with on-going 15M mobilisations in Spain. After the first assembly, the 
group decided to move to Rossio. They remained camped in the square for three weeks, and 
more people joined, especially for the assemblies. The Acampada was the first meeting point 
of different actors after the GaR (Baumgarten, 2013). However, no direct organisational link 
existed between the GaR and the Acampada: even if some of the GaR organisers participated 
in the latter, they did not lead it. 
                                                          
51 Translated from Portuguese. 
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Emerging spontaneously, the Acampada brought together anarchists, libertarians, 
autonomists, anti-parties groups, and members of internal tendencies the BE. As Luhuna 
Carvalho explains, this occupation was not  
“buil[t] on a previous network of social, countercultural, or political movements. These 
movements existed, but not on an organised or tangible scale capable of giving an 
infrastructural substance to the occupations, which then fell into a mere reproduction of 
the ‘popular assemblies’” (Fernández-Savater et al., 2017, p. 122). 
Contrary to what was happening in Spain (as will be discussed shortly), the Acampada 
was a small event composed mainly of seasoned activists and party militants, bringing together 
various factions of institutional and non-institutional actors. Even if many newcomers became 
engaged with politics for the first time, they largely remained within grassroots subcultures of 
the movement and participated in establishing a “network of autonomous spaces, practices and 
movements” (Fernández-Savater et al., 2017, p. 122) in Lisbon.  
Even if there had been potential for radical anti-systemic mobilisation in Portugal, it 
never reached the same level as in Spain. At its peak, around 500 people participated in the 
assemblies of the Acampada (estimated by an interviewee). However, the Acampada sowed 
the seeds for the constitution of a platform that would organise the Global Action Day.52 
“Rossio is an important moment in all of this, which went unnoticed. If you were not 
there you would not have any idea, but most of these people met in Rossio. [...] it 
brought together people with experience with people that had never done anything 
before. Plus, it coincided with the general elections, with the memorandum and 
symbolically it had some effects. So, the 15O is born from various people that were 
present in Rossio, that knowing that there would be an international demonstration 
started to meet regularly. People from Rubra, MAS and then people with no connections 
[…] that is the moment that a lot of people start to meet […] it was very small, but at the 
Lisbon scale it had some importance.” (Interviewee 14, Portugal) 
 
                                                          
52 The Global Action Day occurred on October 15th 2011 to mark the 5-month anniversary of the first 
protest in Spain (15M). Despite being called from Spain, groups in various countries organized events 
as well. 
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“The fact that it brought so many groups together, that were close within themselves, 
potentiated a lot of things. It ended up working as a catalyst for what happens after.” 
(Interviewee 13, Portugal) 
The Global Action Day in October 2011 constituted the first mobilisation attempted 
outside the CGTP’s sphere of influence, which protested against the austerity policies of the 
right-wing coalition government elected in June 2011. Distinct from the GaR, instead of being 
organised by a small clique of activists, the organising platform was a coalition of more than 
40 collectives of social movement groups (Soeiro, 2014). Following the organisational patterns 
found in other countries, the assemblies followed a deliberative and open model, without 
formal structure or leadership. The organisers estimated a hundred thousand people protested 
all over the country. 
Despite the wide range of groups that supported the Global Action Day, it is important 
to note the ongoing tensions between autonomous and libertarian groups with anti-party 
discourse and more institutional actors. In addition, rival factions within the BE competed for 
the control of movement groups. Carvalho points out that the participants of the Acampada  
 “had a complex relationship with the institutional leſt and these mobilisations against 
austerity were eventually co-opted by the political parties or by the groups who aspired 
to become the new political parties. The content of the demonstrations turned from a 
blatant refusal of austerity without specific demands into something instrumentalized 
toward reclaiming new elections and hence the victory of a hypothetical ‘unified leſt.’ ” 
(Fernández-Savater et al., 2017, p. 122) 
The newly emerging groups were overtaken by their institutionally linked counterparts, 
which then allowed the better-established groups to dominate the field. An element that was 
frequently mention in interviews was the disruptive nature of infighting between BE-associated 
factions. These divisions would endure until the Ruptura/FER53  came to control the 15O 
platform after the General Strike of March 2012. As this happens the groups still affiliated with 
the BE disconnect from the platform leaving a rift between them and the Ruptura/FER faction. 
The groups that continued to be affiliated with the BE would later embark on a mobilisation 
                                                          
53 Ruptura/FER was one of the minority tendencies inside Bloco de Esquerda that would abandon the 
party in late 2011 and constitute MAS (Movimento Alternativa Socialista). They were very active 
throughout the protest cycle. I will provide more details in Chapter 7. 
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project that would lead to a new protest platform called Que se Lixe a Troika (which I discuss 
in the next chapter) and lack of united mobilisations throughout the cycle. 
FIGURE 5.  2 NUMBER OF PROTESTS (PER HALF-YEAR) BY TYPE OF ACTOR IN PORTUGAL 
(2009-2015)  
 
Note: I have combined the protest activities of trade unions and social movements to show that there 
were various instances of protest. 
 
Furthermore, in contrast to what I will show in the next section in Spain, trade unions 
were the dominant protest actor throughout 2009 to 2015 as it can be seen in Figure 5. 2. 
 
5.1.2. Turning Points in Spain 
On Sunday, May 15th of 2011, a week before the regional elections of May 22nd - two months 
after the GaR in Portugal – and after a growing process of mobilisation by different groups, a 
joint effort by Democracia Real, Ya! and Juventud Sin Futuro was the turning point of the 
protest cycle in Spain  (Kerman  Calvo, 2013; Díez & Laraña, 2017; Portos, 2016, 2017; 
Romanos, 2013, 2016). After the demonstration, attended by around twenty thousand people, 
a small group of protesters decided to camp at one of Madrid’s central squares, the Puertas del 
Sol. The police repressed the initiative, which lead to a call for other protest groups to take the 
square (toma la plaza). 
This event triggered a massive wave of mobilisation led by autonomous groups with 
non-hierarchical and horizontal structures. They occupied squares across Spain for about two 
months (depending on the city and the degree of repression) and held daily public assemblies 
to discuss matters such as education, health, feminism, and democracy. The 15M movement 
led to almost three years of sustained protest, generating multiple spin-offs and giving visibility 
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to pre-existing groups like the housing movement. Consequently, their symbols and forms of 
organisation came to mark all mobilisations in Spain that emerged afterwards.  
FIGURE 5.  3 NUMBER OF PROTESTS (PER HALF-YEAR) BY TYPE OF ACTOR IN SPAIN (2009-
2015) 
 
Note: I have combined the trade unions and social movements to show that there various instances of 
protest, particularly in Spain, where this two types of actors collaborated. 
 
After more than two months (from May to July) of occupying squares throughout the 
whole country, the movement dispersed into neighbourhoods. These local assemblies were 
networks of groups working together on the ground. As I will show, they were integral to the 
movement’s ability to sustain mobilisation.  
During this period (Summer 2011) the first sectoral struggles also began. After the 
summer, sectoral campaigns in education that would become known as Mareas (tides) 
emerged, incorporating practices, resources and members of both trade unions and social 
movements. 54  A feedback effect arguably reinforced these tendencies of simultaneous 
decentralisation and specialisation. 
Another outcome of this initial stage was the organisation of the Global Action Day, 
which was initially promoted by Democracia Real, Ya! (DRY!). This initiative would 
incorporate more than one million people all over Spain and extend beyond borders, to 
countries such as Portugal. 
 
                                                          
54 I deal with contention around social rights in more detail in the next chapter. 
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5.1.3. Going Beyond the Core: a Summary 
Some large differences between the turning points in Portugal and Spain were the ability of 
protest actors to sustain protest by going beyond the core, generating multiple spinoffs, and 
amplifying the protest capacity of pre-existing groups. 
 Highlighted both by the literature and my interviewees, one of the most important 
features of the Spanish movement 15M’s ability to mobilise and politicise a whole new 
generation of activists (Antentas, 2015; Romanos & Aguilar, 2016). Taibo (2011) suggests that 
despite the movement’s novelty, 15M combined previously existing social movements (which 
he calls “critical social movements” and includes, for example, the GJM, Feminists and 
existing squats in Madrid) and the new groups that came to organise the demonstration (such 
as the DRY!). This collaboration would persist throughout the two to three months of the 
encampments in Spain. In the Portuguese case, even though the GaR mobilised people on the 
day of the demonstration, it was not able to sustain mobilisation afterwards.55 The GaR protest 
was an example of an intermittent going beyond the core, as it possessed overarching structures 
of mobilisation but did not carry them forward. 
Second, the different strengths and positions of the institutional actors vis-à-vis non-
institutional actors during this period is also crucial. In Portugal, this stage of fitful mobilisation 
ends with the general strike in November 2011, organised by the main trade union federations, 
the CGTP and the UGT, with explicit support of social movements. By then, it was clear that 
trade unions were the dominant protest actors in Portugal. Furthermore, it is possible to observe 
other actors linked to the BE disputing the space of social movements with non-institutional 
groups. Despite the emergence of new forms of protest throughout 2011, the social movement 
enters 2012 in a state of disarray, broken and divided. These later protests never created a 
momentum that allowed new sectors to form a stronger countermovement against austerity and 
liberalisation. The movement barely expanded beyond activists and institutional actors.  
In contrast with the Portuguese case, trade unions and political parties in Spain were 
barely present or visible in the 15M-related mobilisations: indeed, they were unpopular and 
viewed (by the protestors) as illegitimate. The delegitimised parties and trade unions would 
only gain traction in later stages of the cycle of protest. 
 
 
                                                          
55 This will prove consistent throughout the whole cycle of protest, as I demonstrate in the following 
chapters. 
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FIGURE 5.  4 TAKEN PART IN LAWFUL PUBLIC PROTEST IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS (%) 
(2002-2016) 
           
Source: European Social Survey 
 
FIGURE 5. 5 FEEL CLOSE TO A PARTY AND PARTICIPATED IN LAWFUL PROTEST (%) IN 
PORTUGAL (2002-2016) 
 
Source: European Social Survey 
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FIGURE 5. 6 FEEL CLOSE TO A PARTY AND PARTICIPATED IN LAWFUL PROTEST (%) IN SPAIN 
(2002-2016)  
 
Source: European Social Survey  
 
If looking to data from the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2016 it is possible to 
see an increase of number of participants in protest events in the period between 2008 and 2012 
in Portugal and Spain confirming the trends identified throughout this section. Lawful protests 
almost doubled in both cases: in Spain participation in protest goes beyond 25% of the 
population, while in Portugal reaches 8%.  
Beyond protest participation, it is important to understand how institutions channel 
dissatisfaction. When combining the variables “feel closer to a political party” and “taking part 
in a lawful protest”, stark differences emerge between countries in terms of the role that protest 
assumes. In Portugal, both categories regarding protest never surpass 10 per cent, while in 
Spain they do in almost every survey round. In Portugal the category with the biggest increase 
since 2002 was those who neither participated in protest nor felt closer to any party. In Spain, 
protest categories grew the most. From 2014 onwards, parties recover in both countries, 
possibly thanks to the renewal of pre-existing parties and creation of new parties such as 
Podemos. 
If in Portugal the crisis led to political disaffection and apathy among most of the 
population, in Spain protest became a major source of political engagement. However, the 
contrast lies not only between strategies of “exit” and “voice”, but also between institutional 
and non-institutional solutions: in 2014, Portuguese political parties recover supporters, but in 
Spain political parties combine with protest movements due to the creation of Podemos. In the 
following sections I unpack the main reasons for these differences. 
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5.2. Between Democracy, Precarity and Austerity: Movement Culture and 
Frames 
As Tarrow remarks (1989; 2011), turning points of contentious cycles exhibit both previously 
existing trends and open, broad discourse that mobilises beyond the core constituency. With 
the movements of the crisis (Della Porta, 2015), an overarching and transversal critical 
discourse directed both at governments and economic players emerged, carrying signifiers that 
resonated with distinct segments of the population. The movements against austerity demanded 
a democratisation of politics and full inclusion of citizens, as opposed to what they viewed as 
an oligarchic takeover of political institutions (Gerbaudo, 2017). Their purpose was to make 
democracy “more democratic” through full participatory inclusion of citizens and opposing 
established elites. 
At the turning point of the cycle of protest this democratic desire was expressed by what 
Gerbaudo (2017, abstract) calls “citizenism”:  
“Citizenship has acted both as a source of popular identity interpolating a diverse 
set of demographics, and as a central demand, organising calls for greater popular 
participation in decision-making, freedom of expression and against corruption. 
Anti-austerity movements put forward an anti-oligarchic view of citizenship.” 
This polarising discourse with populist traits can be seen both as a demand for inclusion 
and as a source of collective identity that, due to its transversal appeal, unites multiple groups 
contesting austerity. 
Claims to and frames of representation play an essential role at the opening of cycles of 
contention due to their ability to mobilise broader sectors. They work not only as diagnoses of 
injustice (Benford & Snow, 2000), but also fulfill a strategic role (Tarrow, 1989, 2013; 
Zamponi, 2012). However, limiting the analysis to broad claims on participation and 
representation would reproduce a romantic narrative transmitted by the movements to 
researchers: spontaneity and novelty were used to broaden the scope of participants and present 
the mobilisations as distinct from previous ones (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a). To a certain extent 
I argue that “citizenism” was a broad and open discourse whose modularity ensured its 
durability. As Tarrow argues:   
“Once invented, words for contentious politics are polysemic, and that makes their 
meaning both ambiguous and available: their ambiguity is part of what makes them 
modular and therefore available for repetition […] Ambiguity helps create coalitions, 
enabling groups ‘with very different agendas to come together in a common stance of 
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indignation’ […] Ambiguity also condenses meanings. Contentious words are what 
Edward Sapir called ‘condensation symbols’, which grow in complexity with increased 
dissociation from their original usage.” (Tarrow, 2013, p. 15) 
The citizenship discourses at the turning points were far from spontaneous reactions to 
an overall crisis of legitimacy, but constituted, to a certain extent, a materialisation of power 
relations between actors on the ground. Therefore, actors in different power relationships 
articulated diverse discourses. 
Besides the modularity and resonance of frames and discourses, I also consider how 
movements translated them into practices, which led to broader and more inclusive recruitment. 
Besides frames, I also investigate organisational forms and repertoires as being part and an 
extension of the wider symbolic domain of social movements.  
I argue that at the turning points some degree of innovation and openness introduced 
new repertoires and claims based on democracy and political rights, which become central 
elements of mobilisation. As I show in the following chapter, as austerity endured, new actors 
emerged, and labour and social rights progressively became the central issues of protest in 
Portugal and Spain. By emphasising the processual and relational origins of claims, it is 
possible to observe how different articulations of citizenship rights emerge throughout the 
cycle of protest and also translate into practices. 
 In Spain, 15M’s discourse and organisation was based on two main ideas that shaped 
their action. The first was a democratic principle by which their objective was to make common 
people engage in politics and to discuss and make decisions collectively by consensus. 
Secondly, the movement was anti-personalist and, as a result, against any type of 
representation. The movement's practices positioned it as an alternative to the representative 
democracy that allowed economic and political powers to inflict injustices on citizens. 
Instead of a one-off event without broader repercussions, this movement became a 
sustained protest wave that lasted for almost three years. It was not a unified or centralised 
movement, but rather one that evolved with changing actors and contexts. In fact, 15M became 
an umbrella term for a variety of different groups that shared a common approach to popular 
and deliberative democracy (Romanos, 2016): most followed a horizontal, deliberative model. 
The movement appeared in three forms throughout the peak mobilisations between 2011 and 
2014: unitary (15M), sectoral (Mareas, which stood in defence of public services; I develop 
this group in the next chapter) and local groups (neighbourhood assemblies, which I discuss in 
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more detail in the following section). These components were not mutually exclusive, but 
overlapped and cooperated depending on the type and period of mobilisation. 
15M featured a compound repertoire of action that combined permanent occupation and 
claims to the public space, open and deliberative assemblies, and civil disobedience. Its 
openness, the non-defined contents of the debate and the disappearance of acronyms or flags 
representing organisations marked the movement. Formed outside the institutional sphere, it 
produced a language that was inclusive and tolerant by avoiding attachment to symbols of 
identity such as flags and closed political ideologies, which resulted in an attempt to simplify 
communication, that was replicated online (Anduiza, Cristancho, & Sabucedo, 2014; Castells, 
2012; Morell, 2012). 
 “I believe that they [participants in DRY!] were people without previous political 
experiences, maybe some, but the important thing was not so much where people came 
from, but rather the space they create [...] what they propose and create is a UFO […] it 
opens a new space, where all of us feel called to, where all of us feel included, it is a 
space without flags, without identities, without ideologies, where the language is very 
direct and it relates with the common people and creates a certain imaginary of the 
problems […]” (Interviewee 18, Spain) 
Finally, the groups on the ground ascribed to a more autonomist and loose definition of 
the movement. Amador Fernández-Savater defines the 15M as a “climate” that spreads, 
changing the understanding of politics and society beyond the squares, and unites groups with 
the common objective of transforming society. 56  Likewise, many of my interviewees 
underscored how touching the first moments of the public assemblies at Puerta del Sol were. 
“I went with my partner and with some friends and we arrived to Sol and we saw 40 
thousand people, i.e., the square was completely occupied, it was an awesome feeling, 
especially when they say this is an assembly […] and people sat down to do the 
assembly. It really started to change my mind” (Interviewee 3, Spain)  
 
“It was very exciting […] we were all at the Puertas del Sol and suddenly there was 
someone who says 'comrades, this is a citizens' assembly' and the word citizen assembly 
gave me goosebumps” (Interviewee 15, Spain) 
                                                          
56  See Amador Fernández Savater - “Como se organiza un clima?” 
http://blogs.publico.es/fueradelugar/1438/%C2%BFcomo-se-organiza-un-clima 
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When it comes to this period in Portugal, protests featured some horizontal, directly 
democratic practices and demands for deeper democratisation, but they were more limited and 
in general less hostile toward institutional politics. At GaR there was a discursive element of 
self-organisation and open demonstration. The organisers framed this initial protest as 
“peaceful, secular and non-partisan” (which they contrast with apolitical) and encouraged 
people to bring their demands. 
Inspired by transnational repertoires and ideas, GaR’s frame appealed to a project of 
political transformation whose objective was, in the organisers’ own words and inspired by the 
Portuguese writer José Saramago, to “turn every citizen into a politician” (interview). The 
1974-5 revolutionary moment in Portugal was drawn as an inspiration to the GaR, since the 
Portuguese Revolutionary Period (PREC) constituted, in their view, a moment of true 
democracy with grassroots mobilisations from urban movement to students, but also 
occupation of lands and factories. They felt that the end of the revolutionary period coincided 
with the entrenchment of shallow democracy in institutions. 
“There was a premise, that what happens after the 25th of April, in terms of participation, 
the whole period of the PREC, with a huge participation of people and civil society and 
that it is usually considered an instability, was in reality a period of true democracy. Our 
analysis is that was the period of biggest democracy in Portugal and that it was from the 
moment that democracy closed itself in parties and institutions that democracy lost its 
intensity […] We thought it was our responsibility to be part of the solution. It was a 
bigger question, for us democracy exists when people living in a society can enjoy their 
freedoms and rights […] like Saramago would say ‘to turn every citizen into a politician’ 
[…] it is not only about voting every four years […] people can decide how to live in the 
different dimensions of their life.” (Raquel Freire57, Portugal) 
In contrast with Spain, the focus of the GaR protest was on labour precarity, even 
incorporating it into their name as a generational issue and expression of discontent. However, 
even if the GaR intended to reinforce participatory democracy, its manifesto largely focused 
on labour and social rights. Soeiro’s (2015) data reinforces this observation: GaR organisers 
asked participants to bring their written demands to deliver to Parliament, and almost 50% of 
those demands were related to labour precarity, while only 23% of them related to the political 
system or transparency. 
                                                          
57 This interviewee asked to be identified. 
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The influence of transnational discourses of “citizenism” and representation were more 
explicit at the Acampada do Rossio and could still be observed at the Global Justice Day in 
October. However, as I argue in subsequent chapters, they were not dominant afterwards. At 
the Acampada, the repertoire of assemblies, occupation of spaces, and direct democracy was 
central and had the clear intent of going beyond the representative institutions. One of the main 
mottos of the Acampada was “democracy is questioned when austerity is the law” (interview). 
Daily life at the camp also revolved around these principles of self-organisation. Nonetheless, 
the group remained small and attracted very few new members. Despite the new repertoires 
and discourses, the movement never fully reached beyond already dedicated activists. 
“There was a bit of an idea of going beyond the political agents in the parliament and that 
all of the rest is civil society, almost as a separation of activities. I think that was the big 
message from the Acampada: people in a square also do politics […] the attempt of self-
organising to organise a demonstration, to create a communal kitchen, […] the idea that 
politics belongs to institutional politics, that belongs to certain agents suitable for the 
position […] Still, we felt it was a truly marginal thing […] being ridiculed in the press 
[…] what happens in Spain is totally different from what happens here. We are portrayed 
as freaks camping in a square, but if you were to go there, you would understand it was 
something somehow different […] it was amazing for our size.” (Interviewee 13, 
Portugal) 
Later, the Global Action Day in October 2011 – organised by the groups present at the 
Acampada – made a mix of economic and political claims. Fernandes (2016) notes that 15O 
protest was framed around claims for democracy based on the memory of the PREC. João 
Labrincha, one of the GaR organisers points out that “there were moments during the PREC 
[…] where people could participate in popular assemblies but since then it had not happened 
again” (Público, 16 October 2011) (T. Fernandes, 2016, p. 189). GaR-inspired protesters 
reference the revolution more infrequently after the Global Action Day, and when they do, the 
references generally frame 1974-1975 as the moment of establishing labour, education, and 
health rights. After this stage these opposition groups started to adapt their discourses to logics 
closer to the classic left (Baumgarten, 2013, p. 467).  
As a result, political claims for representation never became dominant. A discourse of 
opposition to institutional actors was never massive in Portugal as it was in Spain. Even though 
there were demands for open democracy, these came to be progressively subordinated to 
economic ones (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019).  
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FIGURE 5.  7 PROTEST WITH DEMANDS ABOUT REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION (%) 
IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL (2009-2015) 
 
 
In Portugal – as opposed to Spain – few groups questioned the legitimacy of the regime. 
Two interpretations of the revolution subsisted among contentious actors. The “unfinished 
revolution” is a future-oriented frame, where the past is not presented as the genesis of the 
regime, but rather a future not yet achieved, i.e., the promise of the revolution remains to be 
fulfilled. This interpretation was not dominant, exhibited only in a few documents and 
interviews by small autonomist groups. The “defence of the revolution” discourse, on the other 
hand, is a present-oriented and defensive articulation of the past. It sees the revolution as a 
foundational moment for a range of social rights, or what is normally referred as the “conquests 
of the revolution” (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019). Because this dominant frame was 
intrinsically linked to institutional actors, the Portuguese movement never left the sphere of 
social rights and defence of the regime borne out of the transition to democracy (Carvalho & 
Ramos Pinto, 2019). 
As such, it is important to notice that the continuous increase in demands regarding 
representation and participation in Portugal seen in Figure 5. 7, when they reached their peak 
in the first half 2013, rather than being for the opening of democracy it was for the resignation 
of the government. 58  Furthermore, these political claims were made not only by social 
movements but also by trade unions. Hence, protest groups would come to focus on the 
dispossession of social rights that the austerity regime precluded rather than an overt critique 
                                                          
58 I discuss this in more detail in the next chapter. 
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of the political foundations, as in Spain. In the latter country, the frame was directed against 
“politics as usual”, criticising representative democracy and corruption:  
“[…] activists have demanded a number of basic citizenship rights that political elites 
had neglected while prioritizing the interests of powerful economic actors. Activists have 
also clarified that the crisis was not only of the economy but also of an institutional 
system that facilitates corruption and impedes the emergence and development of an 
alternative to neoliberal policies” (Romanos, 2016, p. 131).  
In Portugal, this type of frame never became dominant because the central topics were 
precarity and austerity, not institutions (Soeiro, 2014; Fernandes, 2016).  
These differences have broader implications for movement frames and cultures. 
Gerbaudo (2017) argues that “citizenism” contrasts with class-based sources of mobilisation, 
as it seems to be more attractive in countries where the discourse of class has lost traction and 
is not a constitutive part of mobilising cleavages. For example, Cruz (2015) argues that over 
the last 40 years the “empire of class” and the mobilising capacity of trade unions in Spain 
declined. Even if in Portugal trade unionisation, linked with extensive precarisation of the 
workforce, has decreased, social and labour rights continue to constitute the central axis under 
which the regime was built and consequently dominate the field. Furthermore, in Spain, even 
groups like Juventud sin Futuro that have an explicit critique of youth precarity frame it within 
a political discourse and a critique of the regime. 
In Spain, the discourse of dissatisfaction with the political status quo went beyond core 
activists. After three years, 70% of the population still agreed with the demands of the 
movement (Sampedro & Lobera, 2014). Even if Portuguese actors had begun to utilise this 
type of anti-regime discourse, they were never able to make it resonate as in Spain and 
remained entrenched in labour issues. 
 
5.3. Networks of Resistance: Building a Connective Structure 
Scale shift, or the capacity of an initial mobilisation to generate spinoffs, is central to the 
process of expanding the base of protest (Tarrow 2011). As discussed in the previous sections, 
if in Portugal protest organisation was top-down and decentralisation spinoffs were weak, one 
of the main characteristics of the Spanish movement was the shift toward locally based 
assemblies in neighbourhoods. In other words, in Spain the mobilisation process entailed a 
form of ‘grassrootisation’ or downward scale shift (Portos, 2017) that was absent in Portugal. 
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After the initial moments of protest, spin-off movements tend to develop (McAdam, 
2013), both reinforcing and reconstituting ties that transform protest. Local networks of 
resistance are crucial to mobilisation capacity, even if they are not directly visible during the 
protests. These generate connective structures are central to contentious processes as they 
sustain mobilisations (Tarrow, 2011).  
In Portugal and Spain, this downward scale-shift implies not only a particular form of 
organization based on local groups, but could also be considered a repertoire of direct action. 
In one way or another, in the southern European countries hit by the crisis, local forms of direct 
social action emerged. In the case of Italy, Bosi and Zamponi define this as “forms of action 
that focus upon directly transforming some specific aspects of society by means of the very 
action itself, instead of claiming something from the state or other power holders” (Bosi & 
Zamponi, 2015, p. abstract). These comprise a variety of repertoires of action that rely on 
alternative forms of resilience involving political consumerism, occupations, etc. They argue 
that rather than novel, these repertoires are embedded in the contentious histories of each 
country. 
These connective structures differ in Portugal and Spain: anti-austerity protests in 
Portugal centralised their activities and focused on large protest events led by institutional 
actors or their partners. In Spain, decentralisation fueled mobilisation capacity by drawing on 
energy from decentralised groups. These spaces were already established in Spain, as noted in 
the previous chapter, and Madrid in particular, plays an essential role in enabling groups to 
position themselves in the urban landscape. These groups created meeting spaces for activists, 
laypeople, and collectives, which were the building blocks of future mobilisations. The lack of 
this culture and similar spaces in Portugal in the years preceding the crisis affected the capacity 
groups to mobilise to protest austerity policies.  
In Spain, after more than two months occupying squares and public space throughout 
the whole country, the movement dispersed into neighbourhoods and formed local 
assemblies. 59  The decision to decentralise did not come quickly. For several weeks, the 
movements in the squares debated whether or not to disperse as the objectives of that 
mobilisation seemed to not be achievable anymore in the squares. Several attempts to leave the 
square (levantar campo) stalled, as more radical or persistent groups would remain camped. 
Eventually, however, unceasing police violence and institutional pressure led to the 
abandonment of the camp. Participants both felt that disbanding brought the risk that the 
                                                          
59 As my fieldwork was centered in Madrid, the description corresponds to this city. 
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movement might totally disappear, but also that it might be an opportunity to reinvigorate the 
movement from below. 
“A lot of people thought that we should leave because the environment was degrading 
and that the key was to move to the neighbourhoods.” (Interviewee 3, Spain) 
 
“The decision is taken because there was a risk of the movement to disappear; the 
assemblies start to lose quality and it provokes a reaction that I thought it was smart. 
Let’s move into the neighbourhoods, let’s try to decentralize our struggles and develop 
them in smaller areas.” (Interviewee 1, Spain) 
By dispersing and recuperating a long and established tradition of local grassroots 
activism and structures, the process of decentralisation came to constitute a network of local 
groups acting on the ground and in close contact with communities. This move was of 
importance considering the intense and daily nature of contentious action between 2011 and 
2013. The flexible and robust network of support allowed the activists to communicate quickly 
and easily. As the network extended beyond the neighbourhood, inter-network collaboration 
helped to sustain broader mobilisations. 
These networks’ structures had a capillary and rhizomatic features. First, inter-
neighbourhood assemblies helped to coordinate between neighbourhoods. Additionally, many 
of the activities of the assemblies necessitated partnerships with unitary and sectoral groups. 
Most neighbourhoods in Madrid developed specialised working groups on topics related to 
public services, such as health and education (as I show in the next chapters, these constitute 
critical contentious issues). For example, as the government attempted to privatise these 
services, these groups collaborated with workers from local public services. As such, these 
local assemblies expanded while supporting the activities of more extensive networks and 
movement issues.  
“It was a very intense year, not only because we had the neighbourhood assemblies, but 
also because we participated in inter-neighbourhood assemblies, of coordination between 
all the groups. But we also coordinated ourselves with other movements.” (Interviewee 3, 
Spain) 
 
“The 15M (…) ingrained all types of struggles since it happened. The 15M of 
Carabanchel was one of the most potent ones, it was big and we divided ourselves in 
various working groups, working with pre-existing associations in the neighbourhood 
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[…] we work a lot on housing and still to this day the housing assembly has more than a 
hundred people […] we established a public services commission that worked on two 
axes: education and health. In health it coincided with the intent to privatise six hospitals 
and healthcare centres, The workers opened their assemblies to the 15M and to the 
citizenship, and we could have a continuous mobilisation until last year [2014]” 
(Interviewee 4, Spain) 
In Portugal, there were some efforts to perpetuate the on-going mobilisations either by 
shifting mobilisations to the local level or by constituting unitary platforms. After the initial 
demonstration, the group around GaR tried to create a platform called M12M to unite the 
assemblies that emerged across the country in an attempt to decentralise the movement. 
However, they never gained traction. 
Later, inspired by the Spanish example, the Acampada do Rossio attempted to continue 
its activities through decentralisation. Different activist groups also tried to decentralise their 
activities by forming popular local assemblies (Baumgarten, 2017a; Carvalho, 2014b). 
“I think there was never the capacity to take it beyond the square, I think it could have 
had some effects and made the difference to take this into the neighbourhoods […] there 
were several attempts, but it never became potent […] to create an alternative to the trade 
unions, the political parties, the institutional powers, that failed completely.” 
(Interviewee 13, Portugal) 
As in Spain, the main idea was to stimulate community activism around 
neighbourhoods, but it hardly reached beyond the activist groups. A few assemblies emerged 
around Lisbon, e.g. in Barreiro, Algés, Graça and Benfica, and they tried to embody a spirit of 
resilience based on self-organisation, urban gardening (production and consumption), and 
solidarity-based exchanges (Baumgarten, 2017a; Carvalho, 2014b). 
 Several other projects expressed the same concerns: groups such as RDA69 emerged 
around a particular area of Lisbon (Av. Almirante Reis in 2010) and were much closer to the 
squats and libertarian groups in Spain. These were deeply critical of a protest cycle dominated 
by institutional actors.60 Again, they were never able to reach a broader audience. 
                                                          
60 These groups were always present during the cycle, even if they were not as visible or dominant, and 
they organised a demonstration at the end of the cycle in 2014 to celebrate the 40th anniversary of April 
25th.  
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Even if small in scale, these autonomous groups became the basis for the emergence of 
an alternative circuit to the ones dominated by institutional actors. The groups that emerged 
out of the Acampada met again in Coimbra (in July 2011) and decided to join the pan-European 
Global Action Day protest against austerity (in October 2011). Though in many cases invisible 
throughout the cycle of protest, they were present at occupations in Porto (Fontinha School in 
April 2012) and Lisbon (São Lázaro in May 2012) and also in the celebration of Global Spring 
in 2012 (Baumgarten, 2013, 2016). However, they never reached the same scale as in Spain 
and could not sustain broader protests from the local neighbourhood level. 
This is fundamental to understanding the different paths that each country took. Spain 
and Portugal had different traditions at the local level: in Spain there were more long-standing 
local networks (as described in the previous chapter) that supported decentralisation, but in 
Portugal these only became visible and constituted themselves during the cycle of protest, so 
it was harder for them to take root. Furthermore, the dominant actors also had different 
interests, and in Portugal, social movement groups were not able to generate enough resources 
to enlarge their bases:  
“Groups remain small, and activists report a lack of support, particularly in smaller cities. 
There is a constant debate within and among groups about how to attract new 
participants and engage them in politics. New activists also cannot be recruited easily 
through personal networks” (Baumgarten, 2013, p. 460).   
Different local networks of resistance were important. If in Spain the long-standing 
local structures were invigorated by 15M’s decentralisation that created a basis for sustained 
protest, in Portugal it constituted a small network of secondary groups that never became 
relevant.  
Finally, in the case of Spain, interviewees established a connection between the process 
of decentralisation and the emergence and sustenance of Mareas; I develop this progression 
further in the following chapters. 
 
5.4. External Intervention and Institutional Reactions 
So far, I have dealt strictly with endogenous dimensions of protest to explain the differences at 
this turning point. However, these protests did not happen in a void, and the political 
opportunity structure is as crucial as internal dynamics of contention to explaining the presence 
or absence of mobilisation beyond the core. 
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 As previously discussed, Spain and Portugal share similarities regarding the political 
and economic context in which anti-austerity protest arose. In 2010, these countries, led by 
their respective Socialist Parties, pursued austerity policies that envisaged wage cuts and 
welfare retrenchment; and the policies intensified under the right-wing governments elected to 
both in 2011. Initially trade unions led the opposition, calling for general strikes. It was only in 
2011 that new actors from outside the institutional arena emerged, leading to the intensification 
of the wave of protest.  
Although Portugal’s government under the PS initiated austerity measures to generate 
market trust, political tensions rose with mounting pressure for a bailout. This was a short 
(March to June) but eventful period of time, marked by the GaR protest, the resignation of the 
Socialist prime minister José Sócrates over parliament’s refusal of the fiscal austerity plan and, 
finally, the out-going government’s request for financial assistance from the EU-ECB-IMF 
Troika, with the support of the right-wing opposition parties, the PSD and CDS-PP. Between 
April and June, not only did elections take place, but negotiations with the lenders were 
ongoing. At the end of May, the government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Troika that would commit the country to extensive budget cuts, whatever the outcome of the 
elections. 
 Despite the rising discontent, this situation led to a state of political paralysis where the 
discussions with the Troika and the upcoming elections were at the centre of political debate. 
The institutional actors that were involved in protests (the PCP and the BE) focused on the 
elections, and the legitimacy of austerity was barely disputed in media. Apart from the BE, the 
PCP, and the CGTP, there was barely any discourse countering austerity, which made 
articulating grievances using that rhetoric more difficult. As was the case in Italy with 
Berlusconi (Zamponi, 2012), Prime Minister Sócrates became such a divisive figure and the 
target of so many grievances that his resignation partially made mobilisation seem redundant. 
In June, the election of a technocratic flavoured right-wing government (exemplified by Vítor 
Gaspar, Minister of Finance, who had credentials in international institutions) was well 
received, and contestation would only rise again in mid-2012. The Troika’s bailout was 
legitimised as the only alternative to crisis. 
 The Spanish situation was slightly different. During the regional elections of May 
2011, all over Spain, the protesters challenged the prohibition to remain in the squares during 
the ‘reflection day’ that preceded elections in an act of civil disobedience. Even if there was a 
growing crisis in Spain, the pressure to assume an external bailout was not as strong as in 
Portugal, translating into a very different conjuncture for non-institutional movements. In April 
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José Luís Zapatero, at the time President of the Spanish Government, decided not to stand as a 
candidate in the upcoming November general elections. Unlike in Portugal, there was no key 
personality to rally against, and together with more politically directed criticisms from the 
movements, there was a broader focus on the theme of an overall corrupt party and political 
system. Furthermore, due to the lack of external intervention, blame could not fall on 
international institutions. 
The more national character of the Spanish process was reinforced by the proposal 
submitted by the PSOE (and supported by PP) in September to inscribe a maximum budget 
deficit in the constitution (also known as the “golden rule”). The constitutional reform 
reinforced the 15M’s frame of critiquing of transition to democracy. The blame lay not so much 
with a particular Prime Minister, but rather with the system as a whole; the external imposition 
was softer and could be interpreted as a political choice made by the elites, which intensified 
the impression of an oligarchic takeover. Nonetheless, PP won November’s general elections 
with its largest majority ever. 
Additionally, relations of power and autonomy between actors differ in Spain and 
Portugal. In Spain, institutional actors such as IU, CCOO and UGT were never able to join 
forces with 15M because of the tradition of non-communication or distance between 
institutional and non-institutional actors (see Chapter 4 and Fominaya, 2015). The Spanish 
movements aspired to enlarge democracy beyond institutions and institutional actors. 
Furthermore, Fishman (2012b) argues that Spanish institutions are not as likely to be influenced 
by protest, leading to more frequent and disruptive ones.  
By contrast, the main parties and trade unions on the Portuguese left engaged directly 
with and channelled protests. This resulted from the inability to constitute and activate 
networks of support as in Spain, but also from the conflictual field, where the institutional 
actors kept an attitude of despising (PCP) or divide and rule (BE) whereby they tried to control 
all the initiatives that emerged. Also, in Portugal, there were parties in parliament that could 
channel the population’s grievances. The PCP and BE channelled many of the grievances 
relating to the loss of labour and social rights to parliament. 61 
 
                                                          
61Furthermore, one final argument in terms of context has to do with the type of debt held by the country. 
Portugal’s debt was mainly public, while in Spain it was mainly a private one and it originated a housing 
bubble. Hence, in Portugal the cuts were directed towards the public sector resulting mainly in trade 
unions protest, while in Spain the housing bubble affected people’s livelihood more directly leading to 
local forms of grassroots movements that interacted with other protests and, therefore, exponentiated 
protest. This constitutes one important avenue of research for the future. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the emergence of non-institutional actors contesting austerity 
redefined the field of protest, constituting a turning point in the cycle that helps to understand 
Portugal and Spain’s divergent paths. What lies at the heart of this phase is the capacity (or 
lack thereof) of protest movements to go ‘beyond the core’ of their supporters and expand their 
bases and actions. Spain’s movement was more successful at building infrastructures of 
mobilisation than Portugal’s, due to different practices, culture, discourses and networks. A 
stuttering start in Portugal meant that the movement never developed a network that could 
withstand internal conflicts and pressure from institutional actors. In Spain, previously existing 
structures that developed outside the control of institutional actors contributed to creating a 
broad and inclusive movement.  
There were also fundamental differences between these two countries’ political 
contexts. In Portugal, the turning point occurred in the shadow of external intervention and a 
government resignation combined with general elections, which seemed to diffuse grievances. 
Protest focused mainly on labour precarity and economic grievances, and claims about the 
legitimacy of the regime were subsumed under these themes. Largely directed by institutional 
actors, the main objective of the protest groups was the restoration of the “Spirit of April”, or 
the revival of the post-1974 social contract. Additionally, the movement was not able to 
decentralise or build sustained grassroots mobilisation. A different scenario emerged in Spain, 
where groups with open discourse and grassroots mobilisation constituted themselves as 
alternatives to institutional actors and challenged the status quo. Additionally, the lack of 
external intervention focused the blame on the domestic political class as a whole. 
 The protests in Spain generated a great capacity for amplification. As many of my 
interviewees remarked, the 15M movement leveraged a variety of pre-existing groups. In the 
first year of mobilisation, everything seemed possible. In Portugal, rather than decentralising 
tendencies, one-off events centralised mobilisations. In fact, despite some unifying events, the 
strength of institutional actors combined with the weakness of non-institutional players 
disrupted the emergence of new demands and structures of mobilisation. 
All in all, this first phase of the protest cycle shaped the rest of the process. As the cycle 
developed in Portugal and Spain, new actor and claims came to challenge austerity. I will look 
into that in the following chapter. 
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6. From Representation to Redistribution: between 
Social Movements and Trade Unions 
 
The most forceful argument of this study will be that people engage in contentious politics when 
patterns of political opportunities and constraints change, and then by strategically employing a 
repertoire of collective action, creating new opportunities, which are used by others in widening 
cycles of contention. When their struggles revolve around broad cleavages in society; when they bring 
people together around inherited cultural symbols; and when they can build on – or construct – dense 
social networks and connective structures, these episodes of contention result in sustained 
interactions with opponents in social movements 
Tarrow, 2011, p. 29 
 
In this chapter, I describe how the cycle of protest peaked in Portugal and Spain in 2012 until 
the demobilisation process that started in late 2013. With relation to the theoretical 
underpinnings of this dissertation, I consider the ways in which the interaction between 
multiple actors, interests, and discursive repertoires entangled during the cycle of contention. 
While working within a contentious politics framework, I discuss how the process operated 
(i.e. I provide a deconstruction of the interactions between the different actors during the 
process).  
Following the turning points of mobilisation discussed in the previous chapter, the 
phase described in this chapter helps present a better understanding of how the cycle of 
contention unfolded in Portugal and Spain. The dynamics identified in previous chapters did 
not disappear: the ability to go beyond the core continue to be critical explanatory factor 
throughout this chapter as well. However, as I intend to show in this chapter, the anti-austerity 
mobilisations went beyond what was described previously. After the initial turning point, new 
dynamics of protest developed. Instead of being broad in scope, the claims by different 
contentious actors during this stage targeted specific policies linked with social rights such as 
education, healthcare, housing, and also labour. Furthermore, there was a resurgence of trade 
unionists, who played a key role in the movement.62 As a result of these dynamics, I argue that 
as austerity endured after 2011, protest changed. Discursive repertoires transformed in both 
countries: the centrality of political claims diminished in relation to the previous chapter 
decreased and, as a result, labour and social rights became the prominent issues, and new 
organisations came to the fore. The changes reflect the internal plurality of the contentious 
field: alongside social movements, trade unions and political parties were also essential actors. 
                                                          
62 Which does not mean that they had been absent before, but just that they had not been the main 
protagonists. 
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In Portugal, due to the movements’ incapacity to ensure a stable mobilisation structure, 
movements were only able to mobilize successfully upon the development of particular 
political opportunity structures (e.g. the attempt to implement the payroll tax by the right-wing 
governement in September 2012 that leads to the resurgence of social movement). During this 
time, there was a dominant, strategic and convenient alliance between the QSLT and the CGTP. 
Nevertheless, the message of actors involved in this alliance changed after the Constitutional 
Court ruled against some of the austerity measures passed by the Portuguese government 
months before. After this judicial decision, the alliance focused on social rights and on the 
“defence of the revolution” (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019) and more radical approaches of 
“going beyond the revolution” were contained and never gained ground. As such, trade unions 
and the QSLT were able to control the emergence of an alternative discourse that was critical 
of the regime and asked for the fulfillment of more radical messages of revolution. 
In Spain, between the end of 2011 and the end of 2013. the contention dynamics were 
more complex than in Portugal. The complexity was due to the heterogeneity of the actors, the 
size of the field, and the relative autonomy of the social movements’ vis-a-vis institutional 
actors. Rather than displaying a dominant form of mobilisation, various overlapping dynamics 
co-existed: after the decentralisation into the neighbourhoods described in the previous chapter, 
four protest dynamics developed. First, a defence of social rights, which to pertained to various 
issues, such as education and healthcare. The defence triggered joint mobilisations between 
social movements and trade unions on an equal footing. Secondly, movements for housing 
were equally important and helped to amplify local grievances at a national scale. Thirdly, there 
was a continuous stream of labour protests at the factory level. However, these movements 
lacked coordination and were not directly connected to major trade unions. Lastly, apart from 
these small and continuous mobilisations, there was the organisation of large events of protest 
where all these platforms converged to protest against austerity measures. 
In this chapter, I will first set the context of enduring austerity after the election of right-
wing governments in 2011 in Spain and Portugal. Since the cycle of contention took different 
paths in each country, I will approach these countries contentious dynamics separately. For 
example, whereas in Spain, the persistence of protest resulted from what I call “overlapping 
dynamics”, in Portugal the protest followed an almost linear sequence. As in the previous 
chapter, I rely on a methodology that includes protest event analysis, interviews, and 
observation of large events of protest to identify the main trends in the protests. 
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6.1. A New Political Context? Right-Wing Turn and Enduring Austerity 
In 2011 general elections led to a right-wing turn in both Spain and Portugal, which resulted in 
the biggest defeat of centre-left parties in government since the 1970s. While in Portugal, the 
PSD and the CDS-PP formed a post-electoral coalition, in Spain the PP secured its most 
significant majority ever. The new governments pushed austerity programmes further and 
deepened the so-called structural reforms with budgetary cuts and privatisations. Despite the 
emergent wave of protest, no institutional alternatives developed at this point.63  
The Portuguese right-wing coalition, under the Memorandum of Understanding and 
surveillance of the Troika, committed itself to “go beyond the Troika” as a way not only to 
counter the spillover effects of the Greek crisis, but also to ensure market trust  (Moury & 
Standring, 2017; Ramalho, Thassis, & Kanellopoulos, 2017). As a result, the newly elected 
government, announced new austerity measures. Between their election in June 2011 and 
January 2012 a series of decrees were issued that mainly involved public sector wage cuts. In 
December 2011, following the Spanish example, the prime minister of Portugal, Pedro Passos 
Coelho, suggested the addition of the deficit ‘golden rule’ into the Constitution, which never 
happened.  Furthermore, at the beginning of 2012, the partners at social concertation (i.e., the 
joint platform between trade unions,64 employer confederations and government) reached an 
agreement to proceed with a labour reform that would leave workers with fewer unemployment 
benefits, holidays, and less collective bargaining power.  
In the summer of 2012, after a brief period of contestation in 2011, the anti-austerity 
protest reached a new peak due to an opening up of opportunity structures,. First, the 
Constitutional Court overruled some of the austerity measures. Second, in April 2013,the 
Socialist Party broke their relative neutral position towards austerity and would later propose a 
vote of no confidence to the government. Finally,  in September 2012, the prime minister 
proposed a new measure (payroll tax) that led to open contestation from social movements to 
the junior coalition partner.65  
In Spain, following the austerity agenda of the PSOE, upon election, the PP government 
immediately proceeded with a labour reform that brought trade unions to the forefront of 
                                                          
63 As I will show in the next chapter, political alternatives at the institutional level would only emerge 
in the electoral period of 2014-15. 
64 Only UGT, employers’ confederations, and the Government signed the deal. CGTP did not. 
65 See section 6.4. for a detailed discussion. 
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protests. Similarly, in the summer of 2012, not only did the PP government nationalise 
Bankia,66 but the ECB, in a demand for more austerity, bailed out the banking system.  
Regional governments also applied austerity. Given their regional autonomy in policy 
making, there were attempts of privatisation of public services. For instance, as will be 
discussed in more detail in the following sections, in the summer of 2011 and the fall of 2012, 
the Community of Madrid advanced with reforms in education and healthcare services. These 
reforms were met with resistance from a variety of actors. The reforms served as a blueprint 
not only for other regional governments but also for the central government. Following the 
reforms, a new education law was implemented in 2013. If movements for education were 
starting to fade away at that point in time, the new measures rekindled the movements. As such, 
reactions that started at regional level quickly spilled over to other regions and to the national 
level. Furthermore, multiple corruption scandals developed during the crisis that affected the 
PP government and created a sense of indignation among the population. 
As a result, in both Spain and Portugal, as austerity measures endured throughout the 
cycle of protest new forms of protest were prompted. Despite keeping many of the 
organisational features identified before, these new forms of protest were conceived to fight 
back specific measures such as the Mareas or the QSLT. In the following sections, I address 
the emergence of these mobilisations. 
 
6.2. Actors and Claim-Making between 2009-2015  
In this section, I will show the difference between actors and claim-making between 2009 and 
2015 in Portugal and Spain. I will focus mainly on the years of most intense mobilisation 
between 2012 and 2013. Doing so will allow me to uncover the main trends of protest that I 
will unpack in the following sections in a more detailed way. I will show that there was an 
overall trend for the persistence of economic claims, followed by social ones, with trade unions 
continuing to be relevant. This discussion will serve as an introduction to the following 
sections, where I will explore in more detail the central dynamics of protest. The objective is 
show both the differences between the countries and the diversity of the anti-austerity field. 
 As already suggested in the previous chapter, the structures of mobilisation and actors 
during the anti-austerity cycle of protest were different in two countries. In Portugal, 
throughout 2009 to 2015, trade unions were dominant, particularly after 2011, while social 
                                                          
66 Bankia was a private bank that was founded in 2010 as a result of the merger of various regional 
savings banks. In 2012 the bank was on the brink of bankruptcy and was partially nationalised. 
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movement and civil society actors were less expressive (see Figure 6. 2). This contrasts with 
the Spanish case, where social movements organised a larger number of protest events. 
Nevertheless, trade unions in Spain had a significant role as well, being present at more than 
50% of events coded in 2012-2013. This is in line with some previous research and challenge 
the anti-austerity cycle of contention was led solely by social movements (Accornero & Ramos 
Pinto, 2015; Portos, 2017). 
FIGURE 6. 1 PROTEST EVENTS ORGANISED BY POLITICAL PARTIES, TRADE UNIONS AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS (%) IN SPAIN (2009-2015)
 
Note: Multiple choices were possible. Data were weighted by the number of events and adjusted to a 0–100 scale. 
 
FIGURE 6. 2 PROTEST EVENTS ORGANISED BY POLITICAL PARTIES, TRADE UNIONS AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS (%) IN PORTUGAL (2009-2015) 
 
Note: Multiple choices were possible. Data were weighted by the number of events and adjusted to a 0–100 scale. 
 
Analysis of claim-making between 2009 and 2015 identifies economic claims as the 
predominant type in both countries. The main difference arises from the weight of these types 
of claims in each country: while in Portugal economic claims were present in over 70% in most 
of the years, in Spain economic claims barely surpassed 60% in 2012. The overall dominance 
of economic claims in Portugal leaves little space for other types of claims to emerge. 
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In this way, it is possible to see that political claims had more preponderance in Spain 
than in Portugal. Between 2009 and 2015, political claims accounted for 16,9% of the total 
number of events, while amounting to only 9.7% in Portugal. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, these claims only became relevant in Portugal in 2012 and 2013 and focused mainly 
on the call for government resignation rather than a political renewal and institutional 
transformation. In Spain, on the other hand, due to the nationalist mobilisations, there was a 
spectrum of political claims. As can be seen from the data on the types of political claims in 
Spain (see Figure 6.2), claims about participation and representation peaked in 2011, while 
claims about the state and inclusion (i.e. nationalist demands such as the territorial conflict in 
Catalonia) remained relatively stable throughout the whole period.  
FIGURE 6. 3 CLAIM-MAKING IN SPAIN (%) (2009-2015) 
  
Note: Multiple choices were possible. Data were weighted by the number of events and adjusted to a 0–100 scale. 
 
FIGURE 6. 4 CLAIM-MAKING IN PORTUGAL (%) (2009-2015) 
Note: Multiple choices were possible. Data were weighted by the number of events and adjusted to a 0–100 scale. 
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FIGURE 6. 5 NUMBER AND TYPE OF POLITICAL CLAIMS PER YEAR IN SPAIN (2009-2015) 
 
 
 
With regard to social claims, no clear differences existed between Portugal and Spain. 
Between 2009 and 2015 in Spain the social claims accounted for 25% of the 3221 of the events 
coded, while in Portugal the claims represented approximately 21.5% of the total number of 
protests. Despite the lack of clear differences, there are differences in the organisational basis 
of protest and overall types of claims. In this way, in Spain, in the period under study, claims 
associated with education were present in 10.3% of the protest events (n=332), for healthcare 
the figures were 7.1% (n=230), while for housing they were 7,5% (n=240). As I will show in 
the following sections, it is important to note that despite the joint rise in 2011 and onwards, 
the mobilisations had multiple peaks throughout 2011 to 2013. In Portugal a different picture 
emerged, where education (11.7%; n=158) and health (7.4%; n=99) constituted the bulk of 
claim-making and housing was irrelevant (0.6%; n=8). In both countries social movements and 
trade unions were central actors, despite the fact that their importance and alliance preferences 
were different. In Portugal, trade unions and social movements were of relatively equal 
importance, while in Spain social movements were the leading player in the field, both 
unilaterally or in joint events with trade unions. 
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FIGURE 6. 6 TYPE OF ACTORS (%) IN SOCIAL CLAIMS PER YEAR IN SPAIN (2009-2015) 
 
Note: this is a subset relative only to protests on social claims 
 
FIGURE 6. 7 TYPE OF ACTORS (%) IN SOCIAL CLAIMS PER YEAR IN PORTUGAL (2009-2015) 
 
Note: this is a subset relative only to protests on social claims 
Figure 6. 8 shows a clear trend of the protest with claims for social rights following the 
same trajectory as the total number of protests in Spain. Moreover, there was a steep rise after 
Zapatero announced the first austerity measures in May 2010: the number of reported protests 
more than doubled, going from less than 10 events at the of 2010 to almost 70 events by the of 
2011. These protests remained constant until 2013. Thus, it can be argued that the 15M 
extended its activity through the emergence of its offspring and through the enhancement of 
previously existing groups such as PAH and in the form of Mareas.  
In contrast to Spain, in Portugal trade unions led the defence of social rights at the peak 
of austerity implementation. Social movements and civil society actors, as shown in previous 
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chapters, were particularly active in the mobilisation build-up between 2009 to 2010 due to the 
closure of services in depopulated rural areas. In 2011 to 2014, policies targeted mainly wages 
and labour rights in healthcare and education. The policies generated corporative campaigns 
from these sectors rather than the alliances evident in Spain. Furthermore, housing issues were 
absent from the agenda due to the lack of a speculative bubble that existed in Spain. 
FIGURE 6. 8 TYPE OF SOCIAL CLAIMS (%) PER THREE MONTHS IN SPAIN (2009-2015) 
 
FIGURE 6. 9 TYPE OF SOCIAL CLAIMS (%) PER THREE MONTHS IN PORTUGAL (2009-2015)  
 
Note: Social claims correspond to the overall claims in this domain, while the claims on education, 
health, and housing are subcategories of the broader category. 
An analysis of the protest event analysis data reveals the different paths followed after 
2011 with regard to actors and claim-making. Whereas in Portugal protest was predominantly 
confined to economic claims and trade unions, with some glimpses of social movements, in 
Spain social movements and trade unions collaborated on an equal basis with both economic 
and social claims being important. Following the argument advanced so far, the following 
section  explores the roots of these different dynamics of mobilisation. 
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6.3. Spain: in Between Overlapping Dynamics of Contention 
As shown in the previous sections, one of the main features of the Spanish cycle of protest was 
its sustained levels of protest between 2011 and 2014. This was due to what I will call 
“overlapping dynamics”. Rather than a single linear progression of protest, the contestation of 
austerity involved multiple issues and a myriad of actors who collaborated and participated in 
various and sometimes simultaneous activities. Following the 15M and its discursive 
repertoires, enduring austerity led into new mobilisations. I argue that these mobilisations were 
a continuation of the 15M, which is to say, their repertoires and claims were transformed and 
transferred to different types of mobilisations.  
In the following sections, I will describe the four main dynamics present throughout 
this phase. The first was the movements in defence of education and healthcare services: as I 
will show, these position-takings involved both trade unions and social movements acting as a 
sort of hybrid actor. Secondly, as house evictions intensified, a powerful movement for housing 
developed. Moreover, it is essential to consider two more protest dynamics. On the one hand, 
the formation of large protest platforms that brought together multiple actors, on the other hand, 
another formation, what I call labour from below. The latter formation corresponds to small 
and non-interconnected forms of labour protest that develop in Spain  in various sectoral areas, 
especially in the private sector. I will now describe how this developed throughout 2012 and 
2013. 
 
6.3.1. Mareas as a Hybrid: between Social Movements and Trade Unions 
From 2011 onwards, cuts in public services led to the emergence of groups led to the emergence 
of groups fighting back those austerity measures, which came to be known as Mareas or 
Tides.67 As such, these groups constituted an answer to threats that emerged throughout the 
cycle of protest in a specific arena. The Mareas were sectorial mobilisations that mixed 
elements and resources from both social movements and trade unions: as it will be seen, if on 
the one hand, they kept organisational practices coming from the 15M, on the other hand, trade 
unions provided important resources for mobilisation in terms of personnel and infrastructures. 
The more visible ones were the ones in education and in healthcare. 
The use of the term Marea was symbolic of the repertoire and movement practices: by 
using the term the groups wanted to point out to a more fluid, autonomous, decentralized, 
                                                          
67  It is possible to see multiple examples of these groups here: 
https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Lista_de_mareas  
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leaderless and democratic movement that was more or less spontaneous. Image-wise and 
symbolically, the use of same colour t-shirts at demonstrations reinforced this aspect of 
repertoire and movement practice by giving the Mareas a wave-like similarity and an immense 
visual impact. 
The Mareas were all-inclusive regarding membership; apart from the workers, users of 
public services were also involved.  For example, regarding the tide for education, which was 
symbolized by the colour green, one interviewee commented:  
“In the school year of 2010 we already started to note cuts in education in some places 
like Vallecas […] there we started a movement at the neighbourhood level that unites 
teachers and parents […] we launched a very horizontal movement without trade unions, 
but just with the educative community.” (Interview 7, Spain) 
 
“In Madrid, there were big demonstrations; you make it with the parents’ collaboration 
[…] the student's unions are implicated as well. What starts as a teachers protest, for their 
labour conditions […] transforms itself in a more general struggle about the public 
school.” (Interview 7, Spain) 
The Mareas involved both trade unions and various social movement actors. 
Nevertheless, despite the presence of labour organisations, the unionists upheld the movement 
practices that spread out and diffused after the turning point: going beyond the defence of 
labour rights, they defended the universality of public services. In this sense, the Mareas were 
a ‘hybrid’ composed of a mix between unions and movements (as it was not strictly an initiative 
from the former). Two indicators attest to the involvement of both social movements and trade 
unions the type of claims present in the protests and the actors involved. As it is possible to see 
there was a balance regarding actors in education and health sectors, which resulted in a 
combination of economic and social claims: these were simultaneously against austerity and 
for better labour conditions, as they were for the defence of public goods.  
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FIGURE 6. 10 ACTOR (%) BY TYPES OF SOCIAL CLAIMS IN SPAIN (2009-2015) 
 
FIGURE 6. 11 TYPE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS CLAIMS BY ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL 
CLAIMS IN SPAIN (2009-2015) 
 
The formation and mobilisation of the two most active and engaged Mareas was 
similar. Both in education and health sectors, there were previously formed small platforms 
that provided the first basis for mobilisation. Also, the threats emerged locally and regionally, 
but quickly became national. As a result, the scale of the protests and mobilisations shifted 
(Tarrow, 2011). 
Regarding the Marea Verde, in July 2011, in the midst of the ongoing 15M protests 
dynamics described in the previous chapter, the Government of the Community of Madrid, 
given its policy autonomy, announced measures involving cuts and privatisation in the 
education sector. As such, a group previously formed by teachers and parents in 2010 in the 
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Madrid neighbourhood of Vallecas68 launched a horizontal movement that involved the entire 
educative community. It was this small and initial mobilisation that developed the slogan 
“public school from everyone to everyone”, which would be taken by the broader movements.69 
As with the Green Tide, the White Tide (resistance in the health sector) emerged after an initial 
plan presented by the Community of Madrid to ‘sustain’ the health care services in the region 
in 2012.70  Initial reactions started at the Hospital de la Princesa in Madrid, where local 
mobilisations made use of civil disobedience.  
Figure 6.8 shows the eruption of both types of mobilisation. The announcement of cuts 
and privatisations measures led to an immediate reaction with protests rising in late 2011. The 
number of protests decreased slightly afterwards, with a resurgence in 2013. Health 
mobilisations reached their peak by the end of 2012. 
Nevertheless, it is critical to understand in more detail the modus operandi of these 
groups. For example, the Green Tide developed a repertoire that ended up diffusing to other 
sectorial protests. During the summer of 2011, teachers gathered in assemblies and decided to 
move on to strikes that were supported by a network of regional schools. These small-scale 
mobilisations led to an intense strike campaign between September and November of 2011. 
Besides the continuous strike days, the mobilisations involved multiple protest actions such as 
marches.  
As other regions in Spain slowly undertaken similar type of policies and austerity 
measures throughout 2011 and 2012, a scale-shift in terms of mobilisations happens as these 
become national rather that regional. In the case of issues pertaining to education, the cuts led 
to continuous protests and mobilisation that, in May 2012, peaked with the first general strike 
in the sector that united Primary to Higher education levels. Not only that, but in 2013 the 
government passed a bill, the LOMCE or ‘ley Wert;71 as it came to be known, which lead to 
another general strike in education in October of that year (Rogero-Garcia, Fernández 
Rodríguez, & Ibánez Rojo, 2014). Similarly, in the health sector, the mobilisation followed the 
same process - as these austerity policies expanded to other regions of the country and the 
central government tried to implement them at a national level, protests spread (Sánchez Bayle 
& Fernandez Ruiz, 2014).  
                                                          
68 Vallecas is a working-class neighbouhood in Madrid that has a culture of community organising.  
69 Translation of escuela publica de todos para todos. 
70 This was to be known as ‘Lasquetty Plan’ given the name of the regional health minister. 
71 LOMCE -  Ley Orgánica pra la mejora de la calidad educativa - was a law to reform the educative 
system statewide. 
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As such, over time, the main identifiable trend was the predominance of social 
movements in the claims for social rights. After 2011, not only did the movements become its 
chief ‘defenders’, but they also collaborated with trade unions. The defence of social rights, 
which materialised in education and health, provided the main stage for joint actions between 
social movements and trade unions. Joint actions constituted for approximately 18% protest 
around social claims during the period under study, while trade unions took alone around 28% 
of the protests in this field. Moreover, social movements alone were the main organisers of 
almost 55% of all actions coded regarding social claims. This was partly due to the housing 
mobilisations, where trade unions were not present, and alternative forms of protest emerged 
as I show in the following section. 
FIGURE 6. 12 NUMBER OF SOCIAL CLAIMS BY ACTORS PER THREE MONTHS IN SPAIN (2009-
2015)
 
FIGURE 6. 13 REPERTOIRES IN SOCIAL CLAIMS BY TYPES OF ACTORS IN SPAIN (2009-2015) 
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When considering the repertoires of action, it is important to consider the combination 
of both conventional actions, both in the streets and in the institutions, and disruptive ones.72 
In the Mareas and in the housing movement there were actions in the courts and in the 
parliaments, which challenged the institutions directly. More importantly, with regard to 
disruption and protest, there was a notable difference when trade unions took part in the 
protests. Figure 6. 13 shows that when social movements were the sole organisers, protests 
were more disruptive. Nonetheless, protest actions performed by trade unions alone seemed to 
be more disruptive than protests that included both trade unions and social movements.  
Overall, there was an agreement among my interviewees (especially among activists 
who participated in social movements) that the main trade unions (the CCOO and the UGT) 
were close to, or part of the, state apparatus and accomplices of the first Zapatero’s austerity 
measures. The deep delegitimation of trade unions among activists and social movements led 
trade unionists to integrate alternative mobilisations. Even if they emerged alternatively to the 
trade unions, the activists and actors in the social movements had a broader constituency and 
objectives. The Mareas ended up allying with unions as their resources provided mobilisation 
capacity. Mareas had, in this sense, a para-trade unionist nature, defending simultaneously 
social and labour rights. This stance was part of a framing strategy to defend the overall 
institutional building and mobilisation in different sectors, which helped to articulate different 
groups. Top leadership involvement was scarce, rather it was the rank-and-file militants who 
carried the mobilisations forward Moreover, these mobilisations were able to stop some of the 
austerity measures in the education and health sectors. One such example was the inability of 
the Community of Madrid to follow the privatisation measures underway in the health sector, 
after the intervention of the regional courts, which lead to the resignation of Lasquetty who 
oversaw the policy. 
Besides the mobilisations for health and education, the housing movement constituted 
one the cornerstones of the cycle of protest in Spain, which illuminated a very distinct 
characteristic of Spain’s crisis. These mobilisations, which were based on civil disobedience, 
were far more disruptive and lacked, in most cases, the presence or support of the trade unions. 
In that sense, the mobilisations for housing evolved from locally based grievances to formulate 
a broader framework diagnosis based on the relationship between housing, crisis and 
democracy (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; Martinez, 2018). 
                                                          
72 While conventional repertoires refers to demonstrations, marches, strikes, manifestos, and petitions, 
disruptive repertoires refers to escraches, occupations, blockades, and flashmobs. 
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6.3.2. Housing, Civil Disobedience and Relation with Institutions 
As seen in the introduction of this dissertation, a central feature of the Spanish crisis, in contrast 
with the Portuguese, was the development of a housing bubble (López & Rodríguez, 2011). As 
the crisis progressed, and unemployment increased, more and more people faced difficulties 
paying their mortgages. These difficulties coincided with legislation that punished home-
owners who defaulted on loans, leading to massive levels of evictions. 
Housing issues constituted a central axis of the Spanish mobilisations under the anti-
austerity cycle of protest and illuminated a reaction to a form of accumulation by dispossession 
under the current capitalist dynamics (Della Porta, 2017). In addition, in Spain, movements 
framed these mobilisations for housing not only as matter of social justice, but above all as a 
democratic right (Flesher Fominaya, 2015).  
With concern to the internal dynamics of the housing movement, as with the Mareas, 
the formation of mobilisation platforms was not immediate or spontaneous. As shown in 
chapters four, mobilisations for housing had developed already. Based on these experiences, 
between 2008 and 2010, new platforms expanded to the national level. 
Nevertheless, at this point, the existing platforms still lacked national projection and 
integration in broader activist networks. Exposure at the national level came with the 15M, 
which amplified these mobilisations. Even if there were already ongoing mobilisations for 
housing, it was in the squares occupied by the Indignados and their assemblies that this became 
visible and triggered a network of support that allowed the groups to expand.  
“There was already a movement before the 15M, but being able to tell it in the square, 
that people would come saying they were not able to pay for their house, took it further. 
[…] it is not something that emerges from the 15M, but the 15M had a lot to do with the 
expansion of the movement.” (Interviewee 15, Spain) 
The housing movement involved different actors, from the groups squatting houses and 
buildings in the main urban centers, to the emerging centros sociales since the early 2000s, to 
several different groups that emerged from the outset of the 2008 crisis and onwards, such as 
V de Vivienda73 (2006) or Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca74 (PAH) (2009). This last 
group became the most prominent and it is the one that I will focus on from this point onwards. 
In pursuing their demands, the PAH were more disruptive and confrontational as they were 
                                                          
73 Translated as H for Housing. 
74 Translated as Platform of Affected by the Mortgage.  
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guided by a clear repertoire of civil disobedience, even if combined with conventional forms 
of action following legal and institutional channels. 
In both V de Vivienda and PAH, individuals in local, non-hierarchical solidarity 
structures (i.e. ‘chapters’) met weekly to discuss cases, prepare activities, and help each other 
with regards to eviction processes many of them were suffering. A horizontal structure was at 
the core of their activities, which empowered lay citizens to deal with problems while 
simultaneously being supported by the community. 
As one my interviewees remarked (chapter 5, pp. 114-115), the non-hierarchical 
structure generated a ‘tissue’ or a connective structure (Tarrow, 2011) for the defence of other 
social rights as well. In the short-term, PAH’s primary objective was to stop people from being 
evicted. However, as Flesher Fominaya points out, their demands went beyond that. They 
expected the “retrospective application of assets received in lieu of payment (allowing 
mortgage debt to be cancelled by bank repossession); (…) the development of social rent 
regimes (e.g. rent control and council housing)” (Flesher Fominaya, 2015, p.7). As argued by 
Flesher Fominaya (2015), The PAH wanted to ensure that right for decent housing inscribed in 
the Spanish constitution was guaranteed: in this sense, they equated social rights with 
democracy. 
 The actors used a combination of different repertoires, not only in the streets but also 
in institutions (e.g., municipalities). Between 2011 and 2012, their main campaign was Stop 
Desahucios75: framed as a form of civil disobedience and passive resistance in which a group 
of people would stop evictors, who were attempting to fulfil a judicial mandate, from entering 
people’s houses. The second campaign was Dacion en Pago76 (created in 2010), which called 
for mortgage debt to be cancelled. Finally, the third campaign was Obra Social La PAH, which 
consisted of the occupation of houses and buildings owned by bailed-out banks or vulture 
funds. In the campaigners’ view, these buildings were propriety of the people due to the 
involvement of public money. According to their figures, thus far they have been able to stop 
more that 2000 evictions from taking place and rehoused about 2500 people.77 
 This platform engaged actively with the Congress as well. In March 2011, the PAH 
allied with the groups and trade unions, and submitted a citizens’ petition to the Congress called 
Iniciativa Legislativa Popular (por la vivienda Digna) - Popular Legislative Initiative (for 
dignified housing) (ILP). The dominant political parties in Congress blocked the ILP until 
                                                          
75 Translated as Stop Evictions. 
76 Translated as in lieu of payement. 
77 Data from their website: http:// afectadosporlahipoteca.com 
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September 2011, in effect, stopping the signature collection needed for the petition to be 
discussed at the institution. Between September 2012 and February 2013, they collected close 
to 1.5 million signatures (only 500 thousand were required for the bill to pass). After that, even 
if the petition was discussed in the Congress, the PP limited the scope of the PAH’s proposal. 
As shown in Figure 6.10, there were two peaks in the disruptive actions. The first peak 
occurred in 2011, shortly after the campaign to stop evictions commenced. The second peak, 
which was a consequence of the lack of response of the PP politicians to the ILP, whereby a 
campaign of escraches 78  began against them (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; Martinez, 2018; 
Romanos, 2016). The escraches were highly symbolic and contentious, and despite the lack of 
violent radicalism during the contentious cycle (Portos, 2017), a sort of mild radicalism 
developed and a  non-violent disruption was widely activated among citizens. 
FIGURE 6. 14 NUMBER OF HOUSING REPERTOIRES PER THREE MONTHS (2009-2015) 
 
Note: In this figure, I have included only the events which pertain to housing issues in Spain. 
As Romanos (2016) observes, the housing movement questioned the central argument 
about the tendency for a lack of interaction between protest movements and institutions present 
in the literature about Spain. Despite the horizontal movement, cultural and transversal 
discourse that puts the guarantee of housing as a social right at the heart of democracy, it is 
possible to see that the PAH’s action targeted institutions directly. The movement combined 
repertoires ranging from contentious to legal actions that entailed scale-shift mechanisms. If 
their activities started on a local basis, the activities quickly reached a national scale and, with 
                                                          
78 Escrache is a type of demonstration that gathers people next to the homes or workplaces of 
decision-makers. 
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the ILP, they moved to the European courts. At the same time, there were pressures over 
municipalities and regional governments to stop and prevent evictions at the national level.  
 
6.3.3. Recentralization, Platforms and Protest Events: Post-2012 Dynamics 
Despite the tendency to emphasise a framework that gives predominance to political claims 
with the rise of the 15M, what stands out in the cycle of protest is the pre-dominance of austerity 
and labour related demands (Figure 6. 15) Not only that, but the protests became dominant 
from mid-2012 onwards as political and social claims decreased. In this way labour issues 
played an essential role in mobilisations as they were at the forefront of the cycle of contention, 
standing either on their own or in combination with other issues, despite their delegitimisation 
and critique by social movements actors. One such example was the 15M: despite the apparent 
invisibility of economic claims in the movements, there was a critique of labour relations and 
precarity coming from groups such as Juventud Sin Futuro.79 Furthermore, as seen in one of 
the sections above, the Mareas had a labour component to it alongside the defence of public 
services. All these types of mobilisations were new forms of labour resistance where trade 
unions were mostly invisible. 
Nonetheless, with the slow dissolution of social movement mobilisations post-mid-
2012, a reconfiguration of protest dynamics followed with a “recentralisation”. As used here, 
“recentralization” implies the reassembling of smaller groups into larger platforms to organise 
protest events with broader claims instead of sectoral ones. Despite the conflict between social 
movement and trade unions, alliance building was central to this process. 
There were two phases of recentralization in the post-2012 mobilisations. The first 
started with initiatives such as the union led platform, Cumbre Social (Social Summit) and an 
international general strike. Adding to this, in September 2012, the Rodeo al Congreso (Siege 
to the Congress), a ‘faction’ of the 15M movement mobilised to “Siege the Congress” in what 
came to be some of the most conflictual and violent protests of the cycle. Still, the majority of 
the 15M assemblies did not support this protest (Romanos, 2016).  
In the summer of 2012, the CCOO created Cumbre Social to bring its allies and social 
movements together in a single platform. The strategic move of the CCOO was not particularly 
successful in uniting disparate groups, as the CCOO faced hostility from social movements (de 
Guzmán, Roca, & Diaz-Parra, 2016). Nevertheless, this platform served as the core of the 
European General Strike in November of the same year. Social movement groups were also 
                                                          
79 Translates as Youth without Future. 
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widely involved. This led to a connection between more classic working-class approaches with 
social movement dynamics. Despite the initial resistance and systematic critique to trade 
unions, movements brought innovative repertoires and discourses to this mobilisation, whereby 
they asked for a strike that would go beyond “the worker” as the main subject. Initiatives like 
Toma la Huelga (Take the Strike) suggested that not only would production be affected as 
traditionally in strikes, but consumption too, which meant to stop all economic activities.  
Movement platforms asked for a social strike that involved social movement unionism (Köhler 
& Calleja Jiménez, 2015). The restructuring, or even its disappearance, of Fordist labour 
relations, its precarisation and the emergence of new forms of labour representation and 
repertoires by social movements lead into what could be deemed an alliance.  
The second phase of recentralisation emerged in 2013. If in the first phase, at the turning 
points of the protest cycle, it opened up, integrated new people, stretched and reshaped the 
protest dynamics (chapter 5), in the second phase, even if it meant losing some dynamism, the 
different groups gathered around bigger platforms and unitary initiatives. If in the initial phase 
the 15M dispersed to the neighbourhoods, while simultaneously creating the Mareas, in this 
phase there were new centralities created around groups such as Mareas Ciudadanas80 and 
Marchas de la Dignidad81. As the cycle developed, there was a broader presence, an influence 
of institutional actors, and large protest events organized by outsider/minority unions such as 
Marchas de la Dignidad. 
 With regard to the first platform, it started, in the winter of 2012, in a period of reflux 
for the social movements. Taking inspiration from the Mareas, they were initially named 
Mareas Unidas (United Tides) and then eventually renamed Mareas Ciudadanas. If the 
existing Mareas initially took the initiative, this was not a sectoral protest, but rather an attempt 
to converge into a unitary platform that fought against austerity, debt, and privatisation in the 
footsteps of 15M. For the Mareas Ciudadanas initial demonstration (February 2013) (23F - at 
the anniversary of the failed military coup of 1981), their slogan was ‘against cuts and for a 
true democracy’ (Pastor, 2014). The platform converged not only the existing Mareas but also 
trade unions, the housing movement, and various political parties. 
 
 
 
                                                          
80 Translated as Citizens Tides. 
81 Translated as Dignity Marches. 
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FIGURE 6. 15 TYPE OF ECONOMIC CLAIMS: AUSTERITY AND LABOUR IN SPAIN (2009-2015) 
 
In 2014, the Dignity Marches marked the symbolic end of the protest cycle. Following 
this protest event, demobilisation and institutionalisation followed due to the emerging 
electoral cycle. Mobilised by the Sindicato Andaluz de Trabajadores (SAT), the Dignity 
Marches had the support of all the anti-austerity field, from 15M, other social movements, and 
emerging political parties (Romanos, 2016; Pastor, 2014). Using a typical working-class 
repertoire in Spain of long marches, the protest consisted of assemblies from different areas in 
the country, which converged in Madrid on the 22nd of March. The convergence of protesters 
gathered about one million people. More importantly, claims for redistribution were the key 
demand of the Madrid protest. In this sense, if the cycle of protest initiated with indignation, it 
closed with claims pertaining to dignity. 
 As with the platforms here discussed in this section, small labour protests developed 
after mid-2012. 
 
6.3.4. Labour from Below 
While the previous section discussed large protest events and the constitution of platforms 
where social movement actors and trade unions coalesced around the defence of broad 
economic and social rights, there was also a labour from below protest dynamic. I define this 
as ‘labour mobilisations’ that developed as an alternative and were autonomou from the CCOO 
and the UGT, primarily in the private sector, in which workers adopted more disruptive 
repertoires in their local settings. Rather than a unified tendency, labour mobilisations from 
below were constituted by multiple and dispersed events of protest around Spain. Moreover, if 
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large trade unions were absent from this type of mobilisation, there was the presence of smaller 
and alternative trade unions (de Guzmán et al., 2016). 
As shown in Figure 6. 15, despite work related claims being always significant between 
2009 and 2015, from 2011 to mid-2012 austerity claims emerged either on their own or in 
combination with labour issues. Post mid-2012, both austerity and labour stood separately as, 
during this period, the private sector laid off or fired a sizable amount of workers. Therefore, 
after 2013, the bulk of the occurrences that pertained to economic demands related mostly with 
the factory level type of mobilisations from groups of workers who either risked losing their 
jobs or found themselves in a precarious situation. 
Despite the lack of unity in mobilisation, given the different sectors of activity, there is 
a clear trend that can be identified. Throughout the whole cycle, there was an impact of the 
crisis on business, and much of the labour protest occured in factories. There are multiple 
examples that stand out throughout the protest cycle (and in the protest event analysis) such as 
the factory workers who were employed by the multinational company Coca-Cola, Panrico, or 
even coal miners from the region of Asturias. There were also protests related to the public 
sector, such as cleaners and garbage collectors. Moreover, another group that appeared 
throughout the protest cycle were communication workers who were employed by several 
regional TV channels (such as TeleMadrid). Many of these communication workers were also 
laid off.  
To conclude throughout the previous sections I have shown that if while in defence of 
social rights the top-level trade unions due to their delegitimation had to ally with social 
movements, from 2013 onwards mobilisations happened at the factory level totally 
disconnected from top-level trade unions.  
 
6.4. Portugal: from Movement Void to Strategic Alliance Building 
In Portugal, the contentious dynamics from 2012 to 2014 differed from Spain. Rather than 
displaying overlapping dynamics, which involved multiple actors and claims, the Portuguese 
protest movements were restrained to fewer actors and claims. If, on the one hand, there were 
constant trade union protests, especially in the public sector, on the other hand, social 
movements only ‘exploded’ in September 2012 with the QSLT, following a ‘movement void’ 
(i.e., a period when social movements were absent and rarely participated in protest 
mobilisations). In this sense, the Portuguese ‘story’ follows an almost sequential and linear 
process, in which social movements re-emerge for a short period after its disappearance during 
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the movement void.In the following sections, I provide a detailed description of the process of 
social movements emerging from an almost inert stance to a re-emergence of collective action. 
 
6.4.1. Trade Unions and Movement Void 
Throughout 2011, the emergence of social movements constituted a brief episode in the anti-
austerity cycle of contention. As noted in the previous chapter, in 2011 movement protest were 
sparse, primarily between the GaR and the 15O. While there were small, scattered protests, 
large performances did not occur beyond the CGTP-launched events. Nonetheless, despite the 
clash between the different groups, both left-wing parties and autonomous groups supported, 
with varying degrees of intensity, trade union actions (Soeiro, 2014). Trade unions constituted 
the dominant actor throughout the whole cycle of protest. 
At the end of November 2011, the CGTP and the UGT allied, with the support of the 
PCP, the BE and the existing social movement platforms, in a General Strike, against the 
successive austerity measures announced by the right-wing coalition since its election in June 
2011. The event constituted the first instance of collaboration between ‘old’ and ‘new’ actors 
during the cycle, as a variety of social movements joined the protest march and other actions 
during the day of the General Strike. However, the joint endeavours faded away, especially 
between the two major trade unions, the CGTP and UGT. As I will show, the following months 
led to a rearrangement of alliances that lasted until the emergence of the QSLT (Baumgarten, 
2016).  
In comparison to the Spanish situation, in Portugal the first half of 2012 was unique 
primarily due to a lack of social movement protests, as well as an overall dominance of 
economic claims related to austerity and labour (see Figure 6. 16). During this period, the 
CGTP became the quasi-hegemonic actor contending austerity, and, in particular, organising 
labour protests through the first half of 2012. As Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015) remark, 
anti-austerity movements stood divided along the long-term rivalry between PCP and BE. The 
links between 15O platform and the CGTP were damaged as the platform came to be dominated 
by a specific group, MAS, which was very critical of the union’s stance and strategies. In fact, 
MAS declined to join the general strike the CGTP-UGT had called, and instead organised a 
parallel public march. Despite supporting the reasons for the strike, MAS did not back the 
organisers, nor their strategies. 
Furthermore, the fragile alliance between the CGTP and the UGT broke again as the 
moderate and conciliatory strategy of the latter group, UGT, gained ground. As evidenced in 
previous sections, in early 2012, the right-wing government passed a labour reform that the 
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UGT signed, which left the CGTP as the sole contestant of the labour reform, contributing for 
General Strikes in March spearheaded by this actor. During this period, most groups that 
integrated the 15O platform abandoned the platform’s mandates due to internal contradictions 
and tensions.  
When looking to social movements, Baumgarten (2016) defines the beginning of 2012 
as phase of “experiments with event-based organizations” for social movement groups: 
“From the lack of continuity of activism in the first phase activists learned the necessity 
of working together, while from the second phase they remembered the bad experiences 
of working together in a platform. So, the new attempt at organizing this time involved 
creating events without establishing a new platform.” (Baumgarten, 2016, p. 173) 
Regardless of the dispersion and divergence in social movement groups, a parallel trend of 
small ‘autonomous’ groups emerged with a repertoire of occupations of buildings and spaces, 
for example in Lisbon, and closed schools  in Porto, as well as small protest events in other 
locations (Baumgarten, 2016). These small groups were at the forefront of the ‘Global Spring’, 
which occurred in May 2012, a movement that attempted to ‘reanimate’ mobilisations but was 
plagued with divisions and conflicts. My interviewees agreed that this was a moment of 
movement stasis where there was an incapacity to mobilise continuously, due to conflicts, lack 
of resources, size, and an inability to establish connections with institutional actors. The 
mobilisation capacity of social movements decreased dramatically and was restricted to the 
organisation of small events with an internationalist appeal and limited support to the CGTP 
protests and initiatives. Nonetheless, Baumgarten (2016) argues that despite the low degree of 
activity, this period was central to how groups came to act and organise in the following phase. 
“I: When moving into the creation of the QSLT, the BE had good intentions. It departs 
from an analysis that the 15O had destroyed the relations between the various collectives 
and the possibility of unitarian work. […] 
T: There were almost nine months without significant protests…. 
I: It was despairing… 
T: I mean there was the Global Spring… 
I: The biggest demonstration had 1000 people […] We were there, but more and more 
reduced regarding participation and numerically.” (Interviewee 12, Portugal) 
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However, the intensification of austerity would lead into the emergence of the QSLT 
and a rearrangement of the contentious field. In the next section of this chapter, I delve into the 
contextual changes and consider both the actors and their claims. 
 
6.4.2. Constitutional Break and the QSLT - Alliance Building and Exclusions 
In the summer of 2012, the political opportunity structures changed, which lead to an 
intensification of protest both trade unions and social movements. At the heart of the process 
there was a constitutional debate that sparked a ‘new’ discourse, which led to a new contentious 
phase. In July 2012, after various left-wing MPs called for a review of several austerity 
measures related to cuts in the public sector, the Constitutional Court overruled the cuts as 
unconstitutional. From that period onwards, both social movements and trade unions focused 
on using the discourse of the revolution and the 25th of April to frame their action (Carvalho & 
Ramos Pinto, 2019). Most contentious actors see the Portuguese Constitution as a heritage of 
the carnation revolution that ensured social rights. An attack on such a symbol led the various 
contentious actors to rely upon this reference in their mobilisations. The use of this symbolic 
action entailed both resonance of the frame of social rights and the Constitution with the overall 
base of mobilisation, as well as strategic modularity (Tarrow, 2013) presented by the 
Constitutional Court intervention. The actors made use of an open understanding of the 
revolution to gather support from multiple groups. In the next section, I broaden my 
considerations on this topic. 
As shown by Rodrigues and Silva (2016), a debate over the Constitution between 
political parties, but also in civil society, marked the years of implementation of the MoU. 
Despite being contested in many ways, the heritage of the April 25th comes through the 
Constitution in political debates. Due to the profuse presence of social rights in the 
Constitution, during this period, leftist actors and other social movements took the Constitution 
as a legacy to defend, (Rodrigues & Silva, 2016; Silva & Vieira, 2016). There was an 
understanding that the 25th of April and the Revolutionary period was central to not only 
political and civil liberties but also social rights that ensured emancipatory equality. 
 A second and more crucial conjunctural element was the announcement in September 
2012 by the prime minister of the reduction of the payroll tax. After more than a year of 
austerity and giving continuity to measures that reduced labour costs, the announcement of the 
new measures invigorated protest. The payroll tax was a measure that the Troika had been long 
insisting on implementing, but the measure unleashed contestation from virtually every sector 
of society, from social movements to the junior coalition partner, CDS-PP, and also from 
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workers to employers. For the most part, all of the actors critised the measure for its iniquity, 
as this tax would increase workers tax contribution and decrease the ones made by employers. 
Furthermore, as Valentim (2018) shows, with regard to the GaR’s actions, the QSLT had a 
more positive reception among the mass media when protesting against this measure. The 
payroll tax was contested for two weeks, after which the government ended up withdrawing 
this measure and proposing alternative ones.  
 Apart from these contextual factors, the spark in protest mobilisation was also the result 
of a restructuration process in the contentious arena regarding the interactions between actors. 
The change in this arena led to the peak of mobilisations that happened between September 
2012 and March 2013.  
 The first QSLT protest was an eventful protest (Della Porta, 2008). It condensed many 
of the frustrations and grievances with the ongoing austerity politics, but also reconfigured the 
political environment: the QSTL protest marked the political agenda and changed the trajectory 
of the cycle of contention by introducing new repertoires and frameworks. This platform, 
initially formed as a group of people subscribing a manifesto, quickly expanded and brought 
to the public sphere a new language to contest austerity. Apart from that, the protest was also 
able to sustain smaller and more symbolic events, keeping their mediatic presence on the 
internet and in the mass media. This new platform emerged with the support of the BE and, to 
some extent, ensured the backing of the CGTP and the PCP. According to one of my 
interviewees: 
“Around June, I was contacted to subscribe a manifesto that will be the manifesto of the 
QSLT that was more or less drafted […] I think it was reasonably unexpected, even 
taking into account the GaR, no one was expecting the size of the demonstration, because 
since the beginning no one structured it as a movement. It was just a manifesto, a group 
of people that subscribed a manifesto and was willing to organise a demonstration. Of 
course we knew that the resources had to come from somewhere, but it is also true that 
no one went there to defend the position of a party or trade union […] there was already 
a draft […] and it was permeated by a political sensibility that we could associate with 
the BE, that in the sphere of the social movements translates into the PI.” (Interviewee 
20, Portugal) 
Since its creation, the QSLT was meant to have a unitarian character. It emerged out of the 
disputes within 15O and came from an initiative of the BE to federate all groups in its sphere 
of influence and members of the PCP into a unitarian mobilisation. When conceived, the QSLT 
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departs from two critiques to the previous significant mobilisations: the GaR and the 15O. First, 
demonstrations should express political grievances, and not merely a plateau for citizens to 
express their discontent, as it happened with the GaR. Second, for the members of QSLT, the 
open organisational structures seen at the 15O end up leading to tensions due to the 
opportunistic take over by small organised groupuscules and that, in their analysis, destroys 
the possibility of collective work. As a result, the QSLT deliberately decided to close itself to 
exclude, as new members of the group could only join the platform when agreed by all who 
were already members of the platform. Therefore, the QSLT’s objective was to mark the 
political agenda while excluding their ‘opposition’. Their objective was to have a cohesive 
structure that was not plagued by conflicts. One of my interviewees reports that: 
 “What happens is that when the QSLT emerges, there was a double critique, one to the 
GaR and another one to the 15O. The critique to the GaR is the following: it is not worth 
to do a demonstration if this is not politicized, with few political objectives […] everyone 
goes there and you can have people side by side with a skinhead or someone from the 
PSD that it is unhappy […] which is unfair because the GaR organizers are not that, it is 
rather the way it was seen and it led nowhere. Our manifestos were always very political 
[…] the 15O and its organisation was open, anyone could participate, but in reality, it 
ends up expelling people. Why? Because small groups end up controlling it and everyone 
else ends up leaving since no one has the patience for each time that you discuss 
something they have 20 people defending that same point. Therefore, we create a closed 
structure as we did not intend to be democratic, we do not represent people. It was a 
group with connections to the social and political movements. It is a plural group, but a 
closed one, only those there discuss it.” (Interviewee 19, Portugal) 
Many civil society groups that are satellites of the BE, e.g. Precários Inflexíveis (PI), 
constituted the logistic basis of organisation of the QSLT.82  The PI played a particularly 
important role as a ‘pivot’ player, i.e., being a group composed mostly by members of the BE 
and focusing on questions of precarity. Membership overlap of second and third rank militants 
show that these groups were part of the same network. These spin-off groups were critical as 
their relationship with civil society actors was very different from the top-down interactions 
between movement actors and PCP or the unions. Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015) point 
out the alliances that developed during the cycle of protest, which led to larger and stronger 
protests by the trade unions. The researchers further contend that, though new movement actors 
                                                          
82 Fieldwork observation done in 2013: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7dU5-qmT1A 
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emerged, the actors seemed to rely largely on trade unions for mobilisation, as the trade 
unionists appeared capable of sustaining large protests. 
 
6.4.3. Claim-Making and Repertoires in the QSLT 
The QSLT sustained their activity from their first demonstration in September 2012 to March 
2013 under the banner of O Povo é quem mais ordena - a kind of ‘power to the people’: a direct 
reference to a symbolic and imaginary period of the revolution. The mobilisation process for 
the first demonstration in September 2012 was short on resources and events. The QSLT 
members launched a manifesto to announce the demonstration in late August 2012, with 
sounding resonance in the mass and social media. They also organized a demonstration of a 
flash mob to take place in front of the IMF offices in Lisbon. Together, with the announcement 
of new austerity measures, the demonstrations created a wave of discontent that translated into 
the mobilisation, according to the organizers’ estimations, of one million people all over the 
country. Mobilisations proved to be successful and had an impact. As a result of the 
mobilisations, there was a progressive enlargement of the group. For example, in September 
2011, the signatories and organisers of the September demonstration were about 30 people 
from different quadrants of the left, however, by March 2012, their numbers surpassed 100.  
The emergence of the QSLT led to a shift in claim-making and the various repertoires 
used. The changing discourse involved a reconfiguration in politics, aesthetics, action, and 
repertoires (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019). The name QSLT was highly symbolic and was 
intended to represent the political division between those who signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Troika and were favourable to the austerity measures, as well as those 
situated in the opposite camp. The aim was not only to establish an ideological and political 
line of demarcation, but also to establish a social one: street protest was the way to express 
disapproval of ongoing austerity. The name of this groups was not only a question of resonance 
but also of social movement strategy whereby organizers attempted to fit and adapt to the 
context of continuous austerity and questioning of social rights (Tarrow, 2013). 
As a result, the QSLT, who staged small and disruptive events as well as large protests, 
strategically adapted the repertoires and frameworks to the political opportunity structure. 
Their frameworks went beyond a mere critique of precarity. These were open and transversal 
discourses that resonated due to use of symbols related with the revolution, which, over time, 
became more performative and mediatic, and reached to a broader audience. The best example, 
due to its symbolic and historical charge, was the use of the song Grândola, which was used to 
disrupt cabinet members public appearances. Resembling the escraches performed in Spain 
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during the ILP housing campaign, the song directly evoked the memory of the 25th of April, 
1974. In 1974 Grândola was one of the songs played on public radio stations during the military 
coup. The use of the song in 2013 assisted in reaching the mass media and, as a result, helped 
mobilise the March 2013 demonstration. Moreover, the song was evocative of principles of 
equality and fairness inherited from the revolution and inscribed in the Constitution 
(Baumgarten, 2017b; Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019). By using these symbols, which have 
multiple interpretations due to the positive but polysemic meanings of the April 1974 coup 
(Costa Lobo, Costa Pinto, & Magalhães, 2016), the QSLT allied not only resonance (Benford 
& Snow, 2000), but also strategic modularity (Tarrow, 2013) the result of which was the 
articulation of a ‘new’ message. 
By uniting so many disparate groups, the QSTL framed themselves as a resistance 
movement that had a “minimal programme” to “give the voice back to the people”, instead of 
broader objectives such as renegotiating the debt.  Building on this, their objective was, on the 
one hand, to show the dissatisfaction against the Troika and its policies, while on the other 
hand demand the government’s resignation. Nonetheless, despite the non-partisan, pacifist, and 
secular narrative they espoused, repeating the formula used by the GaR, a critique of the party 
or political system was still absent. 
During this phase of protest, there was an upsurge of claims against austerity, as well 
as for the resignation of the right-wing government (as seen in chapter 5, Figure 5. 7, p. 111). 
Figure 6. 16 shows that while economic claims varied along the process, broader claims, which 
were solely about austerity and not combined with work claims, were mostly visible in the 
period of more intense action from the QSLT. 
FIGURE 6. 16 TYPE OF ECONOMIC CLAIMS: AUSTERITY AND WORK CLAIMS IN PORTUGAL 
(2009-2015) 
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6.4.4. Demobilisation 
Demobilisation began after the QSLT March 2013 demonstration and reached lower levels in 
the summer of that year. Again, as seen in previous moments protest mobilisation in Portugal, 
the demobilisation appeared to be the result of particular structures of political opportunities 
that opened up after the summer of 2012. Therefore, the decrease in the number of protests was 
not only the result of internal disputes over political strategy and organisation, but also a lack 
of mass media attention. By June 2013, a time that the platform organised an international 
protest, many of the interviewees referred as a failure. The failure could be measured primarily 
by the plummeting numbers of participants. The already existing fissures within the group 
deteriorated further and led to a period of inactivity. However, there still existed tacit and 
implicit support of trade unions activities. To close this phase, in the same month, the CGTP 
and the UGT allied again to jointly organize the last general strike of the cycle of protest where 
many actors converged. 
Following this protest, a governmental crisis unfolded whereby following various 
ministerial resignations and presidential intervention, the coalition was reinstated. Many of my 
interviewees stated that the crisis had a demobilising effect, as it appeared that nothing could 
move the government from their positions and from austerity actions. Nevertheless, as can be 
seen, despite the breakdown in the number of protests, the trade union protests continued. 
However, with the tense political situation it was not until the new budget was approved that 
new event actions were taken to the streets. I will explore this further in the next chapter as I 
deal with the demobilisation, institutionalisation, and party system transformation. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter and the previous one, it is possible to perceive that the paths taken in each 
country were not predetermined, but instead relationally constituted and politically conducted. 
Cycles of contention developed in an open way, and took into account the interactions between 
the actors and their environment. 
 This chapter has closely examined how mobilisations against austerity involved 
multiple claims and actors. Nonetheless, the differences between Portugal and Spain shows 
that not only was political process key, but also fundamental was pre-existing actors, 
repertoires, and claims. These aspects were essential components of the cycles of contention: 
being dynamic and relational the mobilisations changed and evolved with time. As such, 
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Portugal and Spain presented distinct anti-austerity cycles of contention that, in many ways, 
reproduced the traces already identified in the fourth chapter. 
Thus, even if novelties existed with regard to the scale of mobilisation, it should not be 
forgotten that these novelties were situated and contextualised. The period entailed regressive 
cuts on social rights and liberalisation of public services. The retrenchment of the welfare state 
and growing unemployment led to contentious mobilisations from various actors which 
underwent different phases in the two countries. 
Two factors combined to produce these different trajectories. On the one hand, there 
was a sort of ‘equilibrium’ between actors in Spain that was absent in Portugal. As Spanish 
trade unions were delegitimised due to their collaboration with neoliberal reforms, non-
institutional protest movements constituted the main channel through which people voiced 
grievances. Nevertheless, the trade unions still held organisational resources that led into 
‘spaces of confluence’ (i.e. the different platforms in which both social movements and trade 
unions worked together). On the other hand, the relation of movements and contentious actors 
vis-à-vis the crisis was different. If in Spain the 15M continuously questioned the democratic 
regime coming from the transition, in Portugal the protest movements reinforced the status quo 
of the regime, putting the constitution and its origin at the centre of their demands and 
discourses. Moreover, another aspect to consider was the configurations between actors and 
their formation. While in Spain, there was a mechanism of scale-shift whereby local 
mobilisations expanded and became national, in Portugal mobilisations appeared to be driven 
institutionally, from top-down rather than from grassroots levels. 
Furthermore, in Spain, mobilisations for social and economic rights were always built 
and framed upon political rights and dissatisfaction in what is usually translated as ‘crisis of 
democracy’. The inability of political parties to sustain and provide citizenship rights created 
a problem of effectiveness which led the social movements to build a discourse that critised 
the institutions that resulted from the transition to democracy as still partially Francoist. In 
Portugal, the same social and labour rights were framed differently with regard to its origins. 
The actors in Portugal acted more corporatively way, and did not form a transversal alliance 
between movements and unions. This alliance only emerged strategically at a particular 
intersection of the cycle of contention. In this sense, it is especially important to note that with 
social and economic rights the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors were 
different. In Spain, rather than being marked by compeition, there existed non-hierarchical and 
cooperative relations (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). However, in Portugal the relations tended 
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to be exclusionary, with institutional actors who dominated the field and refused to cooperate 
with non-institutional actors and non-enabling the constitution of more transversal actors.  
 But the cycle of protest ended up with a transformation of the political sphere, whereby 
social movements integrated and came to influence institutions more directly. In the following 
chapter, I will approach these dynamics of demobilisation and institutionalisation. 
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7. Fragile Realignments? Reconfiguration of the Left 
after the Anti-Austerity Protests 
 
The intense and highly contentious phase of anti-austerity protest in Portugal and Spain, taking 
place between 2010 and 2013, was followed by an electoral and institutional phase that 
comprised multiple elections. These were local, regional, national, and European, and reshaped 
the political landscape not only with new actors that followed in the footsteps of the protest 
movements, but also by leading to a reconfiguration of the party systems.  
Portugal and Spain were not the only countries affected by the “crisis of democracy” to 
which I refer in the introduction of this dissertation. The tension between capitalism and 
democracy led to the highest volatility ever recorded in postwar Europe (Hernández & Kriesi, 
2016) and Portugal and Spain were not exceptions. Nevertheless, even if we are aware of the 
determinant factors behind volatility, it is still not clear what processes are behind it and how 
they can account for different outcomes. The 2015 general elections in both countries allow a 
reading of the institutional transformations, even if with different contours, by the end of the 
cycle of protest. 
In Spain, alongside Podemos a variety of other actors on the Left emerged at the 
regional and municipal level. Emerging to confront the crisis of representation in different sides 
of the political spectrum (Vidal, 2018), they challenged the PSOE and PP hegemony. 
Nonetheless, these dynamics had already been expressed in the initial demise of PSOE in the 
2011 elections (Martín & Urquizu-Sancho, 2012) and the slow increase of voting intentions in 
parties such as UPyD and IU, which in many ways came to occupy a similar political space. 
Arguably, as they were coming up in polls, these could have been the beneficiaries of the 
ongoing political and economic crisis, but ended up being surpassed by new political forces. 
In this sense, the transformation of the left results from the combination of strong social 
movements discussed in previous chapters, with internal dynamics and elite disputes within 
IU.  
In Portugal, as seen in chapters 5 and 6, claims and cleavages remained grounded in the 
economic domain despite the climate of political dissatisfaction. The transformation of the 
party system in this country, rather than involving the creation of new political parties (for 
which there were attempts), eventually led to a pact between centre-left and the so-called 
radical-left. The latter parties had always opposed this political solution. As movements 
remained within the institutional actors’ sphere of influence, their discourse and action had a 
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less significant role throughout the cycle. Their contestation focused mainly on social rights 
and austerity, without pushing for further political change. Debate, as I will show throughout 
this chapter, happens within the space of the institutional Left. In this sense, the reconfiguration 
of the Left in Portugal was the logical conclusion of a process where movements contested 
austerity but were not disruptive to the political sphere.  
When contrasting the Spanish and the Portuguese cases, two important differences in 
the political process becomes clear. If in Spain the debate related to the creation of an 
alternative to PSOE, in Portugal this was about what kind of relationship the ‘radical’ left 
should have with the PS. The role of the social movements and other contentious actors in this 
regard was different in Spain and Portugal. In the former country, it came to influence new 
political formations not only by the creation of parties where these were expressed, but also by 
the creation of a discourse that was influential and absorbed. In the latter, the non-
disruptiveness of the regime discourse made them less relevant in shaping the transformations 
to the party system. Additionally, it is important to note that throughout this chapter the role of 
social movements will be less evident: by disappearing from this phase, these actors were no 
longer the main protagonists. 
It is important to note that this approach contrasts with most work done so far, allowing 
to go beyond merely the structure of opportunities, while emphasising agency and process. 
Empirical work on Podemos looks to the political and economic opportunity structure that 
facilitated its creation, success and electoral basis (Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016; Sola & 
Rendueles, 2018). Even if this is relevant, it leads into a black box whereby the political process 
and agency are dismissed, and where its emergence it is the direct consequence of the crisis. In 
these studies, there is a lack of focus on the disputes that happen within the left and how these 
were important in structuring the new actors. When looking to Portugal, it is important to 
contemplate why no new political parties were successful and why the radical left was not able 
to take advantage of the crisis in the same way that Podemos and SYRIZA did.  
Against this backdrop, in this chapter I focus on the institutionalisation phase as an 
outcome of the cycle of contention, alongside the dynamics of demobilisation in the ‘electoral 
period’ of 2014-2015. The objective is twofold: on the one hand to explain the influence of 
protest waves on the following electoral cycles and their political re-alignments, while on the 
other to analyse the transformations of the party system, both of the Left and the emergence of 
new political actors. Following the analytical framework used so far, this approach will further 
enlighten the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors along the cycle of 
contention. In this chapter, I ask: what is the reconfiguration of the left after the peak of 
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austerity and how did movements contribute to it? What were the transformations that these 
contentious responses provoked in the overall political field? What sorts of outcomes came 
from the new political movements that emerged? And, finally, what caused the divergence 
between these two cases? 
The transformation of the party system tends to be explained by considering the so-
called why questions which focus on structural determinants of political change. To counter 
these perspectives, Linz and Stepan  (Linz & Stepan, 1978) propose a model that, rather than 
focusing just on structural elements, concentrates on processual, relational and political aspects 
of political change. In his view, as with Tilly (1978), political change is a culmination of an 
incremental process. Therefore, Linz acknowledges the importance of the how questions since, 
as pointed out previously, similar structural conditions might lead to different outcomes. 
Central to this approach is the notion of reequilibration, which follows the stages of crisis and 
breakdown and corresponds to the last stage of his model when new regimes consolidate 
around a new centre of power. Nonetheless, although it takes into consideration broader 
economic elements and context, this approach is one that tends to focus solely on institutional 
dynamics, barely looking into the relations between parties and contentious actors. 
Even if considering this perspective, there is the need for recognising the impact of 
economic factors, more recent works deal with party system change in contexts of crisis and 
austerity. Work on Latin America shows that market reforms led to political transformations 
that entailed a party brand dilution, a decline of partisanship and, more importantly, a process 
of dealignment. For example, Roberts (2012) explores the impact of market reforms and 
liberalisation in party systems in Latin America and contends that the centre-left is fundamental 
to understanding longer processes of political change. Therefore, when the centre-left political 
forces are in power and applying liberalisation programmes, this often leads to the emergence 
of protest, while when in opposition they channel dissent. 
 Nevertheless, the sequence of events within the political process and agency has a role, 
making social movements relevant actors in the process of realignment. Considering the 
objectives of this chapter of reconstituting the process of emergence of new parties, and akin 
to social movement studies, the literature on institutionalisation should be considered 
(McAdam & Tarrow, 2010; Tarrow, 1989, 2011). In Tarrow’s approach, institutionalisation 
constitutes the last stage of a cycle of contention that is usually simultaneous with 
radicalisation. If the latter takes more disruptive and violent forms of street politics, the former 
takes a more conventional path in engaging directly with institutions, being less disruptive. 
155 
 
 As such, overlapping partially with Linz’s perspective, but introducing social 
movement as important actors, Koopmans points out that the end of the cycle is one where the 
“contraction of protest waves is best conceptualized as a process of restabilization and 
reroutinization of patterns of interaction within the polity” (Koopmans, 2004, p. 37). As Tarrow 
adds:  
“As participation is channelled into organization, the parts of the movements that emerge 
in the early phases of the cycle take on a more political logic – engaging in implicit 
bargaining with authorities. As the cycle winds down, exhaustion and polarization 
spread, and the initiative shifts to elites and parties” (Tarrow, 2011, p.212).  
One such example of institutionalisation concerns movement-parties that since 2014 
became of importance (Della Porta, Fernández, et al., 2017). These are hybrid actors that have 
features of both non-institutional and institutional actors, being, therefore, closer to social 
movements in practices and discourses, and important elements to take into consideration at 
the institutionalisation phase. 
All these concepts are part of a toolbox that will allow for further exploration of the 
relationship between social movements and political parties in the context of contentious 
cycles. Such an approach permits an investigation of the internal dynamics of the party system 
which takes into consideration questions of institutionalisation within the cycle of contention. 
There is the need both to look beyond the political space, and to observe its interactions with 
the other actors. 
On a more speculative note, I will argue that in both countries, at the end of the cycle 
(i.e., at the 2015 elections), the realignment of the left was fragile, insofar as the outcomes 
might not be stable or sustainable in the long run. Despite the unfolding changes these are, in 
many ways, not yet in the final stage of the process. Furthermore, I argue that to fully 
understand this reconfiguration besides the aspects espoused by Roberts’ work (2012), one 
must consider a processual, historical and relational approach that looks into the internal 
dynamics of parties and the party system, together with social movements dynamics. This 
borrows and combines the ideas of reequilibration by Linz, that focus solely on the process and 
interaction within elites, with those of Tarrow and Koopmans and the influence of social 
movements in processes of political change.  
This chapter aims at enlarging the already well-established knowledge on party-
movement dynamics in these two countries, which allows us to go beyond mere 
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institutionalisation and understand more broadly how these processes unfold. I will use data 
that proceeds from interviews and conversations, observations of different political events, 
documents collected, articles in newspapers and websites. I will sum up the internal political 
dynamics of these parties and their relationship with the party system (and other left forces). 
However, as pointed out in the literature (Tarrow, 2011), the dynamics of institutionalisation 
tend to go hand-in-hand with processes of protest demobilisation. As such, it is to the various 
elements that contribute to this and develop thoroughly the internal dynamics of the Left which 
this chapter will initially turn. 
 
7.1. Dynamics of Demobilisation: from “Whatever it Takes” and Repression 
to Institutionalisation 
As discussed above, one of the consequences of institutionalisation dynamics, alongside 
radicalisation, is protest demobilisation. As many of those actively involved in the process of 
protest mobilisation start building alternative political parties, protest decreases. Nonetheless, 
these processes relate not only to movement and party formations but also to more contextual 
dynamics: in this sense, following the trends identified in the previous chapters, there is a path 
towards demobilisation that resulted both from economic recovery and institutional processes. 
 In this section, I argue that this is related to factors usually identified in the literature. 
Besides a shift in strategy that comes with institutionalisation, it is essential to recognise the 
role played by the political and economic opportunity structure. As such, I will analyse how 
these are important components to understanding these dynamics and how they come to shape 
party re-arrangements. The objective is then to contextualise the following sections. 
The first factor has to do with the economic recovery and policy-making originating 
both from the EU and national governments. Within this political economy opportunity 
structure (Císař & Navrátil, 2017), after the burst of the economic crisis in which harsher 
measures were taken to control debt and spending, there was an attempt by European 
Institutions to absorb and manage the crisis that does not rely solely on countries impositions, 
but also on monetary policies. Two episodes seem to attest to this. One such example is the 
famously branded “Draghi Declaration” in July 2012, whereby in a press conference in 
London, the president of the ECB pledged to do ‘whatever it takes to preserve the euro’. This 
seems to have contributed to a reduction of the interest rates as shown in Figure 7.1. The main 
idea was to ensure the ‘markets’ that the European Institutions would not allow any of the 
countries to default, keeping the Eurozone stable. Following this, and within its mandate, in 
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2015 the ECB started a strategy of quantitative easing. This allowed the funding of national 
economies by buying debt or government bonds in the secondary markets, which decreased 
interest rates and influenced national recovery. 
FIGURE 7. 1 LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES (MONTHLY DATA) FOR PORTUGAL, GREECE, 
SPAIN, ITALY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Sources: Eurostat; Note - line corresponds to July 2012 
In line with this, as the international economy improved slightly, and the European 
institutions seemed to be more collaborative, if slowly, economic recovery re-started, in both 
Portugal and Spain in the summer of 2013. Not only that, the strict austerity programmes - that 
had slashed many public services and trimmed labour costs - came to an end around 2014. 
Furthermore, the strategy of conservative governments in both countries passed through 
stimulating the economy with an eye on future elections. All these European and national 
factors led to fewer protests. 
 Second, there were also demobilisation dynamics that relate to the political events 
within the cycle of protest. In Portugal, the turning point was the governmental crisis in the 
summer of 2013. Subsequently, protest actions demobilised and changed character. The 
resignation of the Finance Minister, Vítor Gaspar who held an important symbolic position as 
the chief defender and executor of austerity, led to a government crisis as the junior partner 
(CDS-PP) disagreed with the PM’s choice to replace him. As a result, the leader of CDS-PP 
and Foreign Minister, Paulo Portas resigned as well leaving the coalition in turmoil. As shown 
in chapter 5, after the QSLT March 2013 mobilisation the number of protests decreased until 
the summer of that year and movements disappear afterwards. In an attempt to reanimate street 
politics, and claiming the loss of governments’ legitimacy due to their austerity agenda, there 
were calls for protests demanding new elections, coming from sectors close to the BE.  
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In the following month, as this unfolded, the President of the Republic attempted to 
ensure a grand coalition between the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP to avoid a climate of political 
instability that could lead yet again to a rise in interest rates that would damage economic 
recovery. This was ineffective as the PS, even if participating in the negotiations, refused to 
participate in government. Nonetheless, the PR ensured that PSD and CDS-PP continued to 
collaborate until the 2015 general elections. The two parties also considered that it was more 
beneficial to keep collaborating as early elections would be damaging for both (J. M. 
Fernandes, 2016; Fernandes & Jalali, 2017). As such, the lack of success of street politics led 
to an overall demobilisation, as most groups realised that their objectives were not achievable 
this way. 
Moreover, after a succession of ‘failed’ protest mobilisation in which social movements 
were unable to generate diffusions beyond their core, large protest events slowly faded and 
were only performed by CGTP. The government crisis seemed to add to this dynamic, as their 
primary objective was new elections. In fact, after the summer and the resolution of the crisis, 
the main trend the data shows was the continuation of protest sectorization through small 
strikes, such as the transport and communication sector.  
Nevertheless, there were underground mobilisations and attempts to radicalise. On the 
latter, during a CGTP protest in November 2013, various groups allied with dockers tried to 
occupy the Port of Lisbon, but they failed due to the lack of protesters and police intervention. 
One important event to consider is the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Revolution by 
social movement groups in April 2014. This event called Rios ao Carmo83 was an initiative of 
the more autonomous sectors, to which other social movements sectors joined forces. As many 
of my interviewees reported, it was the first time since Global Action Day that there was 
relative peace among the different sectors. Its name was pledge with a metaphor that reflected 
the fluid organisation, instead of a centralised one, in which everyone would be able to form 
their march coming from different places (i.e., the different rivers) of Lisbon and converge to 
Largo do Carmo, where Marcello Caetano (prime-minister at the time) hid and resigned, 
making the military coup successful in 1974. Its objective was to oppose the institutional 
celebrations that normalise the event and take all the revolutionary impetus from it. Not only 
that, it contrasted with the prevailing conception of the revolution that inspired claim-making 
(“defence of the revolution”) throughout the cycle. Rather, they aimed to explore the potential 
of the revolutionary imaginary in a more autonomous way (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019). 
                                                          
83 Translated as Rivers into Carmo. 
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This could be considered the symbolic end of the cycle of contention and marked the 
emergence of new groups which are now opposing the consequences of the tourism boom that 
led to rising prices of housing in Lisbon. 
 In Spain, the mobilisation process lasted slightly longer. As seen in the data presented 
in previous chapters, the decrease in the overall number of protests started in the summer of 
2013, but it was only from 2014 onwards and especially after the Marches of Dignity that this 
dynamic became accentuated. Concomitantly, the Catalan nationalist mobilisations started 
emerging as an essential process from 2013 onwards (Della Porta, O'Connor, et al., 2017; 
Miley, 2017). Nevertheless, in contrast to Portugal, as demobilisation of social movements 
groups took place in Spain, two different paths were followed. One followed an 
institutionalisation route which would lead to the formation of different political parties in the 
whole country, both at a national, regional and local level. The other tendency was of 
grassrootisation, whereby certain sectors of 15M and social movements refused to engage in 
institutional action (as they did since the beginning). I return to these two divergent paths later 
in the chapter.  
Repression, even if sometimes soft, was an essential part of the demobilisation process. 
There are similar occurrences the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism or what others 
have termed as the politics of antipolitics, in which austerity and technocracy were deemed as 
the only choice and accompanied by a suppression of particular citizenship rights (Roberts, 
2008). Three episodes of police violence in Portugal performed during general strikes, although 
not against trade unions, might have contributed to demobilisation. These occurred in March 
and November 2012, and finally in June 2013. Even if speculatively, the common feature of 
these interventions was that they repressed the autonomous sectors of social movements, while 
simultaneously delegitimising trade unions and General Strikes. It is important to note that the 
police never directly intervenes in trade unions marches or demonstrations as the CGTP 
normally has its security service that tries to ensure orderly protests. In Spain, the PP 
government passed the famous Ley Mordaza or Gag Law84 that specifically targets many of 
the repertoires of action developed by 15M, Mareas and PAH (Calvo & Portos, 2018). It 
emerged therefore as an institutional reaction to the wave of protest in order to shut down street 
politics. In the same vein of the politics of antipolitics, Pastor (2014) argues that austerity was 
parallel to a “neoconservative reaffirmation (abortion law, Wert Law), neocentralist and 
                                                          
84 Ley Orgánica 4/2015, de 30 de marzo, de protección de la seguridad ciudadana. 
160 
 
authoritarian that intents (…) bureaucratic repression (burorrepresion) and now the announced 
‘gag law’ (…)”.85 
 The year 2013 constituted a turning point in the mobilisations strategies. The upcoming 
electoral cycle ‘forces’ actors to attempt an ‘assault’ on institutions and change politics from 
within. In this period there were European elections (May 2014), regional elections (May 2015 
in Spain), municipal elections (Portugal - October 2013; Spain - May 2015) and finally general 
elections in October 2015 (Portugal) and December 2015 (Spain). As a result, various political 
projects emerged to dispute institutions. Nevertheless, taking in to account the previous 
mobilisation tendencies reported throughout the previous chapters, the processes were different 
in both countries. In the following section, I focus in detail on these processes.  
 
7.2. Reshaping the Left: between Party Elites and Social Movements 
The transformation of the party system as an outcome of the cycle of contention follows a 
different path in the two countries. First, the starting point was different: while in Portugal there 
is a one-level party system with five main national parties since the emergence of BE at the 
beginning of the 21st century (Lisi, 2009), in Spain the party-system is multi-level (Gunther & 
Montero, 2009; Wilson, 2012) with multiple interactions and influences between regional and 
national levels. Moreover, if in Portugal, PCP and BE occupy, in different ways, the space to 
the left of PS, in Spain this role was fulfilled almost solely by IU until 2014.  
However, there is also a difference regarding the strategies and relationships that left 
parties should pursue with the centre-left, which demonstrates the types of relations 
established. As such, in Portugal the debate surrounding the process of reconfiguration dealt 
with how trustworthy the PS was, while in Spain the social movements developed an 
overarching critique not only of the bipartisan duopoly of the PP and PSOE and their austerity 
measures, but also of the IU. They considered that there was the need to develop a new electoral 
tool that could question the framework that emerged with the transition. 
It is important to note that this stems from the different sorts of involvement between 
social movements and political parties and the trajectories of contention identified in the 
previous chapters.  
In Portugal, ‘factions’ of the BE had a strong involvement in the protest movements 
through their satellite groups, constraining the discourse articulated in the public sphere. In 
Spain, the 15M, and all its branches, by displaying powerful and autonomous mobilisations 
                                                          
85 Translated from Spanish. 
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were able to create a ‘new political paradigm’. In this sense, the dominance of institutional 
actors in Portugal versus the balance between institutional and non-institutional actors in Spain 
directly influenced how the party-system came to realign. The distinct configurations of the 
party system came to absorb and deal with protest differently. While in Portugal the ‘crisis of 
the left’ was managed within party elites and proto-institutional actors on the Left and by 
controlling the movement, in Spain the movement groups had an important task of leveraging 
the recomposition of the Left, coming to interfere directly with IU’s political space. In the 
following two sections I will outline the political process behind each country trajectory. 
 
7.2.1. Breaking the Hegemony: Podemos and the Party-Constellation  
After the December 2015 general elections, the Spanish party-system changed. Rather than one 
of the two hegemonic parties - PP and PSOE - ending up victorious, two new political forces 
erupted into the Spanish national scene. As much of the research so far shows, Podemos and 
Ciudadanos were born out of dissatisfaction with the political system (Vidal, 2018). The 2015 
electoral results led to a tie between the so-called ‘old-politics’ of the PP and the PSOE and the 
‘new politics’ of the emerging parties, in which no clear majority between the right-wing and 
left-wing bloc existed. Taking this into consideration, in this section I will look to the 
recomposition of left forces, taking Podemos as the main gravitational centre of this process. 
 The reconfiguration of the left led to the formation of a party-constellation: various 
other political actors emerge at the municipal and regional levels that coalesce around 
Podemos. In all these projects it is possible to discern the influence of 15M both regarding 
discourse or actors involved (Della Porta, Fernández, et al., 2017). Adding to this, I will argue 
that there is a dispute between elites and social movements, in which the transformation and 
rebranding of IU were central due to the already existing struggles for the renewal of this latter 
party. 
As demobilisation occurred from 2013 onwards, different trajectories emerge. The 15M 
was a broad and all-inclusive movement. This heterogeneity led the different ‘factions’ to 
follow distinct strategies when relating to institutional action. If on the one hand there were 
groups that wanted to elaborate proposals to be heard by the institutions, on the other hand, 
some groups thought they needed to work outside the sphere of the state. The latter is composed 
of autonomous, libertarian groups and direct social action at the local level (Bosi & Zamponi, 
2015) that do not adhere to any institutionalisation project since it does not fit their political 
vision. Rather, they prefer to keep a frontal contestation at the system (and not its integration), 
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by doing local work in assemblies and by creating self-managed autonomous spaces. These 
seem to correspond to the two different modes of being anticapitalist proposed by Eric Olin 
Wright (2015); while the former corresponds to a strategy of taming capitalism, typical of 
social-democratic parties, the latter points out to the movement towards eroding the basis of 
capitalism with everyday practices in order to transcend it. In other words, if one undertakes 
an ‘institutional assault’, the other continues their non-institutional and grassroots activities. I 
will mainly focus on the former dynamics as they were the ones that produced institutional 
impact. 
However, groups coming from the social movement sector undertook a project of 
“institutional assault”, while keeping a social movement ethos to autonomy to the institutions. 
These directed their action mainly towards municipal elections and institutions. However, as I 
will show in the case of Madrid, these groups ally with institutional actors to run for elections 
in broader and transversal platforms. At the national level, Podemos resulted from the 
conjugation of social movement actors and discourses with groups that orbited in the sphere of 
the traditional left.  
Three levels of parties emerged that relate directly to the structure of the state in Spain: 
local/municipal parties - that have more explicit links and influence from social movements - 
regional parties, and national parties. Each one of them has very different origins regarding the 
political space (Martín, 2015), but also connected and formed a party-constellation (a term that 
I will use to describe the amalgamation of forces in the left).  
 
Municipal projects: The case of Madrid 
Municipal candidacies constituted one of the primary paths for institutionalisation. Despite the 
territorial dispersion of these across the country (Rubio-Pueyo, 2017), two major municipal 
projects stand out: Ahora Madrid and Barcelona en Comú. The latter was headed by Ada 
Colau, the spokesperson of PAH until 2014, and as with Ahora Madrid fused existing political 
forces (e.g., Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds - ICV) with social movement actors. In this section, 
due to the similarities in the process and because I have not collected data directly on Barcelona 
en Comú, I will focus on the creation of Ahora Madrid. 
Ahora Madrid reunited Ganemos, a platform involving mostly social movements 
groups, and Podemos. It was branded as an instrumental party by the constituting groups, as it 
served the mere purpose of running in the municipal elections of 2015. The objective was that 
it would not become an autonomous entity that could compete later on with Podemos at the 
local level.  
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Initially, groups at the level of neighbourhood assemblies started discussing the 
possibility of combining street politics and institutional action, despite the generalised distrust 
of the latter. Nonetheless, they considered it important in attempting to renew local politics. 
Some of the initial experiences failed (until Izquierda Anticapitalista (IA), which I will discuss 
in more detail below), started and led a process with the objective of discussing the mobilisation 
experiences of the anti-austerity cycle (housing, mareas, neighbourhood assemblies) in an 
assembly called Alternativas desde Abajo.86 Constituted as a ‘citizenship space’, it did not have 
a party format but rather the purpose of building a collective dynamic for the municipal 
elections of 2015. There was a sense that to solve deeper problems there was the need to enter 
institutions while keeping a collective and participatory process. 
 Nevertheless, IA was also involved in a parallel process of building up Podemos to run 
in the European elections (May 2014), and invited the groups forming part of Alternativas 
desde Abajo to join. However, these groups perceived this as a controlling strategy. 
Furthermore, they wished to keep their independence, as they thought that local institutions 
were better suited to independent grassroots activism. As such, the remaining groups decided 
not to join Podemos and to gather forces to present themselves in the municipal elections a year 
and a half later. However, as IA left to focus on Podemos, these groups lost their capacity to 
operate due to the resources and coordination capacity that the IA provided. 
 At the beginning of 2014, as Podemos was being launched, a new initiative called 
Colectivo en Rede87 appear. This group wrote a “letter for democracy” that proposed to “take 
the institutions” and attempt a constituent process from below. Emanating from Traficante de 
Sueños88 and Patio Maravillas89, the remaining groups of Alternativas desde Abajo join this 
process. In the summer, they promoted a space of reflection called Municipalia that lasted until 
January 2015 and to which 15M, Podemos, IU, Equo and other small parties would also 
converge. 
 The result was the creation of Ganemos Madrid which involved a heterogeneous 
collection of groups (IU, Colectivo en Rede, Equo, ecologists, feminists and 15M related 
groups). However, Podemos did not embark upon this project as they were reticent to run in 
local elections due to insufficient resources and a lack of local infrastructure to achieve this 
while organising their own local branch, instead choosing to prioritise the 2015 general election 
                                                          
86 Translated as Alternatives from Below. 
87 Translated as Networked Collective. 
88  A bookshop in Madrid. 
89  An important social centre in Madrid. 
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(as decided at Vistalegre90). Added to this, despite common objectives, there were tensions due 
to the different organisational models that Ganemos and Podemos espoused. If the former 
focused on a participatory and assembly type of decision making, reproducing the 15M 
repertoires, the latter had a much more top-down and centralist approach that wished to control 
all aspects of mobilisation. 
Nonetheless, as Ganemos generated resources and recognition through public 
campaigning in 2014, Podemos recognized the impact this could have on their party and this 
enabled the two groups to reach an agreement. Their pact contemplated the creation of a 
platform or a so-called instrumental party - Ahora Madrid - that would combine the two parties 
but could not develop to the extent that it could compete with Podemos in its own right. This 
came to be constituted by a blend of different collectives which mix institutional and non-
institutional groups. As pointed out by Martin (2015), the municipal candidatures that emerged 
in the summer of 2014 had a closer link to the movements and more internal pluralism 
integrating both movements and political parties. 
At the municipal elections Ahora Madrid finished second, but since PP was not able to 
hold the majority of seats, AM came to govern the municipality with the support of the PSOE. 
As a similar process happened in Barcelona, a process of change in the relationship between 
institutions and non-institutional actors at the local level developed. Importantly, this is just 
part of the story, and there is the need to look to creation of Podemos and the internal disputes 
within IU. 
 
Podemos, IU and the recomposition of the left 
At the national level, there was a long process of recomposition of the left beyond PSOE, 
starting before the creation of Podemos in 2014. Within the cycle of contention, Podemos was 
not the first attempt to create a new political party that claimed the heritage of the 15M. 
Previously, in 2012, streaming directly from this movement, Partido X was created based on 
social networks and no leadership (Martin, 2015). Nevertheless, it never got close to having 
any of their candidates elected. 
Even if Podemos took on the discursive structure of opportunities created by 15M and 
articulated it within a Latin American populist reasoning (Laclau, 2005), there were 
nevertheless internal dynamics within the IU which contributed to the recomposition of the left 
                                                          
90 During their first Citizens Assembly in Vistalegre (October 2014), the winning list decided that they 
would not focus on local elections to privilege the regional and general elections of 2015. 
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in Spain during this period. These were constituted in the process of defections and internal 
pressures to reform the IU at play since 2008.  
The IU was created in the end of the 1980s out of a crisis of the PCE. Developed initially 
with the intent of constituting a political and social movement that would aggregate disperse 
leftist forces, instead of a coalition, it proposed to reform the space to the left of the PSOE into 
a broader and more open arena of collaboration. However, despite the calls for the dissolution 
of the PCE, this party drove the process as it kept a vertical organisational structure in the IU. 
During the 1990s the IU radicalised and broke the ties it kept with CCOO due to its 
collaboration with PSOE governments. After some positive results in 1990, the party had a 
steep decrease vote share at the beginning of the 2000 (Ramiro, 2004). Until the emergence of 
the financial crisis in 2008, IU would maintain itself as a marginal force despite aggregating 
various dissidents that ranged from Marxist-Leninists to autonomist groups. 
 Multiple attempts to reform the IU emerged since the eruption of the financial crisis. In 
2007, Espacio Alternativo 91  abandoned IU and created a new party called Izquierda 
Anticapitalista92. They left due to the heavy bureaucratic and institutional apparatus, lack of 
internal pluralism and contact with activities from below. As such, this new party envisaged 
occupying a political space brought by the crisis and that in their view IU was not fit to fill. 
Despite their unsuccessful candidacy to the 2009 European elections, in which they did not 
elect an MEP, the party came to play a role during the anti-austerity cycle of mobilisations. 
 Parallel to this, and with the same mindset, a process of internal recomposition started 
with Refundación de la Izquierda93 in which the whole of the IU implied itself, but that pleases 
mainly younger members closer to social movements. The purpose was to begin a convergence 
process beyond the party, materialised in a more open and transversal platform theorised in the 
various events. Nonetheless, two elements reportedly stopped this: on the one hand, these 
changes were met with internal resistances within the IU and, on the other, the 15M created a 
set of political opportunities for new political parties to emerge. 
 By 2013, the evaluation made by groups on the left over the possibility of renewal was 
not auspicious. Despite the crescendo in the polls, the IU was involved in several corruption 
scandals (especially in Madrid) and barely had any contact with mobilisations from below that 
erupted from the anti-austerity cycle of contention. The apparent inability to go beyond the 
party structures and institutions repeated the argument made in 2008 at the beginning of the 
                                                          
91 Translated as Alternative Space. 
92 Translated as Anti-Capitalist Left. 
93 Translated as Refoundation of the Left. 
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Great Recession by groups such as IA or projects such as Refundación de la Izquierda. The 
context seemed more favourable to the aspirations of a younger generation within the party due 
to the crisis of bipartidismo and particularly the PSOE results in the 2011 general election 
(Martín & Urquizu-Sancho, 2012), 15M and strong grassroots movements, and the emergence 
of SYRIZA the previous year in Greece.  
 As a result, besides the emerging municipal and regional projects discussed previously, 
there were projects of national character. In 2013, alongside their involvement in local projects 
(see the previous section), IA initiated contacts to establish an electoral tool for the 2014 
European elections that could congregate a variety of different groups. They established contact 
with Pablo Iglesias, as he enjoyed media exposure but also close ties with IU. It is important to 
note that previously, Iglesias and Inigo Errejón, his close friend, had been involved in 
experiences in Galicia as advisors of the Alternativa Galega de Esquerda (a coalition between 
IU and Anova). They rehearsed the Latin American populist repertoire of action and discourse 
for the first time with good results (Iglesias, 2015a, 2015b; Torreblanca, 2015). 94  This 
constituted an essential experience as it showed that a different form of political campaigns 
could be conducted. 
 Despite their criticisms, the primary objective of the groups that come to constitute 
Podemos later was the renewal of this political space, through breaking the generational gap 
and the bureaucratic stagnation of IU. Their view was  
“that such a project could only be carried out in collaboration with the existing left. The 
proposal we made to the left parties for joint open primaries signalled this orientation. 
We thought that opening the choice of candidates to the citizens would help to tilt the 
balance of forces on the political board in our favour: the left would look more like the 
people.” (Iglesias, 2015a, p. 15) 
 IA and Iglesias’ objective was to create platforms like those later created for the 
municipal elections. This implied not a big and broad coalition but rather a new and reformed 
political formation that IU could be part of and would lend their resources. Their main purpose 
was to test this at the European elections as these were, in their view, an opportunity to open a 
breach in the political field. These elections combine a national circumscription and the 
tendency for protest votes in new candidacies that lead to a higher share of votes. However, 
this process faced the resistance of the IU, despite the previous attempts of renewal within the 
                                                          
94 This party finished 3rd in the regional elections with 13,91% of the votes and electing 9 regional MPs. 
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party. This party refused to create a new political platform to the European elections in which 
they would not be the core and leading actors: all the other forces would have to join under 
their terms. 
 Therefore, when faced with this decision, IA and the group around Universidade 
Complutense (composed by professors and groups already in their universe like Contrapoder, 
Juventud Sin Futuro, Promotora), decided to create a new political party that strategically 
combined two dynamics. The first one being the already existing IA party structures and a 
second one based on the construction of an alternative discourse, a mediatic leadership and a 
program that could translate and channel the 15M political shift into the electoral arena. The 
mass media exposure that Iglesias received throughout 2012 and 2013 in local TV and talk 
shows associated with the right-wing gave him the needed mediatic leadership. The alternative 
discourse and program translated into the initial manifesto (Mover Ficha) that is signed by 
multiple public figures and launched in a public event in January 2014 in Madrid. Being signed 
(and written) by people from different sectors of the Left outside the sphere of the IU, it had 
the intent of displaying an image of plurality and renewal (contrasting with the IU). it gave 
expression to the transversal popular discontent and democratic renewal. This meant that 
establishing hegemony on the left necessitated focusing on a different type of political project 
outside the left-right continuum: a broader and transversal discourse that could occupy the 
political centre that resonated with the ideas of 15M.  
 In May 2014, Podemos elected 5 European MEPs with about 8% of the national vote 
(see table below). Even if staying behind IU whose share of the vote was around 10%, Podemos 
created an important momentum. Therefore, if initially, their objective was to pressure IU, this 
result shows that it was possible to go beyond the IU and therefore change the relationship 
between both parts. 
After this initial breakthrough, as Podemos rose in the polls, IU fell. It is possible to 
argue that until then, IU was the main party benefitting from the crisis and if it was not for the 
emergence of Podemos they could have been the main party on the left. As the future leader of 
IU Alberto Garzón said: “If IU had done its work, Podemos would not exist today”95. From 
this point onwards, the tensions that had been building up between IA and the Complutense 
team became more visible. The latter group embarks on a project of centralisation and 
plebiscitary democracy inspired by the Latin American ‘experiences’ building up an ‘electoral 
                                                          
95 Interview with Alberto Gárzon in Publico.es - Alberto Garzón: "Si IU hubiera hecho sus deberes, 
Podemos hoy no existiría" https://www.publico.es/politica/alberto-garzon-iu-hubiera-hecho.html.  
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war machine’, that gives less importance to the circles and the participation on the ground they 
initially aimed. Their first Citizens Assembly (or party congress) concluded the initial process 
of party creation. The circles created at the foundational moment of Podemos barely received 
any power, and the party got centralised around the general secretary core and the Consejo 
Estatal (State Council). 
FIGURE 7. 2 VOTING INTENTIONS IN SPAIN (2010-2016) 
 
Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas; 
Furthermore, they forbade double militancy with the intent of constraining IA 
militancy. Throughout their first year, they conducted a process of political articulation (De 
Leon et al., 2009), through which they redefined their populist discourse, opposing those from 
below and those from above by using floating signifiers (Laclau, 2005; Sola & Rendueles, 
2018). The clearest example was the articulation of the division and opposition between the 
“caste” and the “people” (i.e., between economic and political elites and the regular 
population). 
If this was the initial process of creation of Podemos, its development would pass 
through the upcoming elections at different levels. This sees the creation of multiple alliances 
with regional parties. I will discuss this in the following sub-section. 
 
The Road to General Elections and the Party-Constellation 
After the European elections, the relations between IU and Podemos changed. Not only did the 
new party attract multiple groups from a more ‘reformist faction’ of social movements, but also 
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various young cadres from IU started joining. The latter group was prominent in the 
redefinition of the party through the addition of their political project and experience. 
Participation in multiple elections marked the initial history of Podemos. In the 
municipal and the autonomic elections, the question of building a party and the tensions on the 
left around allying with IU emerged again, as the young middle-rank cadres once more 
pressured the party. For example, in Madrid Mauricio Valiente (municipal candidate) and 
Tania Sánchez (candidate for the autonomous region) won the primary elections of IU and 
started negotiating a unitarian candidacy with Ganemos. However, facing resistance from the 
IU top leadership they decided to leave the party to form alternative projects. Tania Sánchez 
formed Convocatoria por Madrid96 with the objective of facilitating the process of leaving IU 
to other militants and building a unitary candidacy from below that would aggregate multiple 
forces such as the IU, Podemos and social movements.97 
After Podemos and its partners’ successes in local and regional elections, in which they 
achieved better results than the IU and competed close with the PSOE, there was an attempt to 
bring IU, Podemos and other parties (such as Equo and independent activists) together. The 
idea was to replicate the model from Ahora Madrid and Barcelona en Comú for the general 
elections of December 2015. Nonetheless, as Podemos refused to participate, this project 
changed its name from Ahora en Común98 to Unidad Popular99, effectively led by the IU. This 
followed a process of primary elections to choose their candidates, run by the younger 
generation that remained in the party. Established around Alberto Garzon (who participated in 
15M and was the youngest MP elected in 2011 and later elected leader of IU in May 2016), 
they tried to emulate the success of Podemos. Nevertheless, this failed as more groups and 
individuals left IU to join Podemos. 
In the end, the two ran separately, with Podemos (and the confluences) being able to 
elect more than 60 MPs, while the IU elected only two. In December 2015, Podemos was the 
third force behind PSOE and PP. As Podemos established itself as the strongest party on the 
left behind the PSOE, it could then reintegrate the IU in its own terms. 
 
 
 
                                                          
96 Translated as Call for Madrid. 
97 In 2016, after the December 2015 general elections, this group joins Podemos. 
98 Translated as Now in Common. 
99 Translated as Popular Unity. 
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FIGURE 7. 3 ELECTORAL RESULTS IN SPAIN (2014-2016) 
 
Source: Ministerio del Interior and El País - Sola and Rendueles (2017)100 
By the end of this cycle, it is possible to understand the convergence of the multiple 
existing lefts. Driven by a wide generational gap and opposing strategies, Podemos initially 
emerged as a vehicle to pressure the IU to reformulate its action. However, as they electorally 
surpassed IU, Podemos became the national gravitational force around which a variety of actors 
coalesced at multiple levels: (1) municipal projects that congregated social movement groups, 
IU, Podemos and other smaller parties; (2) IU which came to be controlled by a younger 
generation that remained in the party and that allied with Podemos in 2016; (3) confluences - 
regional parties (Valencia, Galiza and Catalonia) that while running together with Podemos, 
kept their independence and lead at regional levels. Finally Podemos would split into three 
factions: (1) Anticapitalistas (former IA) which kept their autonomy, controlled the party in 
Andalucia, were strong in Madrid, and present in the European Institutions where they allied 
with Varoufakis’ ‘Plan B’; (2) Pablistas: in which Pablo Iglesias was the central pillar, uniting 
various tendencies departed from the IU, were Eurocommunist, and took a more critical stance 
towards PSOE, refusing to ally with this latter party; (3) Errejonistas that connected more 
clearly with the Latin American experiences, defending transversal populism and the 
reconstruction of the left outside the “old symbols of the left”, being more belligerent against 
the alliance with the IU and more prone to deals with the PSOE. These last two factions ended 
                                                          
100 The authors make the following note to the data: “Regional elections do not include four regions 
(Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia). Local elections only collect the results of the ten 
largest cities in Spain. In the local elections of May 2015, Podemos and IU ran as part of citizen 
platforms in many places; and in the general elections of Jun 2016 both formed the coalition ‘Unidos 
Podemos’”.  
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up fighting for the control of the party, with the one under the control of Iglesias coming to 
dominate the party. This story came full circle during the elections of June 2016, since the 
IU/UP and Podemos finally allied in Unidos Podemos and ran together in elections.  
 
7.2.2. Resilience and the Recomposition of the Left in Portugal 
The transformations of the Left in Portugal led to a realignment of the party system, at least for 
the time being. For the first time, various parties on the left combined efforts in support of a 
Socialist government. My argument is that the lack of a new political party in Portugal derives 
not only from the lack of impact of social movements in the reconfiguration of political sphere 
as in Spain, but also from an existing tension in the party system between the radical left (BE 
and PCP) and the PS. From my interviews and observations, the main question that emerged 
throughout the cycle of contention was what type of relationship these parties, and particularly 
among the various tendencies of the BE, wanted to establish with the PS in order to defeat 
austerity? 
 Furthermore, analysis of the BE internal dynamics is vital to understand why this party 
came to occupy the centre of the leftish political turmoil since 2011. First, there were multiple 
splits from the BE and new parties were emerging whose objective was to replace and occupy 
this space to reach an agreement with the socialists and fight back against austerity. Secondly, 
this materialises in the constitution of Congresso Democrático das Alternativas101, a political 
initiative that intended to federate the left around a programme with minimum a set of common 
objectives. Paradoxically, despite the BE’s constant refusal to move in this direction, they end 
up allying with PS after the elections. This can only be explained by the internal party dynamics 
after eliminating both internal and external competition, which allowed them to concentrate 
power around specific figures. 
As discussed in chapter four, the BE results from the confluence between small left 
parties (PSR, Política XXI and UDP) and social movement groups in a particular political 
structure of opportunities reminiscent of the anti-globalisation struggles, the national 
mobilisations for East-Timor and the referendum for abortion in 1999. This party was 
implicated in a double dynamic which involved both actions through institutional channels and 
engagement in the streets. The objective was to achieve, in their own words, a ‘social majority’ 
that could transform Portuguese society. Taking as examples some of the Eurocommunist’s 
experiences, they try to introduce new elements and issues into Portuguese politics. Upon their 
                                                          
101 Translated as the Democratic Congress for the Alternatives. 
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foundation and the first few years, their organisational structure and decision-making process 
were of a polyarchic executive, (i.e., the party would function through horizontal links and 
decentralisation) (Lisi, 2009, 2013; Noronha, 2014; Soeiro, 2009).  
Nevertheless, in 2005 it started a process that involved centralisation, verticalization 
and mediatization, through which the party-elite ensured more power and ended up 
transforming their engagement with civil society groups. From this point onwards, a more 
careful approach develops in order to instrumentalise movements, and their satellite 
organisations started to play a more prominent role in conditioning the renewal of the social 
movement arena.  In a way, the formation of an alternative left in Portugal went from the dream 
of a movement-party to its centralisation.  
Between 2005 and 2011 there was an electoral reinforcement of the BE in which the 
party moved from two (2.44%) to 16 MPs (9.82%). Their main purpose throughout this period 
was to pressure the PS and affirm themselves as alternatives to the latter party. This was 
attempted both through an attempt to broaden their political space and influence by supporting 
the alternative and challenging socialist candidate Manuel Alegre (both in 2005 and 2011) for 
the presidency, and through their articulation of issues in political movements and protests. 
However, as the Eurozone crisis progressed, political tensions rose in Portugal throughout 
2010-11. The BE played a significant role by supporting a no-confidence vote in 2011 in the 
socialist government, and by refusing to talk with the Troika during the negotiations of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (alongside with the PCP). This impacted in their electoral 
results of 2011 and the new political scenario the party had to deal with. Not only did they lose 
half of their MPs, but also a conservative majority now controlled the parliament, changing 
their relative and strategic position towards the socialists. As such, in this context, despite the 
socialists having signed the MoU, multiple groups started to pressure the party to leadership to 
collaborate and influence the party. 
 
Bloco de Esquerda from 2011 to 2015: crisis, internal dynamics and re-shaping of the left in 
Portugal 
The period between 2011 and 2015 was of internal crisis for the BE. This ends up in a 
recomposition at the end of the cycle involving interrelated internal and external dynamics. On 
the one hand, the former encompasses conflicts between different factions of the party, 
leadership problems, but also defections from core groups such as Política XXI. On the other 
hand, the latter comprises strategic options regarding the relationship with the Socialist Party, 
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with social movements and with other pressure groups from the left that intended a full-front 
unity against austerity. 
Francisco Louçã, who was the uncontested leader of the party since its foundation (and 
especially after 2005), abandoned parliament and leadership in 2012. He was replaced by two 
spokespersons (Catarina Martins and João Semedo) from the same internal group. This meant 
that the Socialist tendency, a newly formed group that conjugated the former PSR and parts of 
the PXXI tendencies, came to dominate the party, while the Esquerda Alternativa102  was 
pushed aside and decided to fight back.  
This conflict was caused by, on the one hand, the loss of half of their MPs in 2011 
(some of them prominent figures like José Soeiro or José Manuel Pureza) which meant losing 
resources that were important for the party. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, 
it was because of the competing conceptions on what strategy they should follow towards the 
socialists.103 In many ways, this process was the consequence of the failure to take over of the 
PS as strategised in previous years. 
Regarding external dynamics, the central strategic question was the position of the party 
towards the Socialists. With a right-wing coalition in government and the socialists in a fragile 
position, what should their strategy be towards the Socialist Party? Should they invest in a 
long-term strategy to bring all the forces of the left together? As I have been arguing, the 
relationship to the centre-left is core to understanding the formation and evolution of the BE, 
and even more so during the austerity years. 
As a result, two camps started to form or coalesce: one defending the entrenchment of 
the party in their position, and another defending a broader coalition or pact with the socialists 
and other forces of the left to challenge austerity. As discussed above, at its foundation, the BE 
was projected to aggregate social and political forces as an alternative project to both 
communists and socialists. Nevertheless, in the period between 2011 and 2015 their disputes 
revolved around the tactical aggregation of forces. As a result, different groups emerged out of 
the BE during this period eventually leaving and forming new parties or groups. 
                                                          
102 Alternative Left - previously UDP, a Maoist tendency. 
103 It is in part this conflict that is present in the 2014 convention between the two main lists, which 
seems to be a result of an internal crisis due to their decline in the last elections. The 2014 convention 
is where the dispute was more intense in what seems to be a struggle within a weakened party apparatus 
to ensure positions and resources between them. The convention resulted in a draw that led to a balance 
of power between the majoritarian factions and a formation of a new internal minority closer to the 
movement circles, less institutionalised and more radical in their position towards Europe. This took 
place after all the groups had already fled. 
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The first one was MAS (Movimento Alternativa Socialista) formed by one of their 
internal tendencies (Ruptura-FER) that left the BE in December 2011. They followed a more 
radical trajectory and did not ally with anyone. Their strategy was to control the movements 
and ‘agitate’ street politics (which they ended up doing with the platform that emerged out the 
Global Day of Action - 15O - as seen in previous chapters). Being present in every 
demonstration with their banners, they tried to constitute an alternative that was never 
successful due to their entrist tactics (which led many other groups to block them or not to 
collaborate with them). Eventually, they became a fringe party. Later, they tried to control an 
alternative movement that tried to replicate Podemos (calling it Juntos Podemos104) in Portugal, 
which led to its disbandment and to the party AGIR. They failed to achieve any electoral 
success. 
Additionally, a different set of groups emerged to defend an alliance of the whole left. 
Most of these groups came together, in one way or another, in the 2015 general elections. They 
formed an electoral platform called Tempo de Avançar 105  constituted of Livre, Fórum 
Manifesto, Renovação Comunista and Manifesto 3D (these groups are described in more detail 
below). The process was mediated by Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, and preceded 
by political initiatives that prepared the ground for the emergence of more organised political 
forces. As these platform and groups came to put forward the idea of forming a Left pact that 
was able to defend the welfare state against austerity, I will turn to explain this trajectory more 
thoroughly in the following section. 
 
From Congresso Democrático das Alternativas to a Recomposition of the Left 
From 2012 onwards, various initiatives for a project of ‘left unity’ began to emerge leading to 
Congresso Democrático das Alternativas (CDA).106 This was an integral part of the of the 
contentious cycle and is essential to understanding the various answers given to austerity and 
the formation of new political entities. The group stemmed from three small groups: 
Communist Renewal, independents and finally people connected to Forum Manifesto (part of 
BE’s PXXI). As reported in some of the interviews, and chapter four, there were already 
initiatives that attempted this project since RC left PCP in 2002. 
                                                          
104 Translated as Together We Can. 
105 Translated as Time to Move on. 
106 http://www.congressoalternativas.org/ 
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The CDA diagnosis was that with the Troika and the right-wing coalition government 
there was a paradigmatic shift in Portuguese society, in which the welfare retrenchment 
constituted an attack on the core idea of the regime.  
This demanded the left to unite under programmatic minimum denominators, and 
converge under a unitary platform and space of reflection. As reported in one interview, the 
objective was to pressure the BE to go beyond their institutional borders and reconvene in a 
larger political space by going back to its roots. Still, as I will show, this space was blocked 
over the cycle as the BE was involved in internal disputes. 
Coming from a similar political area and with similar objectives, the Manifesto para 
uma Esquerda Livre107 was launched in May 2012 by a group of people headed by Rui Tavares. 
They criticised the whole left for their lack of political solutions against austerity. Notably, 
they censured the competition between parties, rather than the possibilities for cooperation and 
compromise between the different parts. In noticing the overlapping objectives, the CDA 
decided to invite this group to collaborate. 
“There was a critique to the left using two expression that were talked at the time. One 
the soft left (the PS), and does not become autonomous in relation to particular interests 
and that when gets into power has a much more right-wing agenda than a lefty one. The 
other one was the inconsequent left, regarding the BE and the PCP, always in a position 
of not wanting to be part of a govern solution, always with an outsider strategy, but 
always very critique […] it is almost a bipolar left, between the softness of the PS and 
the inconsequence of the BE and the PCP […] it was not sustainable to keep the left like 
this as the country was facing the abyss.” (Interviewee 2, Portugal) 
The first meeting of the CDA happened immediately after the first demonstration 
organized by the QSLT and on a highly symbolic date (October 5th).108 It is important to notice 
that there was barely any relationship between the two groups, apart from at the height of 
contestation to austerity. Other than the groups already referred, different tendencies from 
Socialists, CGTP, social movements and independent left were also present. As such, it worked 
as a convergence point of different groups and a bridge between groups that favoured a 
common left programme and joint action. As such, this became the starting point for a process 
of realignment that would lead to the left pact, as it was the group that first articulates this idea. 
                                                          
107 Translated as Manifest for a Free Left. 
108 Holiday that celebrates the instauration of a Republic in Portugal. 
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They kept meeting throughout the next year to discuss the welfare state, resulting in multiple 
books and reflections. 
Apart from being a vehicle of reflection, there was always a question regarding the next 
step (i.e., if they should form a new political party).109 Nonetheless, this ended up being an 
unsolvable question and resulted in some demobilisation as there were different political 
‘ambitions’ and interests at play, and the BE was not happy to lose relevance by integrating a 
broader political structure. As such, new and more concrete political initiatives emerged from 
the CDA in order to solve the ‘immobilism’ of the BE. As in Spain, their main objective was 
to present themselves to the European elections of 2014. 
The first initiative to attempt to federate the various groups on the left was Manifesto 
3D. The manifesto gathered former members of the communist party, members from BE from 
Fórum Manifesto (that would meanwhile leave the party in 2014), as well as independents that 
launched a manifesto.110 Another initiative stemming directly from the CDA was the creation 
of a new political party by the group that gathered around Manifesto para uma Esquerda Livre 
to form LIVRE. If Manifesto 3D originated mainly from the ‘old left’ and already established 
groups and which tried to find an alternative political solution, LIVRE gathered many people 
who were new to politics; those who had never been involved with political parties and came 
from mainly from cultural and intellectual circles.111 
In an attempt to enlarge and create a new political entity, the Manifesto 3D proposed to 
the BE the creation of what they called an “envelope party” in which the Manifesto 3D, the BE 
and the LIVRE would run together for the European Elections supporting new and independent 
figures. The BE refused this attempt to renew the left since, as part of the deal, their members 
could not be candidates (due to their refusal to work with Livre due to past but still-ongoing 
conflicts). 
As a result, at the European elections, BE and Livre ran separately while Manifesto 3D 
did not integrate any of the lists. As shown in the table below, from 2009 to 2014 both the PS 
and the PCP improved their electoral results, while BE lost votes and MPs and Livre was not 
able to elect anyone. Nevertheless, an outsider party (MPT) decided to centre their campaign 
around Marinho Pinto, a lawyer and a popular media figure whose discourse focused on the 
political elite and corruption. This party came to elect two MEPs. Nevertheless, in the following 
                                                          
109 At the time it was voted to the best way forward was for the already existing structures to 
converge. 
110 http://manifesto3d.blogspot.co.uk/ 
111 http://livrept.net/ - Their “leader” was Rui Tavares who was elected as MEP by Bloco in 2009 
and meanwhile left due to conflicts with Bloco, continuing to be a MEP. 
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months, as Marinho Pinto tried to create a new party it quickly faded away, disappearing into 
irrelevance. 
TABLE 7. 1 ELECTORAL RESULTS - EUROPEAN ELECTIONS (%) AND NUMBER OF MP IN 
PORTUGAL 
  1999 2004 2009 2014 
PS 43,07 (12) 38,60 (12) 26,58 (7) 31,46 (8) 
PSD 31,11 (9) 33,27 (9) (PSD+CDS-PP) 31,71 (8) 27,71 (7) (PSD+CDS-PP) 
CDU (PCP) 10,32 (2) 9,09 (2) 10,66 (2) 12,68 (3) 
CDS/PP 8,16 (2)  8,37 (2)  
BE 1,79 (0) 4,91 (1) 10,73 (3) 4.56 (1) 
MPT    7,14 (2) 
Livre    2,18 (0) 
Source: Comissão Nacional de Eleições 
This would result in another defection from the party. Fórum Manifesto (previously 
Política XXI112) abandoned the party in the summer of 2014 after the European elections due 
to the continuous refusal of the BE, even in the face of bad results, to compromise and open to 
new political projects. The group left not because of a programmatic divergence, but because 
of a strategic one.113 In their view, there was a need for a platform of dialogue with socialists, 
communists and independents that could face a scenario of prolonged austerity. Furthermore, 
in their perspective, the party was entrenched and had lost their movimentist vocation and 
openness to a social majority. 
In this sense, the radical left seemed to be in disarray. In November 2014 Convention, 
the remaining tendencies in the BE (Socialism and the Alternative Left) disputed the control 
of the party. As their prognosis of future electoral results was not promising, each tendency 
wanted to ensure part of the resources and positions in a minor party until their eventual 
comeback. Therefore, instead of running in joint lists as in previous conventions, their dispute 
was centred around what political strategy to follow and which group would come to control 
the party structure. Nevertheless, by the end of the convention, the voting ended up in a tie 
between these tendencies, leading them to negotiate every single aspect of party control and 
resources. 
The result was two political projects on the left running to the 2015 general elections 
that espoused different strategies. One that wanted to commit to a broader alliance of the left: 
                                                          
112 Forum Manifesto, to which many members of 3D end up joining later, was previously known as 
Política XXI. This group was led by Miguel Portas and reunited old PCP and MDP members, being the 
smaller tendency of BE at his formation, the one with less impact, closer to social democracy. The de 
facto lider of the group after the death of Miguel Portas, Ana Drago stays in the party and as an MP 
until July 2014.  
113 http://manifesto.com.pt/; http://www.esquerda.net/artigo/associacao-manifesto-prepara-saidas-do-
bloco-de-esquerda/33396 
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a united front against austerity, and another that consistently points out the impossibility of 
reaching agreements with the Socialists. In this way, the various political projects that emerged 
from the CDA and the BE defending the former converge in an electoral platform called Tempo 
de Avançar (Time to Move On). 114  These brought together LIVRE, Fórum Manifesto, 
Manifesto 3D and independents. 
However, despite all the predictions, in the 2015 general elections BE had its best result 
ever, while their direct competitors (Tempo de Avançar) were not able to elect a single MP, 
leading the BE and the PCP to support the socialist minority through a parliamentary 
agreement. This seemed to result from the good electoral campaign, the overall internal 
cohesion despite the tensions within the party, a leadership effect around Catarina Martins, but 
also some renewal with new generations assuming responsibilities.115 
TABLE 7. 2 ELECTORAL RESULTS - GENERAL ELECTIONS (%) AND NUMBER OF MP IN 
PORTUGAL 
  1999 2002 2005 2009 2011 2015 
PS 44,06 (115) 37,79 (96) 45,03 (121) 36,55 (97) 28,06 (74) 32,31 (86) 
PSD 32,32 (81) 40,21 (105) 28,77 (75) 29,11 (81) 38,65 (108) 38.36 (107) 
(PSD+PP) 
CDU (PCP) 8,99 (17) 6,94 (12) 7,54 (14) 7,82 (15) 7,91 (16) 8,25 (17) 
CDS/PP 8,34 (15) 8,72 (14) 7,24 (12) 10,43 (21) 11,7 (24)  
BE 2,44 (2) 2,74 (3) 3,61 (8) 9,82 (16) 5,17 (8) 10,19 (19) 
PAN      1,39 (1) 
LIVRE/Tempo de 
Avançar 
     0,73 (0) 
Source: Comissão Nacional de Eleições 
 We still lack an explanation for the emergence of a new and unexpected ‘coalition’. 
This pact results, first, from the desire to repeal the right-wing coalition from power together 
with their austerity measures. Nevertheless, this was conjunctural, as it was the first time that 
there was a left majority despite the PS minority. In a political situation that could eventually 
get stalled in case the PS supported a right-wing government, this avoided PS leader resignation 
and the eventual demise of the party, as it happened in Greece with PASOK. In this way, the 
effects of the cycle of contention, with new cleavages and discourses together with an internal 
clarification/depuration of BE, in which they were able to defeat competing new parties,  
afforded them a negotiable position. 
 
                                                          
114http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Politica/Interior.aspx?content_id=4245073; 
http://tempodeavancar.net/ 
115 One such example was Mariana Mortágua, a young MP, that gained visibility during a parliamentary 
commission that investigated the corruption scandal associated with one of the biggest private banks - 
Banco Espírito Santo - in the country. 
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7.3. Conclusion and the Politics of Alliances post-2015 
In this chapter, I have dealt with the last stage of the cycle of contention in which, as suggested 
by Tarrow (1989, 2011), after a highly contentious period, new actors, repertoires and 
frameworks enter the institutions of democratic politics. In the same way, apart from social 
movements and following a Linzian approach (Linz & Stepan, 1978), I have shown that 
existing elites and political parties also play a central role in how the process unfolds. Rather 
than just considering the ways social movements impact the recomposition of the political 
system, I have shown that internal party dynamics were also crucial. 
In this way, institutionalisation took different paths in the cases under analysis here. If 
in Spain a set of new political parties and alliances were able to reach institutions throughout 
the electoral period of 2014/15, in Portugal these attempts failed and instead a shift in the party 
system occurred with the radical and centre-left allying in government for the first time in 
history. In the Portuguese case, the process of realignment was led by the internal dynamics of 
the left mediated by intermediary platforms. The debate was at the elite level with an attempt 
to federate the left with the most pressing issue being what position to take towards the Socialist 
Party. Therefore, social movements played a lesser role in the recomposition of the left since 
their action was one that wanted to conserve the status-quo of the welfare state resulting from 
the close links with political parties. This meant that rather than operating a radical shift in the 
political sphere, social movements did not emerge as an alternative to institutional action but 
instead reinforced it. In this sense, as movements never transformed into political parties 
demobilisation is concurrent to non-institutionalisation. 
The Spanish case was more complex as it involved two political dynamics that account 
for the emergence of new left-wing parties. On the one hand, social movements groups came 
to establish a vital dynamic that led into the creation of alternative political parties; on the other 
hand, there were multiple defections from the traditional left to launch new political projects 
that would break through the existing generational gap. These two dynamics came to synthesise 
in what I called party-constellation, where local, regional and national parties coalesced around 
Podemos (the national gravitational centre) creating a distinct political dynamic to the one that 
existed previously. 
This was not the logical or natural conclusion of the cycle. There were already similar 
forces, namely UPyD and IU, that occupied the political spaces that could have taken the 
structure of opportunities brought by the crisis. Instead, Podemos and Ciudadanos established 
themselves as the new players in the political field. The transformation of the left resulted from 
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the combination of strong social movements discussed previously with the internal dynamics, 
and elite disputes within IU described in this chapter. Their debate was about the best strategy 
to create an alternative that could take over the PSOE in a situation of crisis. Contrasting with 
this, in Portugal, the discussion centred on how to establish a fruitful relationship with the PS. 
 As such, the conjugation of different analytical tools here makes clear not only the 
different paths that the cycle takes but also the importance of actors and their relationships 
along the cycle of protest. If the Spanish social movements were of crucial elements in the 
emergence of the ‘party-constellation’, in Portugal the recomposition came from disputes 
within the left. Nevertheless, this was not absent from the emergence of Podemos as well, and 
there is a case to be made that to a certain extent Podemos is part of a process of rebranding of 
IU (even if not intentionally). 
I contend that this is a fragile realignment of the political system at the end of the cycle 
of contention. Even though ‘new’ repertories and frameworks are slowly incorporated, its bases 
are fragile, and they can be merely circumstantial adaptations/co-optations to/of EU 
austeritarian rule. In this way, in Portugal, the so-called Gerigonça, or Contraption, that 
reunited BE, PCP, Greens and PS in a parliamentary pact, was initially received with 
enthusiasm as it could turn around more than four years of austerity. It is important to note that 
in the beginning, few people believed that such an agreement could endure for the whole 
legislature. Nevertheless, the agreement ensured a position of influence for the PS minority in 
government, as their votes were needed to ensure laws and the yearly budget was approved. 
Plus, austerity was to a certain extent reduced, and some redistributive measures ensured by 
this pact (benefiting from the improvement of the overall international economic situation). 
However, this constituted a sort of trap to the left-wing parties: if they broke this alliance they 
would be blamed for political instability, when a government is ensuring some redistribution 
and political stability. Therefore, they would lose votes. 
Furthermore, the EU managed to control the so-called success case by nominating the 
current Portuguese finance minister to be president of the Eurogroup: a position that requires 
following and imposing budgetary prescriptions. This means that rather than going against and 
beyond austerity, Portugal is still locked into this sort of political economy, meaning that the 
party in government can control their more radical partners. Plus, the pools seemed to show 
that the PS is the main party benefiting from the current situation, which might lead in future 
elections to breaking the pact. 
 In Spain, the political alliances post-2015 were marked by the potency of the new 
parties and a hung parliament in which no clear majorities existed. The nationalist cleavage 
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and ongoing Catalan crisis play an important role. After the general elections of December 
2015, in which the PP gets more votes but not a majority, Mariano Rajoy, the leader of this 
party, refused the King’s offer to form government due to the lack of enough parliamentary 
support. This left the second most voted-for party, the PSOE, to attempt to form a government. 
The initial idea was to attempt a political pact, following the Portuguese example, with 
Podemos and Ciudadanos. However, these two parties were not available to work together as 
their support was not sufficient and nationalist cleavage played an important role. The PSOE 
would need the support from the nationalist which Ciudadanos refused, while Podemos was 
open to the idea of a referendum in Catalonia. Plus, having ensured a significant part of the 
votes, Podemos wanted to be part of the government, something to which the socialists resisted. 
With this scenario, Pedro Sánchez was unable to get elected, leading to new elections. PP again 
won, even if not with a majority, and Ciudadanos offered its support in parliament. As this 
happened, the elite of PSOE forced Sánchez to resign, leading this party to abstain, making 
Rajoy president of government. 
 Nonetheless, Sánchez was able to make his comeback a year later, winning the party 
elections. Already in 2018, after a court decision in a corruption case against PP, the PSOE 
under his leadership proposed a no-confidence vote that counted with the support of Podemos 
and the regional parties, overturning the previous attempt two years before. In this, Sánchez 
became president, replacing Rajoy. However, the new government has to manage a fragmented 
group of interests and support in Parliament as it was hard to conciliate Podemos demands with 
some of the right-wing regional parties. Therefore, the difficulty in pursuing a more 
redistributive agenda has led the current government to focus on issues such as the refugee 
crisis or the exhumation of Franco from Vale de los Caídos. As such, the PSOE has been able 
to renew its image by ensuring the use of symbols and discourses coming from the 15M and 
civil society. As such, despite the influence it has in the current government, Podemos could 
lose influence in upcoming elections if PSOE recovers part of its electorate. In this sense, the 
current scenario might recede into a pre-crisis political landscape where Podemos occupies the 
space previously occupied by IU. 
In many ways, these were latent tensions that the crisis and the cycle of contention only 
brought to the surface. This reequilibration, even if fragile, stems from regimes and parties and 
the way they were built. The question now is how long this will persist for and if these 
reconfigurations will crystalise in the future. Only time will tell. 
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8. Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation, I have compared the contentious responses to austerity between 2009 and 
2015 in Portugal and Spain in the context of the Great Recession. I have conducted a detailed 
analysis of the anti-austerity cycle of protest, from the initial mobilisations at the beginning of 
the crisis, to the transformation of the party system in 2015. This entailed examining (1) 
relations between institutional and non-institutional actors and (2) the range of repertoires and 
claim-making used throughout the cycle.  
It is important to observe that although economic factors led to the emergence of the 
so-called movements of the crisis, the political responses around the world were heterogeneous 
and involved a plurality of actors and claims. Rather than treating the cases in this wave of 
contention as similar, I viewed them as being embedded within national dynamics. As such, 
more than focusing on the transversal and transnational features of protest, in this thesis I have 
instead aimed to look in detail to the particularities of each country in their responses to 
austerity.  
 In this way, I have pursued two main ideas concerning political processes in Spain and 
Portugal. Firstly, even if the movements of the crisis were a consequence of the Great 
Recession, the collective reactions to the financial collapse were more complex and were not 
restricted to social movements. Secondly, to fully grasp the spectrum of reactions and the 
contentious assemblages against austerity, the entire cycle of contention must be examined. 
Instead of analysing one-off events and protest actors, I undertook an integrated analysis of the 
sequence of events, the opportunity structures, the interactions between actors, both 
institutional and non-institutional, and their multiple claims (economic, social and political). 
This entailed a processual and relational analysis, one that brings to the fore a very different 
picture from those provided by other researchers: social movements were not the only actors 
to contest austerity and market liberalisation, and the nature of the political field in which they 
act is crucial to understanding how change was brought about. 
Finally, with regard to the connections between capitalism and contention, it is 
important to realise that different temporalities help us to situate the different aspects of 
mobilisation into the broader cycle. On this point, Della Porta (2015, 2017) posits the existence 
of three temporalities to which we should pay attention, namely, short, middle and long term. 
My analytical framework has made possible a granular analysis and comparison of two 
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episodes of contention that result from short-term changes in capitalism and the development 
of the crisis. 
 
8.1. Contesting Austerity: A Summary  
In this thesis, three initial chapters outlined the context, framework, and methods that 
underpinned the subsequent four empirical chapters. Even though these chapters followed a 
chronological order and processual logic, their organisation was also to a certain extent 
thematic. This is because each phase brought its own sets of issues, repertoires and actors. In 
this sense, the chapters translate the idea of the cycle of protest, broken down into its different 
stages, from the initial mobilisations, through to peak protests and institutionalisation.  
 With regard to the background of the cycle, viewed in terms of previous mobilisations 
and the wider political landscape since the transition to democracy in Portugal and Spain this 
was reconstituted on the basis of secondary data, the relevant research literature, interviews. 
The objective was two-fold: on the one hand, I wanted to contextualise the cases historically, 
but on the other, there was a need to test claims that movements of the crisis are spontaneous 
or novel. And indeed, the findings of this study show that many of the characteristics of the 
contentious actors involved in the mobilisations in the period studied were not new. They had 
existed for some time. Even if the turning points (GaR and 15M) constituted an explosive 
moment “coming out of nowhere”, they incorporated many of the features of previous 
mobilisations.  
To some extent, the key findings of the chapter - Preludes to Mobilisation - show that 
the political dynamics that came to define the anti-austerity cycle of protest were established 
in the early 2000s. In Portugal, the emergence of the BE transformed the party system, and it 
also influenced movements. Due to its initial movement-party nature, it came to influence and 
shape the protest field. This was especially relevant in the case of the grievances regarding 
labour precarity: groups associated with the BE formed platforms against precarity that were 
central in the anti-austerity cycle of protest. In Spain the decentralised and autonomous network 
of movements, which was detached from institutional actors, would later form the core of the 
anti-austerity actions. The network espoused a discursive repertoire, critical of the regime and 
favourable to participatory democracy – which, again, was already in place in the mid-2000s. 
As such, it is possible to detect the development of actions and relationships between actors 
before the cycle of protest that help to explain many features of protest mobilisations between 
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2010 to 2014. These results are clearly opposed to any idea of spontaneity and novelty in the 
social movements.  
As for the following phases, at the turning points of the cycle of protest in each country, 
I compare the emergence of social movements in 2011. I show how these came to redefine the 
protest field, and explore why the cases followed different paths. While in Spain the 15M 
produced mobilisations consistently for almost three years, in Portugal such protest movements 
that existed never recurred with comparable frequency. The main difference at the turning 
points was the diverging capacity of the movements to involve people beyond their core 
activists – to extend their mobilisations beyond their usual activist networks. In Spain the 15M 
expanded their actions to those who were not typically engaged in such activities, whilst in 
Portugal – and despite multiple attempts – the movements recruited few new people.  
 While in Spain the discursive repertoire and organisational practices were open and 
part a variety of different groups that fiercely critiqued the existing political parties, trade 
unions and institutions, in Portugal this type of claim-making and organisation never gained 
ground with protest instead focused on labour precarity. In addition, the connective structure – 
the network and links between different individuals and groups – also mattered. In Spain 15M’s 
decentralisation of activities to neighbourhoods appeared to increase their mobilisation 
capacity due to a pre-existing network of groups and activists at the local level who were able 
to mobilise their resources in new directions. The opposite transpired in Portugal.  Even though 
there were efforts, the assemblies created around Lisbon remained insular, not being able to 
win over new members.  
As the cycle of protest progressed, between 2012–2013, claims evolved from 
representation to redistribution. I argue that as austerity persisted, protest dynamics changed 
and evolved. Claims on representation increasingly gave way to claims about redistribution, 
concerning labour, education, healthcare and housing. This was particularly evident in Spain 
where overlapping dynamics were led by a coalition of actors that involved social movements 
and trade unions. Movements were not subjugated by institutional actors and reflected a 
bottom-up type of mobilisation. The protest dynamics spurred by the 15M lasted for three years 
and entailed the collaboration of several types of actor at different phases of the cycle of 
contention. Since most institutional actors were delegitimized due to their previous 
support/advocacy of austerity policies, they were not able to mobilise as strongly as social 
movements. In a second stage, this compelled trade unions to collaborate with movements after 
the turning point (2011). If the movements provided legitimacy, the trade unions would provide 
the resources to sustain them.  
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Nothing comparable happened in Portugal. After a period of movement void at the 
beginning of 2012 – a moment in which social movement actors disappear – a strategic alliance 
between parties, trade unions and some movement groups connected to institutional actors, 
came to dominate the field and advocate focused redistribution. Claims for democratic 
representation were never dominant in Portugal, and by 2012 it was only visible amongst fringe 
groups of marginal significance to the anti-austerity dynamics. In this sense, after 2012, 
Portugal was dominated by institutional actors: trade unions disputed austerity in the streets, 
and political parties, particularly the BE, through groups associated with them, influenced the 
social movements’ mobilisations. Even if social movement actors were relevant in specific 
moments of the cycle, it was institutional actors – in the form of trade unions and political 
parties – who were the protagonists. Social movement actors were never able to sustain 
mobilisation in a continuous way, emerging only at particular moments within the structure of 
opportunities. 
In analysing these two phases, I developed a critique of the “excessive” focus in the 
literature upon social movements as such. The cycle of contention was more complex, with the 
relations between institutional and non-institutional actors at its core. Furthermore, claim-
making went beyond the merely economic to include demands for a more transparent and fully 
participatory democracy, with various conceptions of democracy and citizenship rights 
deployed throughout the cycle of contention by its constituent actors.  
Lastly, I dealt with the outcomes of the cycles of protest and the emergence of new 
political forces. It is important to stress here that the dynamics observed throughout 2010–2014 
were central to the transformations that emerged in the party system, and especially on the left 
during the electoral cycle of 2014–2015. Nevertheless, in both countries, the transformations 
in the party system did not result solely from social movement actions but from ongoing 
dynamics within the existing left-wing parties. In Spain, Podemos benefited not only from an 
opening in the opportunity structures and discourses created by social movements throughout 
the cycle, but also from the dynamics within the IU. For several years, a younger generation 
had pressed for renewal of the party. If only the IU had resolved its internal disputes and given 
voice to this younger generation, it could have benefited from the general and widespread 
discontentment with the mainstream parties. In Portugal, the weakness of the emerging 
movements was related to the lack of success of new parties. Instead, the project of 
transforming the left involved a broader alliance between already existing parties rather than 
the creation of new ones. This comparison reinforces the idea that different models of 
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mobilisation and of the transformation of the party system operated in the two countries. In 
Spain, movements led to its change, whilst in Portugal these were absorbed by the already 
existing institutions. 
Throughout this investigation, I have endeavoured to show that the anti-austerity 
dynamics of contention in each country reflect two different and contrasting models concerning 
the relationship between actors and their discursive repertoires. In Portugal it is centralised and 
top-down. In Spain there is greater autonomy between institutional actors and mobilisations 
from below.  
So why did the cycle of protest and outcomes differ? Returning to the debates I outlined 
at the outset, a first answer has to do with the different impacts of the crisis in both countries – 
primarily, the crisis leading to more unemployment and emigration in Spain than in Portugal. 
Nonetheless, the political conditions were similar: in the context of the Eurozone crisis, 
austerity was started in 2010 by the ruling socialist parties in each country. These parties lost 
the general elections and were supplanted by right-wing majorities that continued down the 
path of austerity. Therefore, the main difference between these countries’ responses to austerity 
has to do with the configurations of contentious actors. In this sense, the trajectory of protest 
followed in each country was not pre-determined but rather based on the relations in the field. 
This has an important implication: that the political field mediates contentious responses to 
austerity. This goes some way towards explaining why in Portugal we find no new political 
party but rather a reconfiguration of the field. It is to the details of this novel contribution to 
the field of protest studies that we now turn. 
 
8.2. Contributions and Future Research 
This study deep analysis of the political processes in Spain and Portugal also speaks to further 
issues about the relationships between austerity, political crises, social mobilisation and 
change. It also suggests avenues for future research.  
In Spain and Portugal, it is important to notice that the crisis in the “reanimated” the 
SEC field of studies. Given the commonalities and differences between the countries during 
the crisis, it brought back discussions regarding the impact of the transition in shaping 
institutions, democracy and the answers to the crisis. In this sense, this dissertation provides 
empirical evidence to inform the ongoing debates, continuities and changes in the political 
sphere and democracy in the southern European countries are opening up avenues to 
understand the non-institutional side of democracy and how these came to transform 
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institutions. In contrast to many past analyses that have tended to focus on institution building 
after the transition to democracy, this study highlights the important role played by civil society 
in relation to the State. 
In these two cases, the findings show that political transformations were not driven 
solely by the economic and financial crises, but also stemmed from the actions of political 
agents on the ground. The contrast between the two countries seems to point to two different 
models (or ideal types) of mobilisation, each treatin the political sphere as an arena where 
movements and institutional actors interact. The first may be termed top-down, and the second 
bottom-up. This enlightens us not only about how cycles of protest unfold, but also about how 
the different configurations and arrangements in the two countries led/produced different 
outcomes.  
 This research began from a Polanyian interpretation of the crisis and of austerity as 
reflecting a planned liberalisation movement whereby spontaneous counter-movements of 
protection appear. Nonetheless, if the Polanyian framework aids understanding of the triggers 
of protest, it cannot explain fully the shape and nature of the counter-movements. To chart how 
these developed, I therefore proposed an updated version of contentious politics that 
emphasises the plurality of actors and claim-making throughout the cycle, in order to contrast 
it with approaches that focus on a single event or group.  
From this, I proposed viewing the interactions between different types of actor as the 
principal factor shaping the evolution of cycles of contestation. These two case studies show 
that we need to reconsider the relations between social movements and institutional actors. 
These relations are not one-directional, such as from movements to parties, but instead go both 
ways and involve different types of relations: the control of social movements by political 
parties through satellite actors, or the formation of hybrid actors such as the Mareas in Spain. 
Actors are not stable or fixed, but instead are embedded in a field of action. It follows that in 
addition to a cyclical model that considers the sequence of events, the researcher must also 
consider how both sets of actor influence how the cycle unfolds.  
This idea has yet to be fully developed in the discipline of political sociology. In the 
future, I hence intend to explore and develop this line of work alongside a consideration of 
current developments in social movement theory, of which a dominant strand pursues the 
relational turn that was established with the contentious politics approach – and hence makes 
use of terms such as field or arena. The power relations between actors, their historical 
underpinnings and trajectory, and regime building is a potentially productive way to bring 
together the literatures on social movements, political parties, and institutions into an coherent 
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theory – what might be termed regimes of contention. Whilst not unrelated to the concept of 
political regimes, it is substantially different. Its potential usefulness lies in the due emphasis 
it gives to the role that contention plays within particular institutions, while being sensitive 
simultaneously to the reality that these institutions frame protests in terms of relations between 
actors, symbols and resources. Furthermore, contentious politics tends to be based on the 
premise that different types of political regimes lead to different forms of contention. In so 
doing, this approach often fails to acknowledge the range of conditions that can emerge within 
democratic or authoritarian regimes, such as the different models of contestation that exist in 
Portugal and Spain, despite both being democracies. Research on these lines would be directed 
mainly towards elucidating the ways contention develops in particular political regimes and in 
what way the position of actors vis-à-vis each other and the state express different discursive 
repertoires and interests. 
 With respect to future research, this dissertation can be thought to contribute to the 
foundation for further work on the post-2015 reconfiguration in these two countries. The period 
during which mobilisations against austerity occured might constitute a critical juncture and 
could illuminate how political dynamics will come to develop in the future as it sets the tone 
for what comes after. In both countries, this means a weakened Socialist Party reliant on 
support from stronger left-wing parties, fighting over the meaning of austerity and how far 
budgets can be stretched while remaining within the constraints of the Eurozone. 
 One interesting question is to what extent the cycle of protest came to change the 
relations between non-institutional and institutional actors. Was the creation of Podemos 
detrimental to social movements? In what way did the involvement of left-wing parties with a 
parliamentary pact in Portugal open the way for alternative movements to contest the current 
government in Portugal? Or are the same types of relationship still in place in both countries, 
even whilst the protagonists have changed?  
 Another important consideration is the extent to which this model of the relationship 
between actors and political change pertains beyond the European periphery. Even though the 
crisis was more intense in the periphery, it was also felt in the core countries of the EU. In what 
ways were movements accommodated by the institutions in such countries? How are southern 
and northern countries comparable? An unusual and potentially illuminating case of the 
relations between institutional and non-institutional actors would be the transformation of the 
Labour Party in the UK under Jeremy Corbyn. A long-time backbencher with the support of a 
wider grassroots movement, Corbyn was able to bring change from within. This case would 
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appear to reflect a different model that should be added to our approach, and perhaps especially 
after 2015. 
Finally, as with all research, this work too has its limitations. First of these is the absence 
of an analysis of the nationalist dynamics regarding Catalonia and how these interacted with 
the anti-austerity mobilisations in Spain. This is worthy of its own detailed analysis, which is 
absent here only because it would have expanded the project far beyond the capabilities of this 
researcher. A second limitation relates to the discursive dimension of this investigation. Even 
though I have tried to develop a perspective in which claim-making was central, this position 
was still dependent on the configurations found between actors and relatively scarce attention 
was paid to an analysis of the frames developed. Third, focusing strictly on the national level 
has meant neglecting the potential transnational diffusion of frames:  how the frames   travelled 
from one country to the other. These are not closed cases and one can observe a degree of 
interaction that future work in this area might be well-advised to take into account.  
In this dissertation, I therefore hope to have shown that protest is more than merely an 
expression of disarray and dissatisfaction, and instead has significant institutional roots that 
have important consequences for the political process. Protests illuminate wider political power 
arrangements, making them a perfect observation point from which the structures of modern 
democratic politics can be apprehended. They drive political change, because they generate 
discourses and associations that influence institutional politics. These contributions will be of 
interest not only to the growing field of contentious politics and social movements, but also to 
the study of democracy’s non-institutional aspects, and the impact of crises, helping us to better 
understand contemporary political life. 
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Appendix I - Chronology  
In this chronology I have systematized important political, economic and protest events 
between 2007 to 2015. This timeline allows to go beyond mere quantification and understand 
more broadly the structure of political opportunities and threats at a given moment comprising 
institutional episodes (e.g. government resignation or crisis), austerity measures (e.g. 
Memoranda of Understanding in Portugal) and international events such as Monti’s ‘whatever 
it takes’ declaration in July 2012. In addition, I have identified both small episodes and 
campaigns of contention and eventful and transformative protest events. On the former, it is 
important to consider a qualitative interpretation of the data that goes beyond the quantitative 
reading of the PEA. Moreover, due to its symbolic character, large protest events constitute 
critical moments of contention that influence and shape institutional action. To build this 
timeline I have mobilized multiple resources from research being done on the topic, 
newspapers, but also interviews and data collected during fieldwork.  
 Portugal Spain Europe/World 
Month 2007 
1  Demonstration against ETA in Madrid 
(150000); 80000 in Bilbao 
January to March - Campaign of 
Demonstrations against the Zapatero 
Government for the negotiations with 
ETA supported by PP and AVT (from 
60.000 to 340.000) 
 
2    
3    
4    
5 General Strike (CGTP) against 
the ongoing labour reform 
  
6    
7  Week of protests by Rompamos el 
Silencio 
Subprime Mortgage burst 
starting a period of recession 
in the USA that would lead to 
financial instability and bank 
bailouts in the following year ( 
Great recession) 
8    
9  UPyD is created (Rosa Díez as leader)  
10  Housing protest in Madrid with the 
slogan No Vas a tener casa en la puta 
vida 
 
11 State Budget for 2008 approved; 
General Strike in the Public 
Sector (both from CGTP and 
UGT) against the Government’s 
unwillingness to negotiate wage 
increases. 
Gürtel Case investigation starts 
(corruption case involving the PP) 
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12  Espacio Alternativo leaves IU and forms 
Anticapitalistas; Housing and banking 
crisis starts  
 
 2008 
1   
 
 
 
2    
3 FENPROF, teachers 
demonstration against new 
regulations (100000 in Lisbon)  
PSOE wins elections; Zapatero as 
President of the Government for a 2nd 
term; PSOE wins elections in Andalucía 
 
4    
5  Students strike and demonstration 
against the Bologna Treaty (that kept 
going throughout the year) 
 
6 Demonstration by CGTP against 
the Labour reform (200000); 
Truck Drivers strike almost 
paralyses the country  
  
7    
8    
9   Beginning of the Great 
Recession, after bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers. USA 
government bailouts several 
banks and the financial system 
to avoid the crisis to spread. 
10   German, Dutch, Belgian and 
British governments give 
support to banks in an 
approach that in Europe 
followed public investment. 
11 Labour Reform is approved; 
Bankruptcy of BPP and bailout 
by the Government; FENPROF, 
teachers demonstration against 
new regulations (125000 in 
Lisbon); Bankruptcy of BPN and 
nationalisation by the 
Government 
Refundación de la Izquierda - project 
approved by IU to renew the left project 
in Spain to which other forces came to 
join 
 
12  Fusion of regional savings banks, which 
created Bankia 
 
 2009 
1 Government announces several 
policies of investment and a 
Robin Wood tax to alleviate the 
middle class 
Creation of the PAH in Catalonia German Government presents 
a new plan to support banks. 
2   
3 General Strike (one Trade Union 
- CGTP) against the labour code 
+ Demonstration (200000); 
Public workers general strike  
Regional elections in the Basque 
Country, the PSE wins; Regional 
elections in Galicia, the PP wins; 
 
4   After months of protest of the 
‘Pots and Pans Revolution’ in 
Iceland against the banks and 
governmental managements of 
the financial crisis, the country 
elects a new left-wing 
government. 
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5 Teachers protest in Lisbon 
(between 55-70000 protestors) 
  
6 European Parliament Elections - 
the PSD wins with 31,71% 
European Parliament Elections - the PP 
wins with 42,12% 
European Parliament 
Elections. 
7  Week of protests by Rompamos el 
Silencio 
 
8    
9 National Elections, the PS wins 
but loses majority previously 
held 
  
10 Municipal/Local Elections - 
Socialist Party gets ahead 
regarding the number of 
municipalities controlled 
Demonstrations against the Abortion 
law reform (250000) 
PASOK wins early elections 
in Greece. 
11    
12 Financial rating cut by agencies Budget for 2010 incorporates first 
austerity measures; Manifesto with 
50.000 signatures against Sinde Law 
Greek plan to cut deficit after 
discovering a higher deficit 
than expected; rating agencies 
pressure both Greece and 
Portugal. 
 2010 
1 Privatisation of one of the bailout 
banks (BPN); government 
launches investment plan; first 
signs that the government wants 
to reduce deficit; CDS helps PS 
approving the budget for 2010 
Spain launches an austerity package; 
Compromís is created in Community of 
Valencia as a political coalition between 
Bloc Nacionalista Valencià, Iniciativa 
del Poble Valencià and Greens to run in 
the upcoming elections of 2011; 
Demonstration Galicia (Contra o 
Decretazo do Galego - 40000; 
Queremos Galego, parties and trade 
unions) 
Greece announces a ‘Stability 
and Growth’ plan backed by 
the EU, unleashing strong 
protests in the following 
months. 
 
 
2 Suspension of infrastructures 
investment is announced 
  
3 1st austerity package for 2010-
2013 approved in Parliament 
with abstention of the PSD (main 
opposition party); General Strike 
by both Trade Unions in the 
public sector (UGT and CGTP); 
pressure from rating agencies 
continues; new leadership in the 
PSD (Pedro Passos Coelho); 
Budget revised and with more 
austerity measures (Abstention of 
PSD and CDS) 
  
4 European Commission says that 
ongoing austerity is not enough; 
interest rates rise; new austerity 
package negotiated between the 
PS and the PSD.  
 Negotiations for Greece’s 
Bailout plan start, being 
approved a month after. 
5 2nd austerity Package (PEC II) - 
approved the following month; 
PCP proposes a vote of no 
confidence to the government, 
which was rejected with 
abstention of the PSD and the 
Spanish Government approves an 
austerity plan with 5% wage cuts to 
public workers - extraordinary measures 
to reduce public spending; Plataforma 
Queremos Galego protests in Galicia; 
General Strike in the Basque Country; 
Emergency fund created by 
the EU; Austerity plan in Italy.  
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CDS-PP; Demonstration by the 
Public Sector Unions (CGTP + 
UGT) (300000) 
Last week of protests by Rompamos el 
Silencio 
6  Labour Reform; Constitutional Court 
revokes the Statute of Autonomy 
approved in 2006; General Strike in the 
whole country; General Strike in the 
Basque Country 
EU demands structural 
reforms to Portugal and Spain. 
7  Demonstration in Barcelona against the 
decision of the Constitutional Court 
about the Statute of Autonomy (1 
million) 
Rating agencies pressure 
Ireland 
8    
9 New austerity package 
announced (approved in 
November) - PEC3; Government 
announces cuts in public sector 
wages 
General strike (CCOO, UGT, CGT) in 
Spain to protest against cuts, retirement 
age, pension freezes and Labour Reform 
(1st in 8 years); ETA announces the end 
of their attacks 
 
10   
 
 
11 General Strike by both Trade 
Unions (UGT and CGTP) against 
the wage cuts to public sector 
workers announced by the 
government; Budget approved 
with abstention of the main 
opposition party (PSD) 
PAH lauches their campaign Stop 
Desahucios; Elections in Catalonia (CiU 
wins);  
 
Ireland asks for external 
intervention (Bailout). 
 
12  December - budget for 2011 approved; Beggining of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ with Tunisia revolt, 
which spreads quickly to other 
countries in the Mediterranean 
basin. Argelia follows the 
same path by the end of the 
month. 
 2011 
1 Cavaco Silva reelected as 
President; European pressures for 
a Bailout 
General Strike against the pensions 
reform organized by the ELA, LAB, 
CIG, CGT and the CNT 
in Catalonia, Galicia, Basque 
Country and Navarra. 
Protests start in Jordan, Oman, 
Egypt, Yemen 
2  Creation of Juventud Sin Futuro and 
Democracia Real, Ya! 
Protests in Libya, Kuwait, 
Morocco, Lebanon, Syria,  
3 Vote of no confidence by the BE 
to the government (abstention of 
PSD and CDS); 4th austerity 
package is presented by the 
government not having enough 
support in Parliament to be 
approved; Government resigns; 
Geração à Rasca Protest all over 
the country against precarity 
(500000); José Sócrates re-
elected as leader of PS 
  
4 External intervention is asked by 
the government and negotiations 
with Troika begin - PSD and 
CDS participate, but BE and PCP 
refuse 
Zapatero announces that he will not 
stand for re-election; Juventud Sin 
Futuro organizes their first protest 
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5 Bailout approved and signed; 
Acampada do Rossio in solidarity 
with 15M in Spain (lasts 3 
weeks); CGTP demo (65000) 
15M emerges in Spain lasting for 
several months camped in several 
squares across the country, large 
demonstrations; PSOE loses local 
Elections 
 
6 National Elections, new 
government (coalition between 
the PSD and the CDS-PP); Rui 
Tavares breaks with the BE and 
joins the Greens in European 
Parliament 
Protest blocks Catalan Parliament; 
Demonstration against he 
Euroagreement (global action) 
‘Haircut’ in Greece; Mario 
Draghi is nominated out as 
President of the European 
Central Bank. 
7 Additional measures of austerity 
announced; António José Seguro 
elected as new Leader of the PS 
Comunidad de Madrid announces cuts 
in the Education leading to the begin of 
mobilisation in the sector (Marea Verde) 
European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) created by the EU; 
New bailout to Greece. 
8  Summer: decentralization and formation 
of the 15M local assemblies 
Riots in UK. 
 
9 1st evaluation changes the MoU – 
additional measures of austerity 
announced; Constitutional Court 
approves measures after some 
MPs asked for those to be revised 
Budget equilibrium inscribed in the 
Constitution in Spain (Constitutional 
Reform); Marea Verde start their 
campaign of mobilisation with protests 
and strikes 
New austerity package in 
Italy; Occupy Wall Street in 
New York (USA) starting a 
wave of protests all over the 
country. 
10 PM announces more cuts on the 
Christmas and Holidays 
allowance for public workers; 
Global Demonstration (100000); 
Big demonstration CGTP 
(130000) 
Global Action Day Demonstration; ETA 
declares the official end of their 
activities. 
 
 
11 General Strike by both Trade 
Unions (UGT and CGTP) against 
the measures announced by the 
PM in the previous month; 
Demonstration by Public Workers 
Trade Unions (190000); Budget 
for 2012 approved 
The PP wins national elections in Spain 
(biggest majority in 25 years) 
Government of National Unity 
in Greece. 
12 PM suggests that the Golden 
Rule to block deficits should be 
inscribed in the Constitution; 
Ruptura/Fer leaves the BE and 
later forms Movimento 
Alternaiva Socialista (MAS)  
  
 2012 
1 Social Concertation Agreement 
between UGT and Patronal 
Confederation reducing 
unemployment benefits, holidays 
and collective negotiation rights; 
Troika insists on the TSU 
measure that would the private 
sector contribution to social 
security while increasing the 
workers; 15O Protest - confronts 
with far-right. 
Deal for employment and collective 
negotiation signed by the CEOE, UGT 
and CCOO 
 
 
 
2 CGTP Demonstration Government announces Labour Reform; 
Valencian Spring (students’ protest); 
Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba becomes 
PSOE leader; 
Greece gets a 2nd bailout. 
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3 General Strike and demonstration 
(100000) by CGTP in response to 
the January social concertation 
agreement, confrontations 
between the protesters and the 
PSP in Largo do Chiado; 
Amending budget is approved; 
General Srike + Demonstrations against 
the Labour reform; Elections in 
Andalucia, PP wins with relative 
majority, but PSOE and IU pact to get 
into government; 
Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance 
in the Economic and Monetary 
Union. 
4 Portugal is the 1st country to 
ratify the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary 
Union; Fontinha School in 
Oporto is occupied 
Schism in DRY 
 
 
5 Global Spring ‘Manifesto para 
uma Esquerda Livre’ is launched 
(this group would later join CDA 
and found a new party LIVRE); 
A building in São Lazaro 
(Lisbon) is occupied;  
Anniversary of 15M; Global Spring; 
General Strike of the Education sector; 
Miners’ protests; 
 
6 Vote of No Confidence by PCP 
to the right-wing coalition 
government; 
Nationalization of Bankia; Bankia starts 
to be investigated; 200000 demonstrate 
in Madrid against the cuts in social right 
by the government 
 
7 Constitutional Court considers 
cuts on the Christmas and 
Holidays allowances proposed by 
the government unconstitutional 
(OE 2012) 
Spain gets assistance from the ESM to 
address financial sector and banks 
issues; Government announces extra 
austerity measures + help different 
regions to pay their debt; CCOO and 
UGT create Cumbre Social 
New Democracy (center-right) 
wins elections in Greece; 
Mario Draghi announces that 
the ECB will do ‘whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro’ 
8    
9 Additional measures announced 
(TSU) but retreat after a national 
demonstration, governmental 
crisis and presidential 
intervention through a State 
Council; 1st demonstration by 
QSLT (1 million people); 
Demonstration at Conselho de 
Estado (10000); Demonstration 
by Trade Union (CGTP) 
(300000) - Terreiro do Povo; 
September-December has been 
called Hot Autumn 
Diada (Catalonia); 1st and 2nd Rodea al 
Congresso in Madrid with violence and 
arrested people 
 
10 Vote of no confidence by PCP; 
Demonstration for Culture in 
Lisbon (QSLT) (100000); ‘Siege’ 
to the Parliament is called by 
more autonomist groups; CDA 
meets for the first time 
Plan Lasquetty is announced (cuts in the 
health sector in Madrid); Regional 
elections in Galicia and Basque Country 
- Pablo Iglesias and Inigo Errejón as 
advisors in the campaign in Galicia; 
PNV wins; 3rd Rodeo al Congreso 
 
11 European General Strike (in 
Portugal against the new budget) 
- ends with a police charge; PS 
votes against the budget for 
2013; Franscisco Louçã leaves 
the coordination of the BE 
European General Strike; Elections in 
Catalonia (CiU - Artur Mas elected 
president); Marea Blanca emerges to 
contest the Madrid health policies 
(petitions, occupations, demonstrations, 
strikes) 
European General Strike: 
coordinated action between 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Cyprus. 
12    
 2013 
1 Return to the bond market 
 
Caso Barcenas starts to be judged; Party 
X is created 
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2  Marea Blanca protests in all country; 
Demonstrations against austerity and 
Rajoy; Demonstration Marea 
Ciudadana 
 
3 Demonstration against austerity 
(QSLT) which is preceded by a 
campaign of ‘Grandoladas’ 
(500000); Economic Growth 
Restarts 
PAH at the Congress - ILP (1.5 million 
signatures collected); escraches are 
carried against the politicians that refuse 
the ILP; 
Extension of adjustment 
programmes approved for 
Portugal, Ireland and Greece; 
Crisis and bailout to Cyprus. 
4 Vote of no confidence by the PS; 
Constitutional Court declares 
measures proposed at the 
OE2013 unconstitutional (one of 
the measures was the suspension 
of the holidays subsidies in the 
private sector) 
Demonstration by JSF - No nos vamos, 
nos echan 
 
 
5  First General Strike in Public Education 
against LOMCE (100000) 
 
6 General strike/Demonstration by 
Trade Union (CGTP and UGT) 
against austerity measures and 
cuts in the public sector; 
Demonstration against austerity 
(QSLT) - People’s Spring - 
Povos unidos contra a Troika; 
Amending budget; 
Alternativas desde Abajo meets in 
Madrid, convened and led by Izquierda 
Anticapitalista, to run 2015 local 
elections; at the same time IA would 
participate in the construction of 
Podemos 
 
7 Governmental crisis (resignation 
of coalition partner) which is 
solved in the end of the month 
with the coalition being 
redesigned after PR pushed for a 
Grand Coalition (PS, PSD, 
CDS); Vote of no confidence by 
the Greens 
  
8 Constitutional Court considers 
cuts proposed by the government 
unconstitutional; PM threats with 
a new bailout 
  
9 Mariana Mortágua replaces Ana 
Drago in Parliament 
Diada (Catalonia); Demonstration in 
Madrid defending public health systems; 
Demonstrations in Baleares against the 
ongoing education reform (110000) 
 
10 Local elections with PS winning 
more Municipalities; CGTP 
demonstration in Lisbon;  
2nd General Strike in the Education sector 
against LOMCE; Strike at Panrico 
(conflict lasts for more than a year); 
Demonstration against ETA by AVT 
(100000);  
11 Budget for 2014 approved; 
Public sector general strike 
(support from both trade unions) 
and demonstration (50000) 
1,7 million signatures are collected 
against LOMCE; Pro-life groups 
pressure government to change the 
abortion law; Cumbre Social 
demonstrates to defend the public 
services/goods; LOMCE approved; Ley 
Mordaza (Gag Law) approved;  
End of the bailout programme 
without additional assistance 
required in Ireland. 
12 Manifesto 3D for a convergence 
of the Left in the European 
Parliament elections is launched; 
Constitutional Court considers 
Protests against the new abortion law 
(Reforma Gallardon); Economic growth 
restarts 
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cuts proposed by the government 
unconstitutional  
 2014 
1 Standard and Poor's takes 
Portugal out of observation; BE, 
Greens and PCP ask for 
supervision of 2014 Budget; 
Convergence on the left fails; 
Strike at ‘Linha de Saúde 24’ 
(precarious health workers)   
Podemos is launched/created - it brings 
together a lot of people from the left say 
who (IA); IA leaves Alternativas desde 
Abajo and Colectivo en Rede is created 
by activists as an alternative; Plan 
Lasquetty is defeated (he resigns after 
Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid 
paralyzed the process); Protest in 
Burgos (Gamonal) against the redesign 
of street and public spaces - it spreads to 
other cities in the country; Strike at 
Coca-Cola in Madrid starts 
 
2    
3 LIVRE, new Left-Wing Party is 
created to run to the European 
Parliament Elections; ‘Manifesto 
dos 74’ for the restructuration of 
debt is launched 
A student strike starts with 
demonstrations in 50 cities. They 
protested against budget cuts in 
education, the LOMCE law, low quality 
of education and the dismissal of 
thousands of teachers: about 50 people 
were detained by police; Marchas por la 
Dignidad 
 
4 Separate celebrations of the 25th 
of April; Rios ao Carmo 
  
 
5 European Parliament Elections; 
End of the Bailout programme 
without additional assistance 
required; Constitutional Court 
declares measures proposed at 
the OE2014 unconstitutional 
European Elections; Podemos elects 5 
EMP 
European Parliament 
Elections. 
 
6  Manifesto Guayem Barcelona appealing 
to build up a tranversal candidancy to 
Barcelona (later they would change their 
name to Barcelona en Comú); Jornadas 
Municipalia in Madrid, that would 
change their name to Ganemos Madrid: 
King Juan Carlos I abdicate to his son 
Filipe - republican protests emerge as a 
result 
 
7 Fórum Manifesto leaves the BE; 
Constitutional Court approve 
CES (extraordinary contribution 
of solidarity)  
PSOE new leadership (Pedro Sanchez) 
 
 
8 Intervention in one of the main 
banks of Portugal (BES) (crisis 
started the months before) - as a 
consequence Novo Banco is 
created 
  
9 New leadership in the PS 
(António Costa) 
Reforma Gallardon Stops - he resigns 
and Rajoy takes the bill out; Diada 
(Catalonia) 
 
10 Minimum wage rises; Inquiry 
Comission do the BES starts and 
lasts until May 
Operácion Punica starts; Podemos holds 
their first and constitutive Citizens 
Assembly - VistaAlegre; Barcelona en 
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Comú makes an open day (jornadas) to 
produce an ethical code by consensus, 
all the parties from the left participate; 
corruption scandal Tarjetas Black comes 
to light  
11 BE convention: Catarina Martins 
remains the sole coordinator of 
the party; former PM José 
Socrates is arrested under the 
suspicion of corruption 
Referendum Catalonia; Ganemos 
Madrid makes their presentation 
 
12  Congress approves Ley Mordaza (starts 
in 2015); Tania Sanchez and Mauricio 
Valente win the primary elections in IU 
Madrid; 
 
 2015 
1  Ciudadanos starts emerging at national 
level; Ganemos and Podemos reach an 
agreement to create Ahora Madrid to 
run to municipal election; Marcha del 
Cambio (Podemos) (100000) 
Syriza wins the legislative 
elections in Greece and forms 
government. ECB starts 
Quantitative easing. 
2  After celebrating deals between the 
whole left in Catalonia (excluding PSC 
and CUP) Ada Colau presents her 
candidancy to Barcelona (Barcelona en 
Comú); Tania Sanchez leaves IU 
(Madrid) and launches Convocatoria 
Por Madrid; Alberto Garzon is chosen 
as IU’s candidate to the general election 
 
3 A new left-wing party called 
AGIR founded 
Ahora Madrid is lauched as a 
confluences of movements, associations 
and parties; 3rd edition Marchas por la 
Dignidad 
 
4    
5  Barcelona en Comú wins elections; 
Ahora Madrid is 2nd, but is elected with 
support of PSOE;  
 
6  Ahora en Común is created (later to the 
name is added Unidad Popular); IU 
(federal) decides to expel IUCM for 
corruption and obstacles to candidates 
(which leads to the creation of a new 
party at the regional level) 
 
7  Catalunya Sí que es Pot it is created to 
run to the upcoming regional elections 
in Catalonia integrating Equo, EUiA, 
ICS and Podem 
Bailout referendum in Greece: 
it was rejected by 61%.  
 
 
 
8   New MoU is agreed in 
Greece; Tsipras’ resigns and 
calls for snap elections in 
Greece. 
9  Diada (Catalonia); Elections in 
Catalonia - JxSi wins elections; 
Syriza wins the legislative 
elections in Greece and forms 
Government 
10 General Elections - right-wing 
coalition gets more votes, but left 
wing parties hold the majority in 
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parliament leading to a pact in 
the following months. 
11  En Marea (Galicia) is formed as an 
electoral coalition of Anova, Podemos 
and Esquerda Unida to run to the 
General elections in Galicia. Protest 
against gender violence 
 
12  General elections - no clear majority in 
Parliament and after months of impasse 
new elections are held in June 2016 
 
Sources: Observatório sobre Crisis e Alternativas (https://ces.uc.pt/observatorios/crisalt/);  
15Mpedia (https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Portada); El País; Diário de Notícias; Miley (2017);  
Portos (2016, 2017); Cruz (2013); Salmon (2017); Interviews and fieldwork observations; 
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Appendix II - Interviews 
Portugal 
Interviewee Groups 
1 Manifesto por Uma Esquerda Livre, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, 
Livre, Tempo de Avançar 
2 Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, Manifesto 3D, Fórum Manifesto, 
Tempo de Avançar 
3 Bloco de Esquerda, Fórum Manifesto, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, 
Tempo de Avançar 
4 Bloco de Esquerda, Fórum Manifesto, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, 
Tempo de Avançar 
5 Bloco de Esquerda, Manifesto por Uma Esquerda Livre, Congresso Democrático 
das Alternativas, Livre, Tempo de Avançar 
6 Bloco de Esquerda, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas 
7 Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, Fórum Manifesto 
8 (Raquel 
Freire)* 
Geração à Rasca, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas 
9 Partido Comunista Português 
10 Bloco de Esquerda, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas 
11 Bloco de Esquerda, Precários Inflexíveis 
12 Bloco de Esquerda, Autonomist Groups, Acampada, Geração à Rasca, Rios ao 
Carmo, 15 de Outubro 
13 Autonomist Groups, Acampada, 15 de Outubro, Rios ao Carmo 
14 Autonomist Groups, Acampada, 15 de Outubro 
15 Bloco de Esquerda, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses 
16 Partido Comunista Português, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses 
17 CGTP, Partido Comunista Português 
18 Partido Comunista Português, Que se Lixe a Troika, Juntos Podemos 
19 Que se Lixe a Troika, Juntos Podemos, Agir 
20 Que se Lixe a Troika 
21 Que se Lixe a Troika, Bloco de Esquerda, Acampada, 15O 
22 Autonomists, Police Violence 
23 Partido Socialista 
* The interviewee asked to be identified. 
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Spain 
Interviewee Groups 
1  15M 
2 15M, Autonomist and Ecologist groups 
3 15M, Mareas Ciudadanas, Asembleas de Barrio, Alternativas desde Abajo-
Ganemos-Ahora Madrid 
4 15M, Izquierda Unida, Feminists, Asembleas de Barrio, Ganemos-Ahora Madrid 
5 15M 
6 15M, Internet based action 
7 Marea Verde, Mareas Ciudadanas, Comissiones Obreras, Izquierda Unida, 15M 
8 Comissiones Obreras, Izquierda Unida, Anticapitalistas, Podemos 
9 Izquierda Unida, Convocatoria por Madrid, Podemos 
10 Unidad Popular/Izquierda Unida 
11 Partido Comunista Español, 15M 
12 Podemos 
13  Izquierda Unida, Anticapitalistas, Podemos 
14 Marea Blanca 
15 15M, PAH, Feminist groups, Alternativas desde Abajo-Ganemos-Ahora Madrid 
16 Podemos 
17 15M, Marea Blanca, Autonomist Groups 
18 15M, Autonomist Groups 
19 15M 
20 Ecologistas en Accion, 15M 
21 Podemos, Complutense Groups 
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Appendix III - Protest Event Analysis Codebook 
Introduction  
In this appendix I will define the main guidelines of the codebook of the protest event analysis 
I have conducted for this research. Despite being inspired in previous research, I have adapted 
the codebook to the objectives at hand. 
What constitutes an event? Procedures and delimitation 
One of the main issues that emerged during the coding process was the delimitation of what 
constitutes an event. The main question that arose was if particular events constituted multiple 
or single events. The following questions emerged: 
1. If a protest event extents across time without gaps, does that constitute an event or 
several? In the same vein, if there are gaps, but they are coordinated is it one or several 
events? 
2. A protest happening in different locations simultaneously with one organizers 
constitute an event or several? 
3. What if there is a protest that is coordinated across time, but in different locations? 
It is possible to observe three variables that are pivotally and involved in this delimitation: 
actor, time and space. The first logical consequence of this is that whenever a different actor 
organises an event this constitutes a different event. As such, the real question here is how 
space and time change for the same organization. I took into account the following: 
Same Actor Time continuity 
No Yes 
Space 
continuity 
No Different events, e.g.: demo or strike 
in different time or space 
Different events, e.g.: coordinated 
demonstrations that last several days in a 
row but that the locations are different 
Yes Different events, e.g.: strike or 
demonstrations that happens in the 
same place, but across time in a 
coordinated way 
Same event, e.g.: strike or sit-down that lasts 
several days in a row 
 
Data Collection and Coding Process 
Regarding the data collection no sampling was done: instead of selecting various days per 
week, I have collected all the data concerning protest events taking into consideration the 
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definition of event, claims, actors and period. This involved going through the online daily 
archives of each newspapers to collide all of the articles concerning protest events into a single 
document to code them into the database. The coding followed a codebook (next section) with 
clear definition of the variables, but that was refined and improved throughout the coding 
process. The coding process followed two stages: (1) reading each article, summing up all the 
information to a excel spreadsheet with the terms used by the newspapers; (2) this information 
was standardised following the codebook and transferred to SPSS. 
Codebook 
The codebook was organised considering the four dimensions defined in the methods chapter: 
(1) time and space; (2) actors; (3) claims and issues; (4) modes of protest.  
Variable name Description Measurament 
Origins of the Information 
Event code Code of each event  
Number of sources Number of newspaper articles reporting 
the protest 
 
Time and Space 
Country 
 
(1) Portugal; (2) Spain 
Year, Half-Year, Three 
Months and Month 
Different variables that allow for the 
measurement of when the event 
happened 
Year - 2009 to 2015 
Half-Year - 2009(1) to 2015(2) 
Three Months - 2009(1) to 2015(4) 
Month - 2009(1) to 2015(12) 
Location Portugal Location of the Event in Portugal (1) National; (2) Disperse; (3) 
Lisbon Area; (4) North; (5) Center; 
(6) Algarve; (7) Alentejo; (8) 
Madeira & Açores 
Location Spain Location of the Event in Spain (1) Andalucia; (2) Aragon; (3) 
Asturias; (4) Baleares; (5) 
Canarias; (6) Cantabria; (7) 
Castilla y Leon; (8) Castilla-La 
Mancha; (9) Catalonia; (10) 
Comunidad Madrid; (11) 
Comunidad Valenciana; (12) 
Disperse; (13) Extremadura; (14) 
Galicia; (15) La Rioja; (16) 
Melilla; (17) Navarra; (18) Pais 
Vasco; (19) Region de Murcia; (20) 
National; 
Actors 
Actors 
- Social Movements and civil 
society 
- Labour and Trade Unions 
- Political Parties 
Three variables that indicate who was 
involved in the organisation of the protest  
(1) Organiser; (2) Not an organiser 
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Other actors support 
- Social Movements and civil 
society 
- Labour and Trade Unions 
- Political Parties 
Three variables that indicate who was 
supported the protest 
  
(1) Supporter; (2) Not a supporter 
Claims and Issues 
Economic 
- Austerity 
- Work 
- Consumers 
- Producer 
 
Political 
- Representation and 
Participation 
- State and Inclusion 
- International Relations 
 
Social 
- Education 
- Health 
- Housing 
- Other 
 
Cultural 
- Identity Politics 
- Neiborhood, Urban Issues and 
Environment 
- Other  
Variables that indicate the presence of 
these claims and issues in the protest 
(1) Present; (2) Not Present 
Modes of Protest 
Repertoire  Type of Action (1) Demonstration/march; (2) 
Strikes (3) Disruptive (e.g. 
Occupation, Boycott); (4) Written 
Demands (e.g. Manifesto, Petition) 
Target Portugal To who are the protests directed (1) Government; (2) Parliament; 
(3) Prime Minister; (4) 
Minister/Ministeries; (5) Local 
Authorithies; (6) 
Banks/Company/Business; (7) 
Society; (8) International Actors; 
(9) President 
Target Spain To who are the protests directed (1) Government; (2) Parliament; 
(3) Prime Minister; (4) 
Minister/Ministeries; (5) Local 
Authorithies; (6) 
Banks/Company/Business; (7) 
Society; (8) International Actors; 
(9) King; (10) Regional 
Government 
Place  Place where the protest happened (1) NA; (2) Public Space; (3) 
Official building/public 
infrastructure (inside or in front of); 
(4) Private company/location 
(inside or in front of); (5) Other 
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Length Number of days the event lasted (1) 1 day or less; (2) 2-5 days; (3) 
>5 days 
Violence If there was violence during the event (1) Yes; (2) No 
 
